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Abstract 
 
The study focuses on the admissibility and assessment of economic expertise 
in EC competition law litigation. I start by exploring the broader issues raised 
by the integration of economic expertise in litigation: in particular the risk of 
moral hazard and adverse selection because of the epistemic asymmetry 
between judges and experts and expert bias. The analysis of these problems 
will bring me to the question of the conception of science and of the relations 
between science and law that underpins the concept of scientific expertise 
and, more specifically, economic expertise. I will then identify the extent of the 
problem of epistemic asymmetry and expert bias by looking to the degree and 
the locus of the intrusion of economic analysis in competition cases. I will 
explore the instruments, procedural and substantive, employed by the legal 
system, in order to mitigate the risks flowing from the epistemic asymmetry 
and expert bias claims. First, I will highlight the different institutional and 
procedural frameworks that were adopted at the European Union level and in 
some selected member states in order to integrate economic expertise in 
litigation. My objective will be to understand how these institutional solutions 
may address each of the identified problems. Second, I will look to 
“substantive” law approaches in the adjudication of expertise, such as the 
development of specific standards for the admissibility and the sufficiency of 
economic expertise in courts, as an alternative or as an additional option to 
deal with the challenges raised by economic expertise. The paper will 
conclude that the possible adverse effects of the epistemic asymmetry and 
expert bias between judges and experts are important concerns, but the 
current procedural/institutional and substantive legal framework governing 
economic expertise does not take sufficiently into account important concerns 
that are specific to economics and other social sciences, such as the 
preservation of the scientific “competition” in the supply of economic theory 
and consequently, methodological or assumptions-related pluralism in 
economic thought. In particular, I will argue against adopting specific 
standards of admissibility of economic expertise in Europe. This is a US 
context-specific solution which does not necessarily fit with the specific 
characteristics of the European legal system. It is also an approach that 
represents an outdated and partial view of the scientific as well as the judicial 
adjudication process. 
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1. Introduction 
 
“An Indian born economist once explained his personal theory of reincarnation 
to his graduate economic class: ‘if you are a good economist, a virtuous 
economist’ he said “you are reborn as a physicist. But if you are an evil, 
wicked economist, you are reborn as a sociologist”1. 
 
Jokes about economists abound lately.2 It is well known that political 
satire aims the great and the powerful. For the economists have become 
powerful and great in the world of competition law. The rise of economists as 
one of the main (some will advance the most important) actors of the antitrust 
law process during the last three decades, is well documented3. This is not 
only the case in United States antitrust law, where this phenomenon did first 
appear. Economists have also played a key role in EC competition law, in 
particular at the legislative level, by contributing to the design and the drafting 
of the new model of block exemption regulations reflecting economic thinking, 
following the adoption of the block exemption on vertical restraints in 19994, 
and the publication of numerous policy guidelines5. Likewise, their influence 
has been considerable in the administrative law enforcement of competition 
law. The European Commission and the national competition authorities 
increasingly employ economists6 and make extensive use of economic 
analysis in their decisions7, following in that the path of the US federal 
antitrust agencies. The influence of economists and economics in court 
proceedings has nevertheless been more limited8.  
                                            
1
 Paul Krugman, Peddling Prosperity: Economic Sense and Nonsense in the Age of 
Diminished Expectations (W. W. Norton & Company, 1994) at xi. 
2
 For some good specimens see, Gunnar Niels, “The Economist in Court: Guilty of Theories 
that don’t fit the facts”, (2007) Comp L Rev 358; Frederic Jenny, “Economic Experts Before 
Authorities and Courts Roundtable”, Chapter 26 in Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 615, at 
617-619;  
3
 E.g., Franklin Fisher, “Economic Analysis and ‘Bright-Line’ Tests”, (2007) Journal of 
Competition Law and Economics 129. 
4
 Commission Regulation (EC) 2790/99 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to 
vertical agreements and concerted practices, [1999] OJ L148/1 (currently under revision). 
5
 Starting with the Commission Notice on Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (hereinafter 
Vertical Restraints Guidelines) [2000] OJ C 291/1 (currently under revision). 
6
 Almost all national competition authorities in Europe have recruited economists in their 
different departments or have appointed a chief economist that reviews the economic 
soundness of their decisions. 
7
 See, e.g. Case COMP/38.784- Wanadoo España vs. Telefónica [2007] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/38784/dec_en.pdf , Part VIE, 
where the Commission examined empirical evidence in order to substantiate the 
anticompetitive effects of the alleged margin squeeze (although it an concluded that 
Telefónica's conduct has led to “significant consumer harm” (para 618), before qualifying the 
practice as being an abuse of a dominant position 
8
 Economic arguments have been examined by the Courts in recent cases, however, in the 
merger field (e.g. Case T-464/04, Impala v. Commission [2006] ECR II-2289; Case T-209/01, 
Honeywell International Inc v. Commission [2005] ECR II-5575; Case C-12/03 Commission v. 
Tetra Laval [2005] ECR I-987) as well as in antitrust (e.g. Case T-201/04 Microsoft v. 
Commission [2007] 5 CMLR 846; T-168/01, GlaxoSmithKline Unlimited v Commission [2006] 
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Economics and economists may influence decision making by courts in 
competition law cases in two different ways. First, indirectly: economic 
analysis is incorporated in ‘hard law’ (block exemption regulations), but most 
frequently in ‘soft law’, such as guidelines interpreting the competition law 
provisions for the use of courts. It is well known that, according to Article 220 
of the EC Treaty, the European Court of Justice and the Court of First 
Instance are the authoritative interpreters of the Treaty’s competition law 
provisions. The European Commission has nevertheless adopted a plethora 
of interpretative non-binding guidelines. These guidelines do not only have the 
objective to describe current decisional practice and the existing case law but 
they also provide detailed and extensive analysis of the interpretative 
methodology to be used in enforcing the competition law provisions (the 
economic muscle of the law)9. These texts have been largely the work of 
economists or economic and legal experts. As Eleanor Fox once noted, the 
moment of guidelines is when “economists are kings”.10 The influence of 
guidelines in the judicial enforcement of competition law is an empirical 
question: Hillary Greene has recently provided statistical evidence of the 
impact of the different versions of US Merger Guidelines in framing antitrust 
discourse11. Greene notes á propos of the merger guidelines, that they have 
progressively gained “special status in the antitrust debate” and that they had 
an important influence in refining, revising and rejecting existing case law (the 
process of “guideline institutionalization”).12 
The second form of influence of economics and economists in courts is 
direct and relates to the provision of economic expertise in litigation. 
Economists are frequently called to testify as experts, either invited by the 
parties or appointed by the courts. This form of influence of economists and 
economic thinking has risen considerably recently, in part as a consequence 
                                                                                                                             
ECR II-2969). The Court relies, however, in these cases mostly on the economic assessment 
of the Commission or the economic arguments advanced by the parties and rarely, if ever, 
performs an independent economic analysis of its own. 
9
 The Commission cannot, however, adopt guidelines contrary to the rulings of the European 
courts [see the most recent reminder by Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands BV and Others 
[2009] ECR nyr, Opinion of AG Kokkott, para 29]. 
10
 Eleanor Fox, “The 1982 Merger Guidelines: When Economists are Kings?”, (1983) 71 
California L Rev 281.  
11
 Hillary Greene, “Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger Guidelines in Antitrust 
Discourse”, (2006) 48 William & Mary L Rev 771. 
12
 Ibid, at 828-830. The process of “institutionalization of the guidelines provides an 
explanation for their increasing influence in antitrust law discourse:  “… the guidelines 
became increasingly influential in reframing the terms of proper antitrust merger analysis and 
by anchoring important inquiries … Over time, the ‘legitimacy’ of the guidelines increased, 
and even when that legitimacy had not even fully established, the statistics above revealed an 
increased tendency among decision makers to explain or reconcile rulings with the guidelines 
…The history is not merely the result of the acceptance of superior ideas … nor does the 
increase (of their influence) seem consistent with a simple story of (possible unwarranted) 
judicial deference to agency promulgations. …(S)omething more is needed to explain the 
history. The guidelines themselves became legitimized and valued beyond the content of their 
ideas … In short, the antitrust guidelines had become a strong institution”. 
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of the first form of influence: judges need the assistance of economic experts 
to comprehend and implement the economic concepts and reasoning that 
now permeate the EC competition law legal discourse. This demand for more 
economic reasoning is particularly significant in the area of merger control.  
Competition cases are initiated in courts in Europe, either by private 
litigants (e.g. private litigation, preliminary references from national courts at 
the European Court of Justice) or as a follow-up of public enforcement of 
competition law (judicial review and actions for annulment at the European 
level or decisions of national competition authorities or regulators in the 
national context). One could distinguish the situation of the judicial review of a 
decision of a competition authority from that of private enforcement, as 
traditionally the role of the judge is limited, in the first case, to the control of a 
manifest error of appreciation and there is generally deference to the 
economic assessment performed by the competition authority13. The 
European Courts have usually been reluctant to re-assess the economic 
analysis of the European Commission, although the situation has recently 
evolved towards a more intrusive judicial review, in particular in EC merger 
control cases14. 
The growing importance of private enforcement of antitrust law in 
Europe may also lead to an increase in the demand for economic expertise; 
this time at the level of national courts, as a result of the decentralization 
process of EC competition law enforcement after Regulation 1/200315. 
Andrew Gavil notes the important challenges of economic proof in the 
decentralized and privatized European competition law system16: The 
absence of a common European framework providing procedural rules 
concerning the discovery, development and presentation of economic proof 
and the important differences between the national legal systems governing 
evidence and expertise are important matters of concern17.  
If the indirect influence of economics and economists in EC competition 
law has already been examined in depth18, the direct influence of economists 
                                            
13
 Bo Vestendorf, “Standard of Proof in Merger Cases: Reflections in the Light of Recent Case 
Law of the Community Courts”, (2005) European Competition Journal 3; Bo Vesterdorf, 
“Economics in Court: reflections on the role of judges in assessing economic theories and 
evidence in the modernised competition regime”, in Martin Johansson, Nils Wahl & Ulf Bernitz 
(eds.), Liber amicorum in honour of Sven Norberg – A European for all seasons (Bruylant, 
2006), at 511. 
14
 Matteo Bay & Javier Luis Calzado, “Tetra Laval II: The Coming of Age of the Judicial review 
of Merger Decisions”, (2005) 28(4) World Competition 433. 
15
 Regulation 1/2003  
16
 Andrew Gavil, “The Challenges of Economic Proof in a Decentralized and Privatized 
European Competition Policy System: Lessons from the American Experience”, (2008) 4(1) 
Journal of Competition Law and Economics 177. 
17
 For a brief analysis of some national experiences on the judicial assessment of expertise 
see the excellent work of Déirdre Dwyer, The Judicial Assessment of Expert Evidence 
(Cambridge Univ. Pres, 2008), pp. 180-197. 
18
 See, most recently, Ioannis Lianos, La Transformation du droit de la concurrence par le 
recours á l’analyse économique (Bruylant, Brussels, 2007). 
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through the provision of expertise in litigation is a less studied phenomenon. 
An important difference with the indirect influence of economics in antitrust is 
that judges are not deciding “in isolation” on the introduction of economic 
analysis in their effort to resolve the specific competition law dispute they are 
trying to deal with19, but that their decision-making is constrained by the social 
meaning and context of “expertise”. Scott Brewer wonderfully summarizes this 
point with the formula of “epistemic deference”20: in deciding to call or listen to 
an economic “expert” judges admit limitations to their knowledge for the 
purposes of legal decision-making, which is an essential dimension of their 
legitimacy and authority. Judges are supposed to know the law; but in this 
case the law has also an economic content which judges are 
discovering/assessing with the active assistance of the economic “expert”. In 
other words, there is a situation of epistemic un-equality between the judge 
and the expert. The specificities of economic expertise may lead to a number 
of problems, linked essentially, but no exclusively, to the epistemic asymmetry 
between the judge and the economic expert with regard to the economic 
content/dimension of the law. 
Epistemic asymmetry is not, however, the only source of difficulty for 
the judge. The diversity and evolving character of economic theory put the 
judicial decision-maker and the legal system in front of difficult choices, in 
general, when they devise general rules guiding the assessment of economic 
evidence. These choices, as this study will argue, have not only implications 
on the evolution of competition law (its enforcement in the actual fact-pattern 
or in future analogous fact-patterns through the operation of the rule of 
precedent) but have also implications on the direction of economic theory and 
future research in economics. 
The study focuses on the assessment of economic expertise in EC 
competition law litigation. It will first explore the challenges of integrating 
economic expertise in litigation: in particular the epistemic asymmetry 
between judges and experts. Epistemic asymmetry becomes an issue as 
soon as economics becomes a necessary tool to interpret the law and we are 
confronted to the possibility of expert bias. The requirement of objectivity, 
which is important for the legitimacy and social acceptability of the judicial 
decision-making process, will, in this case, be profoundly interlinked with the 
development of objective knowledge. Economic science will be the source of 
objective knowledge in the antitrust field. However, this study will argue that, 
notwithstanding the problem of expert bias, the conception of economics as a 
source of objective knowledge does not hold and that the judicial decision-
makers should be aware of this possibility when they evaluate economic 
                                            
19
 In the sense that they do not employ a legal self-referential interpretative method, by only 
referring to other legal authorities, such as regulations or instruments of soft law, such as 
guidelines. 
20
 Scott Brewer, “Scientific Expert testimony and Intellectual Due Process”, (1998) 107 Yale L 
J 1535, 1586. 
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expertise. The study will identify the extent of the problem of epistemic 
asymmetry by looking to the degree and the locus of the intrusion of economic 
analysis in competition cases.  
The last two parts will explore the instruments, procedural and 
substantive, employed by the legal system in order to mitigate the risks 
flowing from the epistemic asymmetry between judges and experts and the 
problem of expert bias. 
 First, I will highlight the different institutional and procedural 
frameworks that were adopted at the European level and in some selected 
member states in order to integrate economic expertise in litigation. My 
objective will be to understand how these institutional solutions may address 
each of these problems. Second, I will look to “substantive” law approaches, 
such as the development of specific standards for the admissibility and the 
sufficiency of economic expertise in courts, as an alternative or an additional 
option to deal with the challenges raised by economic expertise in courts. The 
paper will conclude that, although the possible adverse effects of the 
information and epistemic asymmetry between judges and experts is certainly 
an important issue, the current procedural/institutional and substantive legal 
framework governing economic expertise does not take sufficiently into 
account important concerns that are specific to economics and other social 
sciences, such as the preservation of the scientific “competition” in the supply 
of economic theory and consequently, methodological or assumptions-related 
pluralism in economic thought. In particular, I will argue against the adoption 
of specific standards of admissibility of economic expertise in Europe. This is 
a US context-specific solution which does not necessarily fit with the specific 
characteristics of the European legal system. It is also an approach that 
represents an outdated and partial view of the scientific as well as the legal 
process. 
 
2. Expert evidence in the courtroom: origins and problems 
 
 In the increasingly complex litigation world of competition law, courts 
need the assistance of economic “experts” in order to acquire specialised 
information, which is otherwise unavailable to them. The need for expertise is 
essentially the consequence of a perceived epistemic asymmetry between the 
judicial decision-makers (judges and/or jury in the US system) and the 
“experts”.  
The existence of an epistemic asymmetry should not, however, lead to the 
conclusion that the role of the judge or jury is to conform to the expert’s 
opinion. First, there is a risk that the expert takes a specific position in order to 
please one of the litigants, in particular if the latter employs him as an expert 
witness. Second, there is always the possibility for conflicting expert opinions 
and testimony. This is particularly true in economics, where disagreement 
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between economists has been a frequent subject of satire. The possibility of 
an objective economic truth could be questioned. Criticisms to economic 
theory and methodology may put into question the hard scientific status of 
economics and thus lead to a re-consideration of the role of the judge in 
assessing economic expertise. Third, one could establish a relation between 
the market for economic expertise in litigation and academic research in 
economics perceived as a scientific endeavour. If the rules that apply to 
economic expertise in courts may influence the way economic thought may 
evolve in the future, that should be taken into account in designing the legal 
rules on expertise. This could be an important, yet unexplored, implication of 
the rules governing economic expertise. 
 
2.1. The origins of expertise: informational asymmetry and epistemic 
competence 
 
The need for expert evidence arises essentially from the need to 
integrate scientific knowledge in legal proceedings. The phenomenon finds its 
origins in the emergence of modern science and the need for specialized 
knowledge, as a result of the differentiation of society21. However, it has not 
been until the end of the 18th century that, for the first time, expert witnesses 
were employed as “a distinct and well-defined legal entity”22. As this was 
explained by Learned Hand in his seminal article on expert testimony, expert 
witnesses came progressively to replace two other methods of integrating 
specialist expertise in the courtroom: the selection of jurymen that “were by 
experience fitted to know the class of facts which were before them” and the 
tradition to “call to the aid of the court skilled persons whose opinion it might 
adopt or not as it pleased”.23 Following the “adversarial revolution” of the 
English legal system during the 18th century, the litigation process was 
transformed in order to take into account the emergence of new actors, in 
particular the expanding presence of lawyers/advocates. This led to the 
establishment of distinct roles for the judge, the lawyers and the other actors 
of the litigation process, which affected the way evidence was produced and 
presented in courts. The term “expert” appears to have been adopted in the 
1850s or 1860s24. There is debate over which form of expertise, court-
appointed or expert witnesses first appeared, Tal Golan claiming that prior to 
the adversarial revolution, the judge was the main actor of the judicial process 
and the experts were directly commissioned by the judge, while Déirdre 
                                            
21
 Niklas Luhmann, Differentiation of Society (Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 1982). 
22
 Tal Golan, ‘The History of Scientific Expert testimony in the English Courtroom’ (1999) 12 
Science in Context 7, 8.  
23
 Learned Hand, “Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony”, 
(1901) 15 Harvard L Rev 40. 
24
 Déirdre Dwyer, The Judicial Assessment of Expert Evidence (Cambridge Univ. Pres, 2008), 
at 279. 
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Dwyer argues that court-appointed experts was an innovation of the 19th 
century, following the increasing concerns raised about the effects of expert 
partisanship during that period25. 
The role of experts is however, different from all other witnesses 
brought in by the parties. Their position is “peculiar” because the expert 
witness is allowed to testify not only on matters of facts for which he had 
personally witnessed but on inferences from facts or classes of facts that 
others may have reported.26 Expert evidence can be on questions of fact as 
well as on questions of opinion: any distinction between the two being 
arbitrary27. An additional characteristic of expert witnesses: in contrast to other 
witnesses, is that they represent “persistent communities of practice outside 
the legal domain”28. 
The existence of scientific expert witnesses has thus a different 
justification. Other witnesses intervene only because they have a “space-time 
advantage” compared to the judge or the jury: they were someplace the judge 
or jury were not and had a direct experience of the “facts”.29 In contrast, the 
principal role of the expert is to become an “educator” or “translator” for the 
judge or the jury: summarizing knowledge that it would be difficult, long and 
costly for the judge or the jury to acquire by their own; translating 
signs/meaning from the language of economics to a language/discourse 
which is understandable by the judge and/or the jury, in other words ‘common 
(shared) sens’. 
His knowledge advantage derives from a variety of sources. The expert 
may have direct experience on the factual situation. His expertise may find 
basis in a data base, his observations for a long period of time, secondary 
sources, such as academic research and training in particular research 
methods and disciplines. This may be information acquired prior and 
independent of the litigation or after being involved in the litigation.  
Consequently, we can define the term “expert” in relational terms, as a 
function of “epistemic authority”, or better put, “epistemic deference” of one 
agent to another30. A more general definition is also possible: 
 “an expert is a person who has or is regarded as having specialized 
training that yields sufficient epistemic competence to understand the 
aims, methods, and results of an expert discipline. An expert discipline 
                                            
25
 Ibid., at 269-272. 
26
  Learned Hand, “Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony”, 
above, at 44. 
27
 Déirdre Dwyer, The Judicial Assessment of Expert Evidence, above, at 87-97 
28
 Ibid, at 6. 
29
 Michael Risinger, “Preliminary thoughts on a functional taxonomy of expertise for the post-
Kumho World”, (2000) 31 Seton Hall L Rev 508, 510 
30
 Scottt Brewer, above, at 1588: “For A to be an epistemic authority for B on some subject 
matter, B must judge that A has some sufficient knowledge, intelligence, or wisdom which 
makes it reasonable to believe either that what A says on that subject is more likely to be true 
than the results reached by B through B’s independent investigations, or is no less likely to be 
true than the results that would be reached by B through B’s independent investigations”. 
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is a discipline that in fact requires specialised training in order for a 
person to attain sufficient epistemic competence to understand its aims 
and methods, and to be able critically to deploy those methods, in 
service of these aims, to produce judgments that issue from its 
distinctive point of view. A non-expert is a person who does not in fact 
have the specialized training required to yield sufficient epistemic 
competence to understand the aims, methods, and judgments of an 
expert discipline, or to be able critically to deploy those methods, in 
service of the discipline’s aims, to produce the judgments that issue 
from the discipline’s distinctive point of view”31. 
The scientific expert therefore assumes the role of translator. His 
translational function relates to the representation of encoded information 
in a language un-accessible or accessible with a significant cost to a non-
expert..32 Translational systems are by essence subjective and 
“systemically imperfect33” in the sense that there is a degree of uncertainty 
with regard to the interpretative values and outcomes that different 
individuals may derive from the translational process. Indeed, as Umberto 
Eco showed in Experiences in Translation, the aim of the translator is not 
to establish a perfect identity between the source language A to a target 
language B, which would be impossible, as the definitive insight and 
generalization of the way in which the translated language relates word to 
object would require a complete access to it from the translator34. The aim 
is rather to establish some sort of equivalence of meaning. The translator 
should therefore decide what is the fundamental content conveyed, the 
deep story, and then reproduce it in the target language. It follows that 
translation involves a constant negotiation between different 
meanings.This can lead to expert disagreement35. Risinger mentions two 
manifestations of this systemic imperfection of the translational system: 
 “(t)he first problem typically encountered is an imperfection in their 
underlying descriptive or taxonomic system, such that the categories in 
the system are not based on data empirically unmistakable by all 
properly trained (and therefore normed) practitioners… The success of 
the norming process at the descriptive level is measured by how much 
agreement there is among practitioners in giving the same 
classification to the same observed phenomenon. High levels of 
                                            
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Michael Risinger, “Preliminary thoughts on a functional taxonomy of expertise for the post-
Kumho World”, in David Faigman, David Kaye, Michael Saks & Joseph Sanders (ed.), 
Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of Expert Testimony, Volume 3, (West, 2
nd
 
ed., 2002), at 83. 
33
 Idid, at 82. 
34
 Umberto Eco, Experiences in Translation, (University of Toronto Press, 2001), 16-17. 
35
 Déirdre Dwyer, The Judicial Assessment of Expert Evidence (CUP, 2008), at 7: expert 
disagreement exists “when expert evidence offers more than one interpretation”. 
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agreement result in ‘reliable’ taxonomies. The less agreement among 
practitioners, the less reliable the system”.36 
The second problem relates to the inherent subjectivity of the  
“translational system itself”, which “may be highly objective and 
determinate, utilizing quantifiable aspects of the data present and 
mathematically describable relationships, or it may be more subjective 
and indeterminate, ranging from attempts to formally describe and 
combine parameters of incommensurate factors through such tools as 
‘fuzzy logic’”, thus making the translation dependent on “subjective 
judgments of unquantified and often incommensurate variables”.37  
It is not always the case that a process of common principles and education of 
the “experts” will lead, in this case, to the same outcome. 
 The expert’s function is to provide insights that would help the judge to 
understand in their right dimension the facts of the case and the possible 
implications of their interpretative choices. The expert’s role is not to provide 
any interpretation over the content of the law, which is solely a judicial 
function38, or any normative or value-judgment expertise, which is a task that 
the law usually ascribes to the judge or the jury (in the US). There are 
certainly circumstances where the interpretation of the facts involves 
normative judgment but these instances are exceptions to the rule that 
experts should “not testify to mere opinion or conclusion”.39 Furthermore, 
although the judge has knowledge of the legal framework, the economic 
expert detains specialized knowledge that could be useful for the 
interpretation of the law (normative judgment) in situations where reference to 
a meta-legal principle is necessary for the coherent application of the legal 
rule40. The degree of the epistemic asymmetry depends on the nature of the 
proceedings (administrative or court proceedings), the degree of 
specialization of the authorities (the asymmetric information problems 
between the competition authority/specialist court and economic experts are 
less daunting than in the case of non-specialized authorities/generalist 
judges), the distribution of the powers of investigation, prosecution and 
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adjudication (prosecutorial bias risk, which may make the Commission 
disregard economic expertise presented by the parties), the adversarial or 
inquisitorial character of the proceedings (if the judge is confronted to two 
contradicting opinions, he may decide to disregard the economic expertise)41. 
The relation between the judge and the expert could be examined as a 
typical principal-agent problem, where the judge operates as the principal and 
the expert as the agent42. Following this model the principal’s objective is to 
align her interests with those of the agent, in order to avoid a situation of 
moral hazard. The later may occur because of the inherent difficulty of a non-
specialist judge to monitor the performance and reliability of the expert. The 
adversarial process tends to emphasize differences between experts rather 
than to produce a consensus view, which is what judges and jury are 
eventually seeking. The risk of moral hazard is greatly reduced in 
circumstances where the judge commissioned the expert witness or in 
situations where the expertise/information gathering function is integrated to 
that of the adjudication function (e.g. the expert is an assessor or the judge 
has developed expert knowledge in the field). In other words, if there is a 
situation of hierarchy (because of an employment contract between the judge 
and the expert), the alignment of the objectives of each party is almost 
complete. Even in these circumstances, one should nevertheless not exclude 
the possibility that expert witnesses may have previously consulted one of the 
parties or that they may have a vested interest, if they operate as independent 
consultants, to collaborate with one of the parties in the future.  
Déirdre Dwyer mentions three categories of interest that may cause 
some form of expert bias and therefore may give rise to expert disagreement: 
personal interest, financial interest and intellectual interest. These may exist 
“externally to the instant litigation”, what she calls “predisposition” or arise in 
direct relation to the litigation, which she calls “involvement”43. Personal bias 
may arise because of moral opinions or personal relations, when the expert is 
associated with one of the parties (family, member of a professional 
organization). Financial interest originates when “the expert is employed by 
the party on an ongoing basis, beyond the scope of immediate litigation”44. 
Intellectual predisposition or involvement results from the fact that the expert 
shares a particular theory or participates to a specific school of thought, which 
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will influence her expertise. Expert bias may be “conscious”, “where the expert 
chooses to adapt her opinion in order to favour one of the parties” or 
“unconscious”, where the expert’s opinion is trapped to a specific heuristic or 
schema, that of a specific theory or scientific discipline, for example. Déirdre 
Dwyer concludes that “to remove competing expert evidence does not of itself 
remove the problems of expert disagreement and bias”, but simply “removes 
the issue from the sight of the tribunal”45. For example, the adversarial 
process may exarcebate the risk of expert bias because of financial interest 
defended by each party expert although it could be useful in order to reduce 
the risk of intellectual bias. 
Recent statutes imposed to expert witnesses an explicit overriding duty 
to the court to provide unbiased expertise.46 The principle is that the function 
of the expert is to “provide independent assistance to the Court by way of 
objective unbiased opinion in relation to matters within his expertise”.47 The 
exact nature of the expert’s duty to the court is a matter of theoretical 
speculation48. Notwithstanding, in practice, it is difficult to monitor this duty, as 
this supposes that the judge or the jury is able to identify instances where the 
expert did not provide unbiased information. This is extremely difficult to spot 
out in most cases without any previous knowledge of the field. It should also 
be noted that it is rare that experts are sanctioned for violation of this duty to 
the court.49 
Reputation effects may also dissuade the expert from behaving 
opportunistically and from providing biased information, in particular if the 
expert is a repeat player. Credibility is an important asset that the expert has 
interest to preserve in order to operate in the market of legal expertise and 
maintain the value of her services. The market for experts may in this case 
have a disciplining effect in ensuring that the expertise has the required 
quality. Nevertheless, it is possible that the disciplining effect of the market will 
not have any effect. The expert might adopt a strategy of signaling an 
intellectual interest in order to secure continuous employment by a certain 
category of experts. For example, an expert may adopt a theoretical starting 
point which is generally positive to defendants or plaintiffs in a particular 
industry or area of law. It is often the case that parties shop around in order to 
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identify the experts that will be the most favourable to their cause. The 
prospect of a continuous flow of cases from clients with a high risk of repeated 
litigation (e.g. dominant firms) may well motivate experts to specialize in a 
specific kind of argument as a signal to potential clients in order to attract 
employment. The market for expertise will not in this case operate as a 
disciplining mechanism but rather as an inducement to intellectual interest 
and expert bias. 
The existence of an epistemic asymmetry and the risk of moral hazard 
that follows from a situation of expert bias are not, however, the only reasons 
for the relation of distrust that judges and experts have progressively 
established between them. This evolution “resulted largely from the 
overwhelming success” of the scientific method during the Victorian era, 
which viewed science as “the yardstick for truth, or, at least of certainty and 
the impartial man of science as the best keeper of this truth”.50 “Once one 
believed these claims, then the zealous opposition among the scientific 
witnesses could only be interpreted as a sign of moral corruption”.51 The 
adversarial process and the partisan spirit displayed in litigation by some 
experts was, indeed, not compatible with the dominant conception of science 
as an instrument to discover objective reality or truth. The growing 
professionalization of science during that same period increased the 
sentiment of suspicion of judges towards expert testimony.52 The professional 
independence of the experts became a key consideration: experts that earn a 
substantial part of their income from the provision of expertise in litigation 
(forensic scientists) are more likely to face scepticism from judges and juries 
than academic experts who do not appear regularly in court. In other words, 
the relation of distrust may be justified by the existence of a perception gap 
between the conception of science as a desinterested quest for objective 
truth, which was predominant in the 19th century, and the emergence of the 
practice of professionalized science as an essential input for litigation. 
The growing scepticism over the role of expert witnesses and more 
generally expertise in litigation backclashed with the emergence of the 
expression “junk science” or pseudo-science. The term was used by Peter 
Huber in order to refer to “the science of things that aren’t so”53, science that 
is based on bad data and spurious inferences. According to the promoters of 
this concept, “junk science” has affected judicial decision-making in a number 
of areas and is responsible for a range of problems with considerable social 
and economic implications. The concept is an essential part of the rhetoric, 
developed by a number of interest groups, as a reaction to the litigation 
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explosion that occurred in the United States during the 1980s in a number of 
areas, most notably civil liability.54. It was widely believed that reliance on 
questionable scientific expertise may have provoked this litigation explosion, 
thus increasing considerably the costs for business and affecting negatively 
the economy.  
One could, however, question the empirical validity as well as the utility 
of the concept. Although Huber provides a number of examples where the 
courts apparently based their decisions on contestable scientific results, other 
authors contest its magnitude.55 The definition of the boundaries of “junk 
science” as opposed to “good science” is also ambiguous. At which side of 
the boundary would idiosyncratic or minority views fall? What are the criteria 
that apply in setting the boundaries at the first place? A remarkable 
shortcoming of the concept of “junk science” is also that it totally ignores the 
broader social context in which scientific research is produced and is based 
on an idealistic conception of science. Recent theories of philosophy of 
science as well as empirical observations emphasize the role of the social 
context and socialisation as an instrument of consensus formation in scientific 
communities.56 Scientists work in the context of paradigms or research 
programmes, which may operate under different assumptions or prior 
beliefs57. The concept of “junk science” does not take into account the plurality 
of scientific discourse and the possibility that opinions which are now at the 
fringe may become part of the mainstream among the scientists of the specific 
group. The selection of the community of scientists that will serve as a 
reference group is also critical. All natural scientists will not necessarily agree 
in the scientific status of a number of social science disciplines. Although the 
adversarial process may accentuate scientific disagreement, it is also clear 
that this is an important and necessary feature of the scientific process. The 
rhetoric of “junk science” does not finally encourage the development of 
continuous dialogue and cooperation between jurists and scientists but 
creates an atmosphere of distrust and “witch-hunting”, “which is not conducive 
to mutual understanding and cooperation”.58 
The distrust between judges and experts, which is a consequence of 
moral hazard, may also create an adverse selection problem. Parties are 
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interested in bringing forward experts that would be favourable to their cause. 
This is a decisive element in the selection of the experts by the parties. 
Judges and juries are aware of this strategic objective and may eventually 
ignore the expert’s testimony. The side effect may be that good quality 
scientists are dissuaded from participating as experts in legal proceedings in 
order to avoid tarnishing their public image by appearing in court.59  
This issue is related to one of the strongest manifestations of 
conscious financial interest of the expert leading to expert bias: the risk that 
expert witnesses become “hired guns” for the parties that employ them. “Hired 
guns” are driven in their testimony by the successful outcome of the case (for 
their employers) rather than by the loyalty and independent judgment they 
owe to their science/field. Their motivations can be diverse: ensure a 
continuous working relation with one of the parties, in particular if this party is 
involved in a great number of litigations or any other personal benefit by 
defending views that are not the result of independent (in motives) study and 
research.  
The problem of “hired guns” illustrates the paradox of the position of 
scientific expert witnesses in modern litigation. As it was previously explained, 
the dominant conceptualization of expert witnesses’ role relies on a 
principal/agent model, with the judge being the principal. The expert has a 
duty to the court to act as the honest representative of her field. Her role as 
educator and translator assumes that she would place herself outside the 
actual controversy. Nonetheless, at the same time, the expert witness is hired 
by one of the parties and she participates to an adversarial procedure. One 
could therefore oppose to the dominant conception of the scientific expert 
witness as the representative of his field that of the expert as an advocate. 
The development of the field of forensic expertise and the professionalization 
of the role of expert witnesses, with the establishment of multinational 
corporations specialising in economic expertise, underlines the ongoing 
transformation of the role of economic expert witnesses. The duty of the 
expert to her employer will overstep the duty she owes to the court.  
One could certainly advance that by being loyal to the court the expert 
serves at the same time the interests of her employer. This is probably true in 
certain circumstances but one cannot exclude the possibility that these 
interests will at some point diverge. One could also argue that the adversarial 
process, and in particular the experts of the opposing party, will serve in this 
case as a checks and balances mechanism to the risk of misrepresentation 
and partisan expertise. However, this issue also raises the question of the 
objectivity of the expert’s testimony. The qualification of “hired gun” 
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underscores the received view that the main function of the economic expert 
is to act as a representative of her field. The following section will show that 
this conception of economic expertise is flawed, in particular as it is linked to 
an outdated and contested philosophy of science.  
2.2. Science, objectivity and the specific nature of economic expertise 
  
The “hired gun” problem has been particularly influential in framing the 
debate over the role of scientific expert witnesses in litigation: there have 
been many calls for a reform of the adversarial framework and a greater 
recourse to court appointed experts as a way to guarantee the objectivity of 
scientific expertise.60 A number of procedural and substantive law reforms 
were introduced in order to limit the risk of partisanship, including the 
development of hybrid mid-adversarial, mid-consultative expert witness 
procedures, admissibility standards for expertise, greater involvement of 
“neutral” or impartial (judge-appointed) experts in the process. These reforms 
are all based on the assumption that expertise can be “objective”. After all, in 
theory, experts are invited to comment on “facts”. In the received view, 
expertise cannot be normative or involve value-judgments61. It is however less 
than clear what is meant by “objective”. Does it mean “true”? If that’s the case, 
is “objective” an ontological or an epistemological statement? What are the 
properties of “objective expertise”? Is expert bias the only impediment to 
objectivity? Or is the risk of non-“objective” expertise wider than the perceived 
problem of expert bias? 
In my view, all these questions raise the issue of the possibility of 
objective scientific/expert knowledge. According to the received view of 
expertise, objectivity is a value and a quality in itself. Objective expertise is the 
aim of the legal system, the optimum that decision makers should aim to. If 
one takes a functional approach, it is possible to argue that the claim of 
objectivity aims to ensure the legitimacy of the judicial authority, but also more 
generally of the scientific process. As is rightly explained by Gary Edmond, 
“(t)ypically, objectivity is equated with qualities such as independence, 
impartiality and neutrality. Good science, so this story goes, derives its 
authority from being evidence-based, efficacious, communal, critical 
and driven by a powerful method. These characteristics, which are 
often seen as dimensions of scientific (or mechanical) objectivity, 
purportedly function to liberate science from a range of contaminants, 
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such as subjectivity, personal interests, partisanship, fraud, 
speculation, bias, gratuitous assumptions and so forth”.62 
According to this view, “the technical correctness of judicial decisions 
complements their procedural legitimacy”63. 
The link between objectivity and authority is apparent. Objectivity 
guarantees authority as it provides greater legitimacy to judicial decision-
making. Objectivity ensures that the court’s decisions will be perceived as 
epistemologically true [some sort of justified (true) belief] and persuasive. The 
accent is however put on the process of decision making, rather than on the 
outcome. What matters for a legal system’s legitimacy is that those subject to 
the judicial decisions believe that their arguments were appropriately heard 
and assessed by the court, which adequately explained the ruling in such a 
way that the losing party can recognize it as a valid, yet unfavorable, exercise 
of judicial authority. Put differently, 
“what centrally concerns lawyers, scholars, and judges with regard to 
the cogency of scientific expert testimony is not whether the expert has 
– or can transmit to the nonexpert – knowledge in the strong 
philosophical sense, but rather whether the expert has and is in a 
position to be able to transmit to the nonexpert a belief that is 
supported by good reasons…what concerns these jurists is not the 
epistemic concept of knowledge, but rather that of justified belief”64. 
The search for “truth” is perceived by some as an important aim of the 
scientific process65. The “quest for truth” has nevertheless a different purpose 
in science than it has in the courtroom66.  
First, as it is explained by David Kaye, 
“a functional inquiry, rather than a review of the philosophical literature, 
the encyclopedia, or the dictionary is required. The rules of evidence, 
whether derived from the common law or a code, are designed to 
perform certain functions, and the raison d'être of a special hurdle for 
scientific evidence is that this particular evidence poses special 
problems. When these problems are not present, heightened scrutiny 
is not justified and may well be counterproductive, unnecessarily 
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consuming resources and possibly resulting in unwarranted exclusion 
of probative evidence”67. 
Second, scientific truth is not directly linked to the exercise of authority. 
It is thought that the objective of the scientific method is not to legitimate the 
power of scientists but to increase the stock of “objective knowledge”, in other 
words to discover more about the world.68 In contrast, the quest for “truth” in 
the courtroom is to arrive to an ultimate, in the sense of persuasive, 
explanation, in terms of legitimate exercise of authority69. Ultimate 
explanations exist in the sense that they are defined by the courts.70 This is 
not the case in the process of scientific discovery, as “every explanation may 
be further explained”, in the sense that a known state of affairs may always be 
explained by an unknown state of affairs71. In other words, “objectivity” and 
“truth” may be the aim of both the scientific and the legal process but the 
nature of “objectivity” or “truth” that they aim is of a different kind72. Taking a 
functional approach, this study accepts that “objectivity” and/or “truth” in legal 
discourse is partly context-dependent73. 
 The quest for “objectivity” is particularly complex in disciplines such as 
economics. There are some interrelated elements that complicate the task of 
a judicial decision-maker, eager to distinguish “true” from “untrue” statements. 
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 It is usually argued that much of economic theory is not based on 
empirical research but on “a fairly abstract, sometimes unverifiable, and 
largely mathematically derived conclusions about human behavior”.74 This 
criticism of economic analysis carries a particular conception of what is the 
right scientific method. According to the received view, a method is scientific if 
it relies on “facts” empirically observed. This standard view of science, closely 
associated to the work of Sir Francis Bacon, assumes that scientific 
investigations begin in the observation of facts, proceed by inductive inference 
to the formulation of universal laws about these facts and finally arrive by 
further induction at statements of still wider generality known as theories75. 
Both laws and theories are ultimately checked for their truth content by 
comparing their empirical consequences with all the observed facts. This 
inductive method of proof assumes that unbiased individuals will come to the 
same conclusions given the same data, the principle of “universal cognitive 
competence”76.  
The “meta-narrative” of this standard view of science has, however, 
been challenged and provisional, contingent, relative “mini-narratives” were 
instead offered as an alternative77. A profound transformation of the way we 
conceive the scientific inquiry followed: this has important implications on the 
relations between law and science, in general, and the role of economic 
expertise in litigation, in particular. 
 
2.2.1. The evolution of acceptable methods of observation as a limit to 
the demarcation criterion of empiricism 
 
First, there has been a considerable evolution over the acceptable 
methods of observation in economic analysis. Introspection was an 
acceptable method of observation of facts during the 19th century, period 
where economics took shape as a distinct area of research. Following the 
tradition of Greek philosophers, for whom introspection was the unique 
method employed, Jeremy Bentham’s and John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism was 
based on the idea that motives are strictly discoverable by introspection.78 
Particular emphasis was given to internal, subjective, feelings of the 
individuals in question. This introspectively gained self-knowledge could be 
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used in order to understand individual and collective action observable in the 
world. This “understanding from within by means of intuition and empathy” 
was opposed to “knowledge from without by means of observation and 
calculation”.79 The acceptance of introspection as a valid method of scientific 
investigation was connected to the doctrine of Verstehen. The doctrine 
claimed that “to understand human beings and action, we much put ourselves 
in their position”, “to understand others in analogy with ourselves”: the 
doctrine was part of the theory that social and natural sciences differ 
fundamentally and that they may employ different scientific methodologies.80  
For example, utilitarianism and marginal utility-based choice theory 
were employing a hedonistic notion of utility, “as the levels of utility were 
associated with the amount of pleasurable (or painful) psychic feeling” the 
consumer received from the bundle of goods in question, which was also 
cardinal “in the sense that differences in the variations of various bundles of 
goods took on numerical values”.81 Interpersonal comparisons of utility were 
made possible by the aggregation of the sum of the pleasurable feelings of all 
agents. The use of introspection meant that economics was thought of as a 
cognitive science. The emergence of positivism in the beginning of the 20th 
century largely questioned the recourse to introspection as a valid (objective) 
method of observation. Positivism brought a greater degree of empiricism in 
economics: “feelings and the associated mental states were not empirically 
observable and thus a properly scientific economics would need to find 
alternative, more adequate, foundations… inner observations, no longer 
counted as scientific observations”.82 One of the aims of the ordinalist 
revolution was indeed to clear economics from any reference to psychological 
assumptions: the concept of cardinal utility was abandoned and replaced by 
the concept of a scale of preferences.83 This was linked to a shift in the 
acceptable methods of observation. As Lionel Robbins observed, 
 “valuation is a subjective process. We cannot observe valuation. It is 
therefore out of place in a scientific explanation. Our theoretical 
constructions must assume observable data”.84  
The rejection of cardinal utility led also to the extrusion from economic 
analysis of behaviourist psychology, a “queer cult”, according to Robbins.85 
The question that economics should attempt to answer was, according to 
Robbins, “choice under scarcity”, scarcity being “the scarcity of given means 
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for the attainment of given ends”.86 The agent’s preferences are a “given” 
which economists have to identify in order to analyze consumer choice. The 
paradox is that this does not leave any place to introspection, albeit at the 
most abstract level: “the main postulates of the theory of value is the fact that 
individuals can arrange their preferences in an order, and in fact do so”, this is 
derived by everyday inner experience (introspection).87 This introspective 
foundation of the theory of choice leads Robbins and the ordinalists to reject 
interpersonal comparisons of utility. The justification is rather simple:  
“(i)ntrospection does not enable A to measure what is going on in B’s 
mind, nor B to measure what is going on in A’s. There is no way of 
comparing the satisfactions of different people”.88  
The concept of revealed preferences further attempted to ground the theory of 
consumer behavior on observable concepts and to suppress any reference to 
psychology and introspection.89.  
One could, however, note a new trend, in particular since the seminal 
work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky to attach greater attention to 
psychology in contemporary economic theory.90 The psychological trend, that 
is witnessed in many recent economic movements, such as behavioral law 
and economics, experimental economics, neuro-economics, transforms 
economics to a sort of cognitive science, where economic behavior is 
reconceived on the basis of “psychological facts” discovered with the method 
of experimental introspection. Introspection becomes again a valid (scientific) 
method of observation for modern economics91. One could also add older 
schools of economic analysis that questioned the exclusion of subjective 
mental states from economic theory. The Austrian school of economics has 
consistently supported introspection and methodological individualism as an 
acceptable scientific method and considered verification or empiricism as an 
improper foundation for economics.92 In conclusion, it is difficult to define 
scientific statements from non-scientific statements by the simple fact that 
they rely on observations, as the term may take different meanings and may 
refer to a number of methods. 
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2.2.2. The possibility of deductive science as a criticism to the 
demarcation criterion of induction 
 
Second, the inductive model that seems to be the foundation of the 
scientific method has been challenged by a more deductivist approach. Carl 
Hempel and Peter Oppenheim argued that all truly scientific explanations 
have a common logical structure: they involve at least one universal law plus 
a statement of relevant initial or boundary conditions that together constitute 
the explanans or premises from which the explanation, a statement about 
some event whose explanation we are seeking, is deduced with the aid of the 
rules of deductive logic.93 According to them, the logical validity of deductive 
reasoning does not ultimately depend on the material truth of either the major 
premise (if A is true, then B is true) or the minor premise (A is true). The 
operation called explanation involves the same rules of logical inference as 
the operation called prediction, the only difference being that explanations 
come after events and predictions before events. As it is explained by Mark 
Blaug, “explanation is simply prediction written backwards”.94 This perfect 
symmetry between explanation and prediction (the symmetry thesis) is the 
core of the hypothetico-deductive system. The universal laws that are 
involved in explanations are not derived by inductive generalization from 
individual instances: “they are merely hypothesis, inspired conjectures that 
may be tested by using them to make predictions about particular events but 
which are not themselves reducible to observations about events”95. 
The reliance on a deductivist methodology is a crucial component of 
neoclassical price theory, the economic mainstream today. Neoclassical 
economists also adhere to the theory of operationalism (linked with the logical 
positivist school in Vienna at the beginning of the century). Logical positivists 
rejected any form of a priori reasoning as metaphysical rubbish96 Scientific 
statements may be of two sorts: analytical propositions that relate to facts and 
empirical propositions. Analytic propositions are tautologies as they lack 
factual content: they are not susceptible to proof or invalidation through 
factual inquiry. On the contrary, empirical propositions/statements can be 
empirically verified. All other statements are “ethical utterances”, which can 
arouse feelings but fall outside the domain of scientific investigation. They do 
not constitute logical (analytic) propositions or empirical propositions (given 
that their true validity is not capable of empirical investigation).  
This approach had considerable implications on welfare economics. 
Based on positivistic methodology, neoclassical economists dismissed 
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cardinal utility and hedonism as unscientific.97 They regarded the sort of 
utilitarian analysis associated with Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill as 
an exercise in moral philosophy, not scientific investigation98. Since individual 
“utility” is non-observable, it is impossible (as a scientific matter) to make 
interpersonal comparisons between individual’s “utility” levels99. For example, 
Robbins’s work defined distributional issues as not falling within the category 
of the analyzable.100 We cannot measure whether a sum taken from Person B 
will benefit Person A more than its confiscation will displease Person B. There 
is no basis therefore from which to measure overall social welfare post 
redistribution. Any attempt to make such a measurement falls outside the 
scope of any positive science and is essentially normative. Such analysis is 
outside the ambit of economic science.  
The role of assumptions is, however, particularly important for 
economic reasoning. This led some logical positivists to criticize neoclassical 
economic analysis, as being tautological. Hutchison considered that following 
the positivistic analysis, most economic propositions are tautologies and 
prescribed that scientific economic inquiries should be confined to empirically 
testable statements.101 All assumptions through data should be verified: 
empirical testability is indispensable.  
Neoclassical economists responded to this criticism by two ways. 
According to Frank Knight, it is not possible to verify any proposition about 
economic behavior by any empirical procedure because economic behavior is 
goal-oriented and therefore depends for its meaning on our intuitive 
knowledge of its purposive character.102  Milton Friedman went even further:  
the only relevant test of the validity of a hypothesis is comparison of it 
predictions with experience but not necessarily of its assumptions with 
reality.103 According to Friedman, 
“a theory cannot be tested by comparing its “assumptions” directly with 
“reality.”  Indeed, there is no meaningful way in which this can be done.  
Complete “realism” is clearly unattainable, and the question whether a 
theory is realistic “enough” can be settled only by seeing whether it 
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yields predictions that are good enough for the purpose in hand or that 
are better than predictions from alternative theories.  Yet the belief that 
a theory can be tested by the realism of its assumptions independently 
of the accuracy of its predictions is widespread and the source of much 
of the perennial criticism of economic theory as unrealistic.  Such 
criticism is largely irrelevant, and, in consequence, most attempts to 
reform economic theory that it has stimulated have been 
unsuccessful”.104 
Friedman defends a methodological position which is close to 
instrumentalism: the realism of a theory’s assumptions does not matter, what 
counts is the theory’s predictive adequacy and simplicity105. Put differently, 
Friedman’s concern is not if the theory is testable but if the theory works given 
a specific problem. The predictive adequacy of the theory is measured by how 
accurate the predictions of this theory were in the past compared to other 
theories. The continued use and acceptance of the hypothesis and 
assumptions of neoclassical economic theory over a long period, and the 
failure of any coherent, self-consistent alternative to be developed and widely 
accepted, may also be a strong indirect testimony to the worth of the theory.  
This echoes the view defended by Karl Popper who established a 
demarcation criterion between scientific and non-scientific statements.106 This 
was based on the intuition that there is a fundamental asymmetry between 
induction and deduction, or between verification and falsification, between 
asserting something and disproving it.107 As Mark Blaug explains, 
 “no universal statement can be logically derived from, or conclusively 
established by, singular statements however many, singular 
statements. However, any universal statement can be logically 
contradicted or refuted with the aid of deductive logic by only one 
singular statement”.108 
Popper exploits this asymmetry in formulating his demarcation criterion: 
science is that body of propositions about the real world that can, at least in 
principle, be falsified by empirical observations.109 Science is characterized by 
its method of formulating and testing propositions, as it is based on logic of 
disproof: “testability is the same as refutability, and can therefore likewise be 
taken as a criterion of demarcation”.110 
However, the falsification of a theory is not an easy task, for the simple 
reason that it is difficult to test the entire explanans (original hypothesis plus 
auxiliary statements and background knowledge). According to the Duhem-
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Quine thesis the empirical valuation of a theory is a composite test of several 
interconnected hypothesis: although evidence may show falsity within the 
theoretical framework, anomalous evidence will not necessarily indicate the 
individual element inside the theoretical framework responsible for a false 
prediction.111 Theoretical statements cannot therefore be singly disconfirmed: 
empirical data and their interpretation require instruments that themselves rely 
upon other theories as well (the idea of non-separability between theory and 
evidence).112 It is because no conclusive disproof of a theory can ever be 
produced that there is a need for methodological limits on the stratagems that 
may be adopted by scientists to safeguard their theories against refutation: 
these are “ad hoc theory adjustments designed to save theories from 
refutations”.113. These methodological limits –that Popper calls immunizing 
stratagems- are essential in his theory.114 A scientific theory is really testable 
when a scientist specifies in advance the observable conditions that would 
falsify the theory. If a theory succeeds repeatedly in resisting falsification and, 
if in addition it successfully predicts results that do not follow from competing 
theoretical explanations, it is judged to be highly confirmed or well 
corroborated.115  
Falsificationism has been influential, in different degrees, in the 
methodology of economics116, and as I am going to develop in the last part of 
this study, has directly inspired the standards on the admissibility of expert 
(scientific) evidence in courts in US law. If one applies, however, Popper’s 
methodology in economics, it is difficult to understand why the continuous 
refutation of the theory of rational action by behavioral or experimental 
economics has not led to a profound questioning of modern neoclassical price 
theory.117 If one takes Popper’s methodology seriously, the rationality 
postulate could be conceived of as an immunizing stratagem. There were two 
ways to get out of this problem.  
First, the strict character of Popper’s test led economic methodologists 
to rely on the theory of Popper’s successor at LSE, Imre Lakatos, in order to 
establish the scientific nature of economics.118 According to Lakatos, Popper's 
theory of demarcation relies on a strong corroboration test, based on the 
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assumption that there are such things as critical tests, which either falsify a 
theory, or give it a strong measure of corroboration. For Lakatos, falsification 
of a high-level scientific theory is never brought about by an isolated set of 
observations.119 Scientific theories are, instead, composed by different 
research programs, which are series of theories evolving over time. These 
theories have fundamental assumptions (called hard cores) and statements 
on the empirical implications of the program (called protective belt). Hard 
cores are irrefutable, in the sense that they are not challenged by those 
working within the specific research program. Lakatos thus de-emphasizes 
the importance of refutation. In addition, by referring to research programs, he 
introduced in the analysis the context of the specific scientific discovery or in 
other words scientific practice, which is, as I will develop further, a significant 
shift in the way we perceive the process of scientific discovery. 
Second, economic theorists employed a less known feature of 
Popper’s theory: “situational analysis” to justify their reliance on the rationality 
principle. Popper thought that the application of situational analysis to social 
sciences constitutes the most important difference from the methods of 
natural sciences.120. This principle may be false, but the principle “does not 
play the role of an empirical explanatory theory, of a testable hypothesis”.121 It 
is thus “a sound methodological policy to decide not to make the rationality 
principle accountable but the rest of the theory, that is, the model”, 
accountable.122 Popper justifies this approach as following: 
“The main argument in favor of this policy is that our model is far more 
interesting and informative, and far better testable, than the principle of 
the adequacy of our actions. We do not learn much in learning that this 
is not strictly true: we know this already. Moreover, in spite of being 
false, it is a rule sufficiently near the truth… Another point is this: the 
attempt to replace the rationality principle by another one seems to 
lead to complete arbitrariness in our model building. And we must not 
forget that we can test a theory only as a whole, and that the test 
consists in finding the better of two competing theories which may have 
much in common; and most of them have the rationality principle in 
common”.123 
The rationality principle is content-empty as it “is merely the assumption that a 
person will act adequately or sensibly, given his or her goals and the 
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situation”124. In other words, “the rationality principle produces its general 
explanatory power by turning persons in the situational model into 
abstractions; they behave how ‘anybody’ would behave in the situation”125, 
thus making irrelevant any particular psychological underpinnings of the 
human action (in the sense of laws of human psychology) or actor’s beliefs, 
values and the effect of social institutions.  
As Latsis observed, neoclassical economic theory, from the perfect 
competition to the monopolistic competition paradigm, is entirely based on the 
principle of situational determinism and its correlative, the principle of 
rationality: 
“1. The approach is individualistic: phenomena of market behaviour are 
explained in terms of individual human agents acting in a social 
situation. 
2. The rational choices of the individual agents are so constrained by 
their situation that only minimal psychological assumptions are required 
to explain their actions. 
3. Behaviour is animated by the principle that rational agents act 
appropriately to the ‘logic of the situation”.126 
The rationality principle does not integrate psychological or 
physiological criteria. Situational determinism invokes only the constraining 
nature of the decision making agent’s situation. The application of this 
approach led to the development of the hard core of the neoclassical theory of 
the firm, which further assumed that the end followed by all rational actors is 
utility maximization. This is not necessarily compatible with Popper’s theory of 
situational analysis as the latter envisions the possibility of different goals, 
according to the situation, for example fairness could be such an aim. 
However, in neoclassical economics, “business behavior has been 
characterized by the fundamental regulative assumption that decision making 
agents or agencies optimize under severe objective constraints”.127  
The strong version of the principle of rationality has been challenged by 
behavioral law and economics, which advanced its own version of the 
principle, the idea of bounded rationality or “quasi-rationality”.128 This theory 
has important implications on the theory of the consumer that could serve as 
a foundation for competition law intervention129. Furthermore, the predictive 
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limitations of the rationality principle in certain circumstances on the behavior 
of agents have also been explained by the development of the theory of social 
norms and institutional economics.130 
In conclusion, both instrumentalism and falsificationism reject induction 
as a proper method for (economic) science. Popper repudiates induction by 
substituting falsifiability in its place. It is easy, he argues, to obtain evidence in 
favor of virtually any theory. He consequently holds that such ‘corroboration’ 
should count scientifically only if it is the positive result of a genuinely ‘risky’ 
prediction, which might conceivably have been false. His position is, in some 
respects, supportive of the neoclassical school: there are no pure or theory-
free observations, which challenges the traditional view that science can be 
distinguished from non-science on the basis of its inductive methodology.131 In 
other words, Popper’s (and Friedman’s), view of the scientific process in 
methodology does not attach a great importance to induction as a 
demarcation criterion between science and non-science. 
 
2.2.3. The elusive demarcation criterion of facts-based reasoning versus 
theory/abstract reasoning 
 
 Third, positivism perceives facts as the manifestation of the external 
world: “facts in the concrete” should be distinguished from abstract reasoning, 
the latter involving opinion, thus human volition.132 Describing facts involves a 
selection and interpretation process. After all, we do not work on facts but on 
observations of facts (data) and inferences from these observations of facts. 
The values of the observant or the interpreter will inevitably introduce a 
certain degree of subjective judgment and abstract reasoning.  
Statistics appeared in the 17th-18th century (at least in the Western 
World), which corresponds to the period that marked the rise of economics as 
an autonomous discipline, a result of the growing importance of quantification 
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and measuring in social sciences during that period133. The problem of 
statistical analysis and inference, a technique thought to analyze pure facts, 
may illustrate the impossibility of separating completely values from facts. 
One should bear in mind that statistics constitute the foundation of many 
modern technical tools used in economics, such as econometrics, so this 
criticism applies to econometrics. 
 As Mark Blaug explains, 
“…statistical inference involves the use of sample observations to infer 
something about the unknown characteristics of an entire population, 
and in making that inference we can either be too stringent or too 
lax”134. 
In order to infer the existence of a relation between two variables, 
statisticians examine the validity of the research hypothesis (that there is a 
relation between the two variables) by disproving the null hypothesis (that 
there is no relationship between the two variables). The process of statistical 
analysis always runs the risk of, what is called, Type I errors (false positives), 
the decision to reject a correct null hypothesis, but also simultaneously the 
risk of Type II errors (false negatives), the error of not rejecting a false null 
hypothesis. Consequently, the evidence cannot be evaluated unless one 
decides whether the risk of Type I error is smaller or greater than the risk of 
Type II error. This operation involves a value judgment over the weight to be 
given to each risk of error. This implies that the decision-maker needs also to 
evaluate the costs that a Type I or Type II error will produce. As Daniel 
Rubinfeld rightly observes, “courts … ought to acknowledge explicitly that 
setting standards for statistical proof involves just such an assessment of 
comparative social costs”135. 
 More generally, there are various illustrations of the intervention of 
values in statistical analysis. I will focus here on the problems that are 
inherent in the particular method and will not examine the issue of the 
manipulation of data, which is certainly important but can be dealt with greater 
transparency over the methods, reasoning/assumptions and presentation of 
statistical analyses136. The selection of a representative sample which should 
be similar to the target population and which should take into account all the 
important variables constitutes the first step of a statistical analysis. The 
assumptions of the statistician play an important role in the sample selection. 
For example, the first step in sampling is to decide the unit of analysis and 
aggregation of the sample: this choice “may have consequences for the 
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statistical analysis that can be conducted and the conclusions that are drawn”, 
in particular if the specific “phenomenon of interest can be studied by 
observing things at different levels of aggregation, different conclusions result 
from one using one unit of analysis rather than another”137. One cannot 
exclude the possibility of a selection bias in drawing a sample in a way that 
“makes it unrepresentative of the population to which inferences are to be 
made”138. The possibility of a selection bias highlights the need for abstract 
reasoning, either to determine the population to which inferences are to be 
made, or to select a “representative” sample of this population139. 
 The problem of statistical significance constitutes a second example of 
the impossibility of value-free facts. The objective of statistical analysis is 
usually to establish the effect of one variable of interest to an outcome with 
the aim to identify how likely the result comes from the specific cause. In 
economics, for example, a possible question would be to establish the effect 
of prices on consumption. As indicated previously, statistical analysis is done 
on the basis of a representative sample to the population that is of interest. 
For the statistical results to carry weight, the researchers should estimate the 
likelihood that the results from the sample are representative of the results if 
the entire population was studied. The size of the sample may indicate a 
higher or lower (if the sample is small) likelihood that the observed effects in 
the sample are not the result of chance but that of systematic factors common 
to the studied population. Statistical significance answers to the question of 
how confident should the statistician be that the result is not the result of 
chance. In the extreme, one can avoid type I errors (the errors of rejecting the 
null hypothesis that there is no association between the variables) by 
accepting all null hypotheses.  
With time, developed the convention that a 95 percent likelihood that 
the association between variables is not the result of chance is sufficient for 
the statistician to be confident on her inference (statistical significance)140. 
The lack of statistical significance means that the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected. In other words, false positives (Type I errors) can only be less than 
5%, regardless of the fact that as a result of this choice there could be more 
Type II errors (false negatives). This does not necessarily prove that there is 
no association between the variables141. The level of statistical significance is 
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often set by the statistician in light of the acceptable rate of false positives. 
Statistical studies are thus marked by some degree of caution and 
conservatism, as the result will be deemed significant only if the statistician is 
confident (a confidence level of 95%) that the results are due to something 
other than chance. 
Statistical significance may be affected by the choice of the alternative 
or null hypothesis that will be tested, as the “choice of alternatives to the null 
hypothesis will affect the statistical significance of the results”142. An additional 
error often committed by economists is that they confuse statistical 
significance with substantive significance143. As it is explained by McCloskey 
and Ziliak, “a difference can be permanent… without being ‘significant’ in 
other senses… and significant for science or policy … and yet be insignificant 
statistically”144. It is important to specify and examine the “loss function” (utility 
loss associated with an estimate being wrong as a function of the difference 
between the estimated value and the real value), then, by what scale a 
number is large or small for the specific policy purpose and, finally, to perform 
a cost benefit analysis which will include the cost of this loss function145. In 
other words, there is an important difference between statistical significance 
and economic significance.  
 Current practice of market definition in antitrust cases may provide an 
example of the risk of confusion of statistical significance with economic/policy 
significance. Antitrust market definition aims to resolve the question of the 
competitive constraints faced by the particular monopolist or competitors 
parties to a collusive scheme that would impede them from exercising market 
power and therefore affecting consumers. It is common in this case to apply 
the SSNIP test (a form of hypothesis testing – small but significant and non-
transitory increase in price) in order to define the relevant market, estimate 
the existence of market power and therefore determine if antitrust intervention 
is justified. The test assumes that a dependent variable, the demand for the 
product, is a function of several independent variables (hypothetical market 
power of the undertaking): the impact of these independent variables on the 
dependent variable is isolated and then tested for its robustness with a 
statistical significance test. The SSNIP test seeks to identify the smallest 
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relevant market within which a hypothetical monopolist or cartel would be able 
to profitably increase prices.  
The starting point of the test is to observe whether a small increase in 
price would provoke that a significant number of consumers switch to another 
product, thus making the price increase unprofitably. The test relies more on 
total losses in sales after the price increase than just substitution to a 
particular competitor. If the price increase causes the sales of the affected 
products to fall sufficiently to render the increase in price unprofitable, the 
provisional market is expanded and the process is repeated. This aggregation 
process will eventually lead to the definition of a group of products (market) in 
which the SSNIP will be profitable. The US DOJ Merger Guidelines that first 
instituted this test in 1982 determined the hypothetical price increase to 5%: 
the SSNIP will be a price increase of 5% from current competitive prices146. 
The European Commission’s Notice on Market Definition defines the SSNIP 
at the range of 5-10%147. Both guidelines adopt a statistical significance test in 
order to determine the economic significance of a hypothetical price increase 
when measuring losses in sales148. The hypothetical monopolist test will 
produce different consequences for marginal consumers than for infra-
marginal consumers. If more than a “significant” part (95%) of the demand for 
the product is composed by marginal consumers, the relevant market will be 
defined more broadly in comparison to situations where a significant part of 
the demand is composed by infra-marginal consumers. Infra-marginal 
consumers will in this case finish by being charged higher prices than 
marginal consumers, as the market will be defined broadly and it would be 
more difficult to find the existence of a dominant position. 
 
2.2.4. Scientific practice as a limit to the demarcation criterion of 
scientific consensus 
 
Fourth, more recent studies on the process of scientific discovery insist 
on the role of scientific practice instead of philosophical principles in 
understanding the domain of science. Thomas Kuhn’s theory of paradigms 
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encapsulates this sociological turn in the theory and philosophy of science.149 
Kuhn’s main idea is that scientists in each field share the same paradigm (or 
“disciplinary matrix” as he called it). A paradigm is an exemplar of how to work 
in the field. It is usually based on a major success in the past and is acquired 
by practitioners during their professional socialization.150 
 The paradigm defines for practitioners what is worthwhile 
investigating, what methods are valid and what kinds of solutions are 
acceptable. Most of the time, Kuhn claims, scientists accumulate more 
knowledge and solve puzzles within the framework of such a paradigm, what 
he calls “normal science” or puzzle-solving.151 But alongside the accumulation 
of knowledge, anomalies accumulate as well, which leads to a process of 
change. Scientists find more and more phenomena and problems which 
cannot be explained or solved by the theories and methods of the existing 
paradigm. With the accumulation of such problems, more and more scientists 
feel uneasy and this is where revolutions happen. A revolution means that a 
new paradigm is adopted which allows scientists to solve the most disturbing 
anomalies. This involves a profound shift of the focus of research in this area. 
Kuhn’s framework has been applied and extended to economics by Johnson 
who identified four features of the concept of paradigm that, he thinks, may 
apply to economics: fundamental theoretical assumptions (e.g. the rationality 
principle), methods of analysis (e.g. econometric techniques), focal variables 
(e.g. the distinction between micro and macro-economics), basic issues 
referring to the puzzles of particular groups (e.g. growth for neoclassical 
economists, employment for Keynesianists).152 Johnson adds the purposive 
function of the theory, “the goal towards which a strong research program 
directs its efforts”, which underlies and directs theoretical formulations and 
empirical research. A shift of paradigm happens when series of anomalies 
lead to a new perception of the purpose of inquiry: the purposive function of 
the theory determines which anomalies are likely to be regarded as serious 
enough to precipitate a professional crisis.153 Different paradigms have 
specific purposive functions: while the purposive function of classical 
economics was that of maximizing the society’s social and economic welfare, 
ordinalist neoclassical economics’s purposive function was narrower: the 
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maximization of subjective individual welfare, distributive concerns being 
totally ignored .154 
One of the implications of this analysis for our purposes is that one 
should not elevate current scientific consensus to a demarcation criterion 
between science and pseudo-science. It is possible that different paradigms 
emerge and succeed in gradually shifting the current scientific consensus to 
another one. These “revolutionary” theories may rely on a contested, from the 
current scientific consensus’ perspective, theoretical assumption or 
methodology. Their success depends on the capacity of the new paradigm to 
provide satisfactory explanations for the anomalies the previously dominant 
paradigm was unable to explain. But would providing satisfactory explanations 
and a more coherent theoretical framework than the previous paradigm be 
enough to ensure success?  
Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network Theory offers an interesting, and still 
controversial answer to this question.155 Scientific knowledge, as any other 
knowledge is being shaped in a complex social process. It is therefore 
important to observe scientists at work and, in particular, examine how 
scientific knowledge is actually constructed156, to listen to their conversations 
and to follow rigorously the historical development of theories157. Empirical 
findings are not valueless but their meaning is not given and has to be 
negotiated among competent scientists (persons who are regarded competent 
by their peers) who may hold different interpretations of the same “facts”: 
“(t)he empirical findings are therefore contingent, without that meaning that 
they are unimportant”158.  
Empirical evidence is crucial, but its meaning is never objectively given. 
Empirical evidence can be interpreted in many different ways, but it may also 
limit the range of possible interpretations. “This does not necessarily mean 
that knowledge is determined by interests external to the scientific practice, 
such as political and ideological beliefs”159. The intent of the enterprise is to 
underline that scientific knowledge is the result of dialectical relations among 
social, institutional, conceptual and other elements of science in various 
combinations160. 
Constructivism opts for symmetric treatment for different theories. 
According to this symmetry principle, one should treat in the same fashion 
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scientific theories that have triumphed and those that have lost161. Saying that 
truth-claims are contingents, does not mean that everything goes however, 
not does it mean that any two views are equally plausible. Constructivism 
does not deny that some claims are true and others are false, but it highlights 
the fact at the frontier of science the known evidence usually gives rise to 
more than one reasonable theory, that is, a theory that competent 
practitioners deem reasonable in light of the known evidence162. So the 
decision of scientists that something is “true”, is decided only by the 
negotiation, alliances, and rhetoric of the “philosopher stone’s merchants”, as 
this has been demonstrated by historical and empirical studies that show that 
“what scientists have perceived as the ideals of science have varied across 
disciplines, times and places”163. “Unlike other approaches, the constructivist 
approach calls attention to the fact that success and usefulness are not given 
by nature but constructed in a process of negotiation and conflict”164. So 
constructivism is compatible with all methods and approaches and “refuses to 
deprive the status of science from a given practice because some powerful 
gatekeepers feel that this method is improper”165. 
It is clear that the constructivist approach adopts a pluralist perspective 
on science. Nevertheless, this raises a new question. If scientists have the 
choice between different methodologies, how should we explain the option 
that was actually selected? Yonay is right when he notes that 
“traditionally, students of science implied that the development of 
scientific knowledge is determined by the quality of contending 
theories. But if the question is what kind of theories are considered 
adequate and what scientific methods are used we need a new kind of 
conceptual framework? 
The Actor-Network approach has suggested an interesting one. 
The Actor-Network theory (ANT) approach perceives scientists as 
involved in attempts to promote their own contributions and turn them into 
“black-boxes166”, that is “into knowledge which is accepted and used on a 
regular basis as a matter of fact”167. Scientists are involved in what Bruno 
Latour calls “trials of strength”, at which their claims about the validity of their 
findings and the usefulness of their research has to withstand challenges 
made by competing colleagues.168 A successful trial means that the 
contribution “was incorporated into an institutional set of practices”169.In other 
words, any theory can become a “black-box”, once an agreement has been 
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reached that transforms it to an obligatory passage point, that is, something 
that cannot be dispensed with. 
In order to succeed in trials of strength, scientists who compete among 
themselves, have to attract various “allies” in order to support their cases and 
make them more defensible.170 Allies can be “anything that bears upon the 
strength of the contribution in question, including of course other scientists or 
people who support the contribution, either financially, or by bestowing their 
authority upon it, or by simply using it”.171 That could be also the authority of 
respected practitioners in the field, examples from neighboring fields or from 
other prestigious disciplines, the views of philosophers and methodologists. 
“Facts” are the most important allies and in most disciplines they have a 
considerable weight172. But “facts rarely speak for themselves”173. They need 
scientists as “mouthpieces”, and “the scientists who summon them must 
interpret them, convince others in their actuality and explain how they support 
their arguments”174. 
The point is not that scientists manipulate facts but that nobody knows 
what the Truth is before the trials of strength are provisionally concluded. 
Scientists must advance their theory with the aim to convince their colleagues 
of its merit to strengthen the impact of the specific network and therefore form 
part of its “black box”. One cannot distinguish between substantive argument 
and rhetoric. In other words, there is no argument without rhetoric.  
If one follows this view, economists may be perceived as participating 
in conversations. “They argue to persuade each other and occasionally to 
convince non-economists”175. They compete for credibility, which leads to the 
emergence of a specific market for credibility where “there is demand from 
investors for information… and there is supply of information from other 
investors”176. The credibility/persuasiveness of claims “does not only depend 
on arguments, metaphors, analogies, but also on financial resources, 
personal ties, organizational skills”177. “All allies – people, money, facts, 
methodological principles, theories, practices organizations and so forth 
constitute a network which upholds and ratifies each element of it.: it is difficult 
to undermine any single link of the network without undermining the others 
and therefore the ability to connect a new element (method, theory, etc) to a 
strong network is likely to ensure its success in ensuring trials of strength”178. 
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The concept of network overlaps in some degree with institutional 
bodies such as schools, disciplines, paradigms and research programs.179 A 
network is  wider and much more complex a unit than a school and 
constitutes a different concept than a paradigm. It is possible to include in the 
same network scientists that do not share the same views and do not 
necessarily cite the work of each other. We do not have to assume that all so-
called neoclassical economists, for instance, share the same priors, which is 
not the case, as the existence of various schools illustrates. The claim that 
neoclassical economists often refer to similar allies is sufficient. It follows that 
it is not necessary to decide who is in and who is out. “It is absolutely 
conceivable that some scholars would make a more frequent use of the 
neoclassical allies that over time some elements of the neoclassical network 
would become more or less popular, or that some scholars will tie their works 
no more than one hard core”180. It is therefore fruitless to argue whether a 
certain actor really belongs to this or that school. The task of the historian or 
the sociologist is rather to “locate the various social and ideational 
connections and follow how the practitioners themselves have defined the 
various schools and approaches”.181 
The ANT framework has been applied in economics by Yval Yonay in 
his seminal study of the conflict between the old institutionalists and 
neoclassical economists in the Inter-War era182. The struggle between these 
two “networks” is of particular importance for my purposes, as each school 
has profoundly influenced competition law and policy in different periods of 
time. Institutionalists were attached to the empirical and inductive model of 
science. For them valid theory should be dynamic, evolutionary and relative, 
concerned broadly and objectively with processes rather than with precise 
implications of conceptual definitions, scientifically inductive rather than 
formalistically logical in method.183  Neoclassicists counter-attacked by 
pointing out to those aspects of prestigious sciences that were more similar to 
the deductive methods of neoclassical economics, such as theoretical 
physics. In the absence of the possibility of laboratory experimentation (as 
neoclassical economists rejected introspection as a valid method of 
observation), economics was justified in being even more deductive in its 
nature than physics. Institutionalists’ emphasis on the role of social institutions 
is a further source of disagreement. In contrast, neoclassical economists 
focused on a specific aspect of human volition and insisted that economics 
should focus on illuminating the rational aspect of human behavior, without 
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integrating in the analysis exogenous factors, such as institutions. The trial of 
strength between institutionalists and neo-classical economists was finally 
won by the latter, because of the alliance of neoclassical economic theory 
with mathematical economics, in particular during the 1950s.184 The power of 
attraction of mathematical economics was augmented by the development of 
econometrics as a new approach to quantitative research that differed from 
the way institutionalists practiced such research.185 The alliance between 
neoclassical economics, mathematical economics and econometrics 
managed to turn quantitative research from an ally of institutionalists into an 
ally of neoclassical economics. The intense use of the language of 
mathematics or mathematical reasoning has indeed been considered by 
some authors as the demarcation point between orthodox (neoclassical) and 
heterodox economics.186 Mathematical reasoning supports the deductive, 
“close-system” nature of neoclassical economic theory, which ensures greater 
simplicity, elegance and thus appeals to economists.187 
As different networks engage in continuous trials of strength, one 
cannot exclude that the legal system may operate as an important strategic 
ally. The normative force of the legal system will ensure that the societal 
structure that a social science, such as economics, attempts to explain, will be 
profoundly influenced by the concepts and way of thinking of the mainstream 
economic theory of the moment. It is quite well accepted and documented that 
economic theory may be the conceptual substratum of many parts of the legal 
system. One may give the example of the laissez-faire doctrine of the 
classical school of economics as a main inspiration of the Western legal 
system until the emergence of the progressive movement in late 19th century. 
Soviet Union, where the entire legal system was built on the foundations of 
Marxism also provides a compelling example. It seems that the integration of 
economic learning by the legal system constitutes an assurance of success in 
the trials of strength that oppose different networks in economics and has 
stabilizing effects for the mainstream. It may also explain the considerable lag 
between the emergence of a new theory/network as mainstream in science 
and its adoption by the legal system. For example, although the Chicago 
school criticism to activist antitrust enforcement dates from the late 
1950s/1960s, their influence at the courtroom has been felt much later (at the 
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end of 1970s). The particular characteristics of legal authority and precedent 
may explain lawyer’s reticence to embrace new economic theories.  
My point is that if one believes that economics matter for law, it is also 
easy to conclude that law matters for economics. It could be argued that one 
of the strategies of scientific “networks” is to influence, to take up the legal 
system. The legal system will bestow its authority on the theories defended by 
the members of the network. In other words, the legal system is a powerful 
ally. This point of view has important implications on the debate over scientific 
economic expertise in courts. The exclusion or marginalization of competing 
networks from the process of expertise, by presenting them as unscientific or 
unreliable, constitutes a rational strategy. This may be particularly attenuated 
by the development of an exclusionary ethos for certain types of economic 
expertise, based on methodological rather than substantive concerns, as the 
last part of this study will show. 
 
2.2.5. Pragmatism as a limit to the demarcation criterion of objectivity 
 
 Fifth, the idea of scientific objectivity has been increasingly challenged 
by the re-emergence of pragmatism or neo-pragmatism and the discursive 
turn in social theory, among different movements claiming affiliations to post-
modern theory. These new theories change the traditional perception of the 
process of scientific discovery and consequently the relation between law and 
science, which is fundamental for the understanding of the integration of 
scientific (and economic) expertise in litigation.  
Although there are different versions of pragmatism, such as that of 
Peirce, James, Dewey, Rorty, a common trend that runs across the 
pragmatism movement is the opposition to foundationalism, the view that 
there is an objective Truth and that the scientific method provides a unique 
pathway to discover reality. However, pragmatists are not relativists; they 
simply adhere to an instrumental definition of reality/truth: truth is what works 
as the solution of concrete problems and enhances human knowledge.188 This 
instrumental definition of reality leads pragmatists to question, what they call, 
the “spectator theory of knowledge”189. Rorty attacked this “mirror metaphor” 
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or representational theory of knowledge”: knowledge amounts to “a special 
privileged class of representations”190. The research process is inevitably 
situated and contextual; truth is made, not discovered. It is therefore 
“pointless to isolate something called ‘the scientific method”191.  
Rorty advanced a different conception of science, perceived more as a 
discourse, a conversation or rhetoric. Scientific discourse constitutes “a 
particular type of social conversation”192. There are no constraints on the 
object of the scientific inquiry, “save conversational ones”193. This has 
important implications on the conception of scientific knowledge:  
“…scientific knowledge is not the result of an attempt to mirror nature 
but rather the outcome of a particular type of social conversation: the 
scientific conversation. From here, it is but a short step to the explicit 
study of science as discource or rhetoric: the view that science is best 
understood as a type of of persuasion – a particular type of persuasion 
– but one that should be examined by employing the tools of rhetorical 
analysis”194.  
Deirde McCloskey conceptualized economics as a form of persuasive 
language, what she called “the rhetoric of economics”.195 McCloskey 
distinguishes between the official philosophy of economics, positivism, that 
economists employ in their interaction with the outsiders and the 
“conversation economists have among themselves for the purposes of 
persuading each other” of a specific thesis or model.196 The point is, as 
Boylan and O’Gorman observe, that “economists are not working in a 
positivistic vacuum: rather they, like other scientist, are addressing audiences 
in historically situated contexts”197. In that sense, “mathematical models are 
literary figures of speech”198. McCloskey is highly critical of the “modernist” 
influence in economics, the idea that “science is understood in axiomatic 
terms with the focus on prediction, control and the observable world”199. This 
type of rule-bound methodology may work for physics and mathematics but 
these are not good models for economics200. As McCloseky notes, 
“In practice methodology serves chiefly to demarcate Us from Them, 
demarcating science from nonscience … Methodology and its 
corollary, the Demarcation Problem … are ways of stopping 
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conversation by limiting conversation to people on our side of the 
demarcation line”.201 
There is “no need for philosophical lawmaking or methodological regulation to 
keep the economy of intellect running just fine”202.  
McCloskey does not deny the utility of method “with a small m”, but 
distinguishes it from the modernist Methodology, which may lead to fanaticism 
and intolerance203. This method “with a small m” constitutes the Sprachethik 
of economics, “the meta rules that we implicitly adopt by the mere fact of 
joining what our culture thinks of as conversation”.204 The analogy of 
economics as a form of conversation shows how insignificant is the issue of 
demarcation, the question of how we distinguish true science from pseudo-
science, “since nothing important depends on the outcome”205. As Marc 
Perlman notes, 
 “economists’ self-perception is that of an expert. But economists are 
not experts; they are basically persuaders”206. 
The challenges of pragmatism to the received view of scientific objectivity and 
to Methodology may acquire greater force if one thinks of the contingency of 
the main object of economic thought: human affairs.  
If economics is conceived as a form of discussion/communication 
whose objective is not to discover the external world but to promote the 
cognitive interest of the participants to this “dialogical encounter”, in other 
words to achieve self-knowledge207, then there is little point in having different 
rules for the assessment and integration of economics than for other forms of 
discourse. This is not to say that there are no scientific methods (with a small 
m) but that the legal system should recognize the importance of 
methodological pluralism in designing the interaction between legal and 
economic discourse. 
Important practical implications follow from this approach. First, it is 
futile to raise demarcation barriers before assessing the practical utility of the 
specific point of view, in conjunction with a series of observations, theories or 
other points of view. Second, judicial decision makers should assess the 
economic discourse critically, as they would have done for any other type of 
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discourse. This is not to deny the specific difficulty of non expert judges that 
need to understand and critically assess complex economic expertise. 
Different mechanisms could be developed to address this issue208. 
Courts should examine the various contexts of the specific economic 
discourse:  historical (a sort of archeological approach á la Foucault, where 
the legal decision maker examines the genealogy and evolution of the specific 
economic concept)209, social (the disciplinary function of the specific 
discourse, in other words the aim it was and is still supposed to achieve) and 
cultural (the relation between the economic discourse and other types of 
discourse, the perception of the specific discourse inside and outside the 
“economists’ club”). More importantly, the judicial decision maker should 
acknowledge the different nature of her mission, in comparison to that of the 
economist or expert: her objective is not to develop self-understanding and 
self-knowledge but to give a legitimate (in the sense of persuasive) solution to 
a legal dispute. For example, the legal decision maker should find irrelevant 
the need for economists to define restrictively the object of their study in order 
to increase its epistemological accuracy (in terms of deductive reasoning) and 
therefore respectability towards other members of the scientific club (e.g. 
natural scientists). This quest for respectability and conceptual coherence was 
particularly influential in the decision to ignore any ethical, social or 
psychological dimensions in the progressive construction of the ideal model of 
homo economicus: economists were aware that their approach was by 
definition incomplete and essentially a purely methodological decision. In 
contrast, legal discourse is by definition holist: it should incorporate all the 
dimensions of human existence if it is to be persuasive to the much broader 
group of constituents that it is addressed to. But judicial decision makers 
should also be attentive to the conditions that make scientific discourse 
blossom: that is, its openness, dialogue and continuous critical self-
assessment. Our focus should therefore shift to the impact of the legal 
system, in particular the rules of scientific expertise, on the evolution of 
economic discourse. 
2.3. The development of an economic science for litigation: implications for 
the evolution of research in antitrust economics 
  
Déirde Dwyer observes that “expert evidence is presented by 
witnesses who represent persistent communities of practice outside the legal 
domain” before concluding that the courts should recognize “a social aspect to 
the assessment of expert evidence that does not exist for non-expert 
evidence”210. One could indeed conceptualize the domains of law and 
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economics as two distinct self-contained and self-referential autopoietic social 
systems, employing a distinct discourse/language (style of talk/rhetoric)211. 
For example, the concept of rationality could take a different form in the 
context of economic discourse than in legal discourse212. A characteristic of 
autopoietic systems is that communications occur mainly within the system 
itself, not with the outside world213. One way to conceive it is to think of the 
existence of different conversations going on at the same time within different 
groups of participants (social actors). Once the conversations get started, they 
have their own script, which participants of other groups that could 
occasionally participate to the conversation cannot alter.  
This does not mean that each sub-system ignores all others and that 
each discourse is incommensurable with one another. Autopoietic social 
systems are cognitively open to their environment, although they are 
normatively closed. How that happens? It is possible to argue that all of us 
participate at the same time to different conversations or games if we prefer 
this metaphor. The participants to these different conversations (an individual 
can belong to more than one disciplines) may bring to the conversation 
information acquired from other social sub-systems to which they also 
participate214. This is how facts, concepts, theories may spread from one sub-
system over time into other specialist system or the society in general215. Put 
differently, one can be a strong value constructivist but a weak 
epistemological constructivist216. 
Legal and economic discourse can therefore mutually influence each 
other. The legal assessment of economic expertise may affect the evolution of 
economic discourse. The interaction between law and scientific discourse 
does not take only one direction: e.g. economics influence law. Legal 
discourse influences also the production and directions of economic 
discourse. Sheila Jasanoff has been correct to highlight how “the law today 
not only interprets the social impacts of science” but also “constructs” the very 
environment in which scientific discourse comes to have “meaning, utility, and 
force”217. Research is conducted and interpreted to answer legal questions 
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and the content of scientific knowledge is shaped in a complex social process, 
which includes the legal sub-system as well as scientific discourse. Judicial 
decision-making exercises an important influence on the definitions of “good 
science”, therefore affecting at the same time the content and direction of 
economic discourse.  
An illustration of the profound interaction between legal and economic 
discourse is the emergence of economic “schools of thought” as a way to 
conceptualize and rationalize ex post legal doctrine and authority in the area 
of competition law. There is a lot of literature recently on the question of the 
dominant “school” of economic thought that is followed by the current 
Supreme Court of the United States. 
Professor Einer Elhauge from Harvard University has recently 
published an article entitled “Harvard, not Chicago: Which Antitrust School 
Drives Recent Supreme Court Decisions?”, implying that there is a dominant 
“school” of economic thought that provides its conceptual guidance to the 
antitrust jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court; After examining the 14 most 
recent cases of the Supreme Court in antitrust professor Elhauge argues that  
“the Supreme Court has sided with the Harvard School… It has also 
sided with sound economic analysis to resolve antitrust issues, rather 
than a resort to either the old formalisms that favored plaintiffs, or new 
formalisms that try to favor defendants”218. 
At the same Journal issue there was a second article by Professor Joshua 
Wright from George Mason University arguing exactly the opposite:  
“the Roberts Court decisions embrace the Chicago School of antitrust 
analysis and predict that the antitrust jurisprudence of this Court will 
increasingly reflect this influence”219. 
These are non-exhaustive examples of the growing antitrust law and 
economics schools-related literature in antitrust.220 If explanatory features of 
economic discourse, such as schools of economic thought, become also 
explanatory features of legal discourse, there a point to make that there is a 
profound interaction and mutual influence between the two discourses. This 
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approach of conceptualizing the evolution of competition law doctrine 
indicates that institutionalised “schools” or “networks” play an important role in 
antitrust discourse, if not always during the process of formation of 
competition law doctrine, at least at the stage of the ex post conceptual 
rationalization of the case law and therefore its subsequent interpretation. But 
how this process takes place? 
 A possible explanation is the existence of a hybrid competition law 
community formed by lawyers and economists that is in constant 
communication, either in the practical aspect of competition law enforcement 
or in the more theoretical aspect of competition law doctrine. However, this 
does not explain why only certain schools of economic thought seem to attract 
the interest of competition law doctrine and not others: Chicago, Harvard, 
post-Chicago, ordoliberal school are explanatory devices for a mixed (legal 
and economic) set of assumptions, values, policies: they are carriers of 
meaning for both economic concepts, such as barriers to entry, and legal 
implications, such as the definition of dominance or monopoly power. It is 
harder to see how Austrian, Institutional, Marxist, Evolutionist economics, to 
give some example, may be explanatory devices outside the realm of 
economic discourse and serve as conceptual categories within legal 
discourse. 
One could argue that this is linked to the fact that only specific schools 
of economic thought have been attentive to the issue of competition. This is 
certainly not a satisfactory response: for example, there is a distinct Marxist 
theory of competition, which, for different reasons has never made it to the 
courtrooms and has never attracted the attention of competition law 
discourse221. An alternative explanation may be that some of the members of 
the economics community benefit from a privileged access to the legal 
community in competition law, therefore being able to pass their specific 
message on the relevant and adequate economic discourse that should 
underpin legal discourse. This hypothesis, which needs to be empirically 
verified, builds on the observation that economists that are in constant 
communication with competition lawyers in enforcing competition law 
influence the perception, by these lawyers, of the content of economic 
discourse. The increasing role of economic consultancies and forensic 
economics in competition law and policy illustrates the profound interaction 
between these different actors and the constitution of specific sub-
communities.222 The emergence of a market for economic experts in Europe 
illustrates the development of forensic economics or applied antitrust 
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economics as a specific field of economic enquiry.  Competition law experts 
are also highly specialised and are used to have recourse to economic 
reasoning, even in areas outside the close realm of competition law.  
The hypothesis assumes that there are two distinct sub-communities in 
the economics profession: forensic economists and academic economists and 
that the respective influence of schools of economic thought may be different 
in each of these two communities. This distinction needs to be established 
empirically, for example by examining the representation of each school of 
economic thought, as identified by the fact that the members of this “school” 
or “network” share common beliefs, in the sub-communities of forensic 
economists and academic economists, as well as by identifying situations 
where there is a significant gap of representation for a school in each sub-
community. In other words, the research will measure the distribution of 
specific beliefs within each community. The distinction between forensic and 
academic economists also assumes that the mode of operation of each sub-
community is different. Drawing on the work of Robert Merton on the reward 
system of open science, based on priority, one could argue the specificity of 
the academic community of economists with regard to community of forensic 
economists, which is not marked by openness (there is an inherent bias that 
only the results that could be positive to the client are publicly shared)223. In 
essence, the reward system in science is managed by the scientific 
community itself. This does not exclude the intervention of the market 
mechanism at a second stage, after the social reward structure of collegiate 
science took place, “picking up” the disclosed knowledge or information 
brought in by the open science phase in order to develop new products and 
services224. Dasgupta and David have clearly shown that changes brought to 
the underlying reward system of science will have particular implications on 
the “autonomy” of the scientific process, “in the sense of the scientific 
community’s self governance and control over the research agenda”225. 
Others, like Wible have developed a complements view of the organization of 
the scientific process, with market and nonmarket institutions being separate 
institutions but also fulfilling the “dual nature of the scientific enterprise”: a 
unique non market structure and a “secondary science” relying on markets226. 
Wible emphasizes the need to preserve this institutional and epistemic 
diversity:  
“a variety of qualitatively differentiated organizations are essential for 
resolving epistemic scarcity. Humanity cannot depend on just one 
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institution like the market or even the primacy of one institution among 
others. We cannot pull all our organizational ‘eggs’ into one institutional 
basket”227. 
Calls for epistemic diversity have also been recently made in 
competition law economics literature. Oliver Budzinski, among others, has 
highlighted the risks of “monoculture” in competition economics and proposed 
“theory pluralism” of competition policy paradigms as being an essential 
prescription for public policy in this area228. Budzinski’s argument must be 
understood in the context of the debate over the need or not to harmonize 
competition law globally. His contribution attempts to demonstrate the benefits 
of a decentralised approach. However, his most recent formulation of the 
pluralism argument goes further than that. After exposing the basic tenets of 
different competition theories and policy programs (classic and neoclassic 
price theory, Harvard, Chicago and post-Chicago schools, German 
ordoliberalism, Austrian market process theory), Budzinski concludes from 
this pluralism that it is not possible to derive “an unequivocal, scientifically true 
antitrust policy”229. He is critical to the attempt to perform comparative 
evaluations of market performance in economies with different institutional 
and policy choices in order to decide which are the adequate competition 
policy programs (best practices), a procedure that is broadly used at the 
international level (OECD, ICN). These attempts underpin the idea that there 
is a superior, “objective”, theory; however, as he immediately remarks, even 
within the Popperian framework, theories can be proved false but not true, 
therefore there cannot be any serious claim for an ultimate theory230. 
“Sustainable pluralism of competition theories” should thus serve as an 
imperative for science and public policy.  
Budzinski’s policy recommendations are nonetheless less clear. The 
main difficulty of his conceptualization lies with the different time frame and 
objectives of judicial decision-making, in comparison to those of the scientific 
process. For example, should the objective of theory pluralism lead the courts 
to choose a minority theory instead of a majority one, the two theories being 
equal from the point of view of explanatory power, for the simple reason that 
choosing a dominant theory will be reducing pluralism? On what practical 
basis should this choice for pluralism be made in this case? Would that 
require the artificial preservation of “degenerescent” research programs for 
the simple sake of pluralism? Budzinski’s focus on pluralism (the end result to 
achieve) ignores an important aspect, which is mentioned in his study, the 
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theory selection process. Any analysis of pluralism should depart from the 
consideration of the selection process and in particular the reasons that lead 
to its biased non pluralistic results, as demonstrated by the use of the 
terminology of “dominant” paradigm. It is certain that if the selection process, 
which can be conceived as applied practical reason, worked well, there would 
be no “dominant” theory, in the sense that the representatives of all “research 
programs” and “paradigms” will feel confident that their positions are equally 
taken into consideration in adjudicating each case. 
The lack of trust in the selection process could be explained from the 
fact that there is the perception that actors (“research programs”, “paradigms”, 
“schools”) behave strategically. Building on Actor-Network-Theory, this study 
assumes that the content of scientific knowledge is shaped in a complex 
social process. Social networks and relations of power have important 
implications on the directions of the future research agenda and on the 
emergence of dominant schools of thought in science. For example, legal 
mechanisms, such as specific standards for the admissibility and evaluation of 
expertise, may be used by the different actors of the system in order to gain a 
leading position for their “school” of economic theory. The social costs include 
the costs flowing from the monopoly of a particular school of economics in the 
marketplace of ideas. This is a significant concern, in view of the important 
economic consequences of competition law litigation and the benefits of 
scientific pluralism, the existence of different research programs, for the 
consideration of all important aspects of human behaviour, not necessarily 
taken into account by all schools (an example could be the concept of 
bounded rationality). 
As it was previously indicated, competition law may be an important 
and valuable “ally” for competing networks, in particular because of the 
professionalization of economic expertise in this sector and the ability to 
attract new members to join the “schools” or “network”, essentially because of 
the important “rents” to be shared. In other words, I assume that, as any other 
rational economic agent, economists are rational maximizers of wealth 
engaged in rent-seeing activities231. A public choice framework could then 
apply in order to conceptualize the members of an economic “school” or 
network as seeking to increase the relevance of their “school” of thought for 
legal analysis and exclude competing networks.  
Proving the blurring of the distinction between academic economists, 
motivated by the reward process of open science, and forensic economists, 
motivated by a different reward market-based process, could be an important 
step in recognizing that radical changes in the reward structure of science 
leads to a biased selection process in terms of theory pluralism. The blurring 
of the distinction between forensic economics and academic economics 
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corresponds to actual practice: exchanges between expert witnesses are not 
confined to the courtroom but, in practice, extend to the broader academic 
debate, in journals, conferences, the SSRN etc. Preparing the public defence 
of a specific theory and position that is favourable to one of the parties in 
these academic circles is part of the strategy to establish the legitimacy and 
persuasiveness of the claim. Ironically, this is also one of the side-effects of 
the distrust of judges towards expert witnesses. When they refer to economic 
reasoning, judges tend to grant more weight to published economic 
commentary rather than to the expert witnesses’ reports. 
The existence of a market for economic experts may affect the 
scientific process of investigation in economics. Contrary to other disciplines, 
where forensic scientists and academic researchers form distinct scientific 
communities, the leading forensic competition economists are academics who 
actively participate in theoretical economic debates. Consequently, the 
emergence of a market for economic experts inevitably affects the research 
agenda of certain areas in economics (e.g. industrial organization, welfare 
economics) linked to competition policy. The hypothesis that the institutional 
framework of economic expertise, in particular the existence of rules and 
procedures governing the integration, admissibility and evaluation of 
economic expertise may not have a neutral effect on the evolution of scientific 
investigation, introduces a novel research question, which has to be examined 
empirically, through the analysis of the work of economic consultancies, their 
links with academic economists, the emergence of a specialisation of forensic 
economists to defendant or plaintiff-friendly in order to enhance their 
employability232. 
The analysis of the conceptual framework of expertise, the epistemic 
asymmetry problem between judges and experts, in conjunction with the issue 
of expert’s bias, lead to a number of problems identified under the labels of 
moral hazard, adverse selection and economic science for litigation. However, 
these problems may occur in different degrees depending on the area of 
competition law enforcement and the respective role of judicial decision-
makers and experts. It is therefore important to examine the scope and 
implications of economic expertise in competition law. 
 
3. Economic expertise in competition law: scope and implications 
 
3.1. The legal relevance of economic expertise in EC Competition law 
 
The factual complexity and economic nature of competition law 
disputes requires the presentation of economic expert testimony in “all but a 
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few” cases233. Interpretation of facts through economic methods and in 
particular quantitative analysis is crucial in order to prove a competition law 
infringement or to calculate the damages caused by an anticompetitive 
practice234. Since the publication of the EC Merger Regulation in 1989, the 
role of economic analysis in EC competition law has been on the rise. For 
example, references to cross-price elasticity in the case law, the 
Commission’s decisions and soft or hard law instruments may illustrate this 
trend. The following Table compiles the number of citations in Westlaw on 
cross-price elasticity and the SSNIP test (Table 1). 
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The existence of block exemption regulations containing hardcore 
restrictions, in the context of Article 81 EC, may limit the necessity for 
extensive economic analysis in a number of cases. It is, however, clear that 
the importance of self-assessment following the entry into force of Regulation 
1/2003, the publication of a number of guidelines containing extensive 
economic analysis in the context of Article 81 and EC merger control and the 
recent decisional practice and guidance of the European Commission in 
Article 82 cases requires from firms and their counsel the consideration of the 
effects of business practices on consumers and consequently a fair amount of 
economic analysis. To this phenomenon, one could add the implications of 
the decentralization process in EC competition law. National courts and 
judges, as well as national competition authorities, are now among the 
primary actors of the European competition law enforcement system. They 
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have jurisdiction to apply Article 81, paragraph 3, which includes a careful 
balancing test of the anticompetitive effects of a business practice with the 
efficiency gains it is likely to bring and that could be passed on to the 
consumers. It seems that this type of cost benefit analysis, which has already 
been used in merger control, is currently expanding in the interpretation of 
Article 82 EC235. This increases the likelihood that judges will be confronted to 
economic analysis and will have to make use of economic expertise. 
One could give the example of the concept of relevant market or the 
operation of market definition that is an essential step in finding the existence 
of a competition law infringement, except for hardcore practices which are 
anticompetitive by their object. Economists will find such a step redundant, as 
their analysis focuses directly on the existence of anticompetitive effects. 
Nonetheless, the integration of this step in assessing the existence of an 
infringement of competition indicates the important influence of economic 
thinking in EC competition law. Since the Commission’s Guidelines on market 
definition in 1997236, the SSNIP test (Small but Significant non Transitory 
Increase in Price test) has replaced the more functionalist and therefore 
“subjective” approach of market definition that the Court of Justice employed 
in the notorious United Brands case.237 The next step in this continuous 
process of emulation of economic approaches and methods in competition 
law was the abandonment of the requirement of market definition in the 
application of Article 81 EC, when it is possible, through econometric 
methods, to evaluate directly the existence of market power and 
anticompetitive effects.238 
The concept of market power also illustrates the importance of economic 
thinking in the definition of the scope of the provisions of EC competition law. 
Although the analysis followed under Article 81 is still based on presumptions 
and filters (it is not a full effects based approach), these presumptions are 
generally framed by economic thinking. The distinction between vertical and 
horizontal agreements constitutes an obvious example of the importance of 
economic thinking in the design of legal presumptions and categories.239 The 
increasing role of efficiency gains analysis, in the context of Article 81, 
paragraph 3, in the EC merger control regulation as well as in article 82 EC 
also illustrates the point. The influence of economics is not only limited to the 
integration of economic concepts in law. Quantitative techniques may also be 
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used in order to render these concepts operational: the hypothetical 
monopolist test and residual demand analysis in market definition, 
concentrations indexes and price concentration studies in order to define the 
structure of the market, regression analysis and price correlation for the 
analysis of price behaviour, econometric forecasting and but for tests for the 
quantification of damages constitute some examples of techniques now 
employed in competition law.240 
An illustration of this expansion of the economic approach is the 
emergence of a market for economic expertise in competition litigation. 
According to Damien Neven, the annual turnover of the main economic 
consultancy firms has increased by a factor of 20 since the early 1990s and 
currently exceeds 20 million £241. This is about 15% of the aggregate fees 
earned on antitrust cases. In the meantime, there has been a surge in 
recruiting economists in competition authorities. There are 83 professional 
economists out of 267 in total at the Directorate General of Competition at the 
European Commission that have a background in economics242. In 2003, the 
Commission established the position of the Chief economist with a team of 11 
economists with the aim to provide the necessary economic input to the 
decisions of the European Commission and other legislative proposals. The 
institution of chief economist has expanded to national competition authorities, 
such as the Office of Fair Trading in the United Kingdom or the French 
Competition Authority. The surge in recruiting economists in competition 
authorities was partly the consequence and partly the reason of the 
introduction of economic analysis in EC competition law. However, the 
European Courts have usually been reluctant to re-assess the economic 
analysis of the European Commission, although the situation has recently 
evolved towards a more intensive judicial review, in particular in the area of 
EC merger control. The nature of the judicial process is one of the elements 
that determine the intensity of the interaction between the judge and the 
economic expert. Economic expertise may also take different forms, each 
leading to a different degree of epistemic asymmetry and consequently of 
judicial oversight. 
 
3.2. The many faces of economic expertise in competition law 
 
The incorporation of economic analysis in competition law may take different 
forms. It is possible to distinguish between four forms according to the 
principle of delegation of the translation task from legal to economic 
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discourse. The legal community may choose to delegate the translation task 
to an expert, someone who is well versed into the economic discourse: the 
expert will attempt to interpret its meaning to a common (shared) sens. One 
could in this case distinguish between situations where, in completing his 
adjudicative effort, the judge has to choose between different translation-
versions (economic authority) from situations where there is a broad 
consensus in economic discourse and the judge has no choice but to adopt or 
reject the consensus view of “translation” (economic facts). In other 
circumstances, the legal system will internalize the effort of translation by 
incorporating the economic concept into legal discourse: this incorporation 
can be implicit and strong, when the legal system is enshrined by the specific 
economic discourse (economic laws), or can be explicit and soft, when the 
legal system occasionally refers to economic concepts that are defined and 
employed at the doctrinal stage243. 
 
3.2.1. Economic “facts” 
 
The first category consists of statistical data (firms’ sales, consumer 
preferences, current costs) or economic concepts widely used by the 
profession, such as opportunity costs, variable costs, fixed costs, average 
avoidable costs, incremental costs which define the economic context of the 
dispute (economic facts). These data are based on observations, which are 
ultimately theory laden244. There is however generally a broad consensus 
between economic experts on their meaning. This consensus does not 
include the inferences that are drawn from the data by the use of statistical 
methodology. In other words, one could distinguish two forms of statistics: 
descriptive statistics and inferential statistics245. It is only the former that 
belong to the category of economic facts. If the judge decides to take into 
account the economic context of the dispute, these economic facts will be 
established by experts empirically. The degree of epistemic asymmetry will 
reach its peak: the expert does not only have superior knowledge, in 
                                            
243
 Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Harvard Univ. Press, 2006) distinguishes between 4 
stages of thinking about the concept of law: the semantic stage (which relates to the general 
assumptions and practices people share over the concept of law- criterial, interpretive, natural 
kind)), the jurisprudential stage (the development of a theory of law that is appropriate given 
the theorist’s answer at the semantic stage, in other words develop the values justifying a 
specific legal practice), the doctrinal stage (where we construct an account of the truth 
conditions of propositions of law in the light of the values identified in the jurisprudential stage) 
and the adjudicative stage (where judges or decision-makers adopt propositions of law based 
on the conclusions reached at the doctrinal stage). 
244
 Observation is always informed by theory: Erica Beecher-Monas, Evaluating Scientific 
Evidence (CUP, 2007), 37-39 (noting the social construction of scientific “facts”).  
245
 Descriptive statistics describe the data (including concepts such as standard deviation, 
etc). Inferential statistics are used in drawing conclusions/inferences about the general 
population from a single study: Erica Beecher-Monas, Evaluating Scientific Evidence, above, 
at 60. 
  56 
comparison with the judge, of the statistical methods that will be used to 
collect and to present the data but has also spent time in collecting and 
associating this specific data to the economic context of the particular dispute. 
As it is difficult and time consuming for the non-specialist judge to examine in 
detail the expert’s observations, the risk of moral hazard will be exacerbated. 
This risk can be mitigated either by the adversarial process or by the 
involvement of court-appointed experts. It is well known that different 
approaches to data analysis may lead to different conclusions, depending on 
the researcher’s underlying assumptions and strategies246. This is normal 
procedure in science, where assumptions are generally used to fill the 
informational gaps. It is therefore important for the courts to be able to identify 
these underlying assumptions in order to be able to assess the expert’s theory 
or observations, in particular the compatibility of these assumptions with the 
inferential interest and objectives of the legal decision-maker247. 
 
3.2.2. Economic transplants 
 
It is possible that the task of translating will not be delegated to an expert 
economist but will be accomplished by the legal decision-maker/judge. Non-
delegation of the translation task constitutes therefore the first important 
characteristic of economic transplants. The second characteristic is that 
economic transplants convey the decision to integrate explicitly economic 
analysis, not only at the adjudicative stage (as was the case with economic 
facts and economic authority) but also at the doctrinal phase. They operate at 
the doctrinal stage as guiding principles for all decisions adopted at the 
adjudicative stage. Economic transplants are, in most cases, analytical 
concepts, such as market power, barriers to entry, consumer welfare, 
efficiency gains, which are essential intermediary steps before the 
qualification of the facts of the case as constituting, for example, a restriction 
of competition, under Article 81 EC, or an abuse of a dominant position, under 
Article 82 EC. Most frequently, these economic transplants have been 
introduced by soft law instruments, such as guidelines that have mainly 
integrated the economic approach in EC competition law248.  
This situation should be distinguished from those where expert economic 
evidence “crystallizes into legal standards that are applied in subsequent 
cases”249. Barbier de la Serre and Sibonny cite the example of the concept of 
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collective dominant position, which was framed progressively by the case law, 
building on the theory of tacit collusion. It is important to observe that the 
Courts did not adopt the economic concept of tacit collusion but preferred 
instead to develop a new concept, collective dominant position, thus breaking 
any link between the new concept and its economic underpinning. This is not 
the case for economic transplants, where the choice of an equivalent 
denomination to that used in economic discourse emphasizes the economic 
origins and nature of the transplant. One could consider that this choice 
indicates a canon of interpretation addressed to the legal community, an 
indication that the interpretation should not ignore the dual, legal and 
economic, nature of the transplant. 
 An interesting feature of economic transplants is that their interpretation is 
not always function of the exact meaning of the concept in economics. A 
typical example of this asymmetry is the different conceptions of market 
power in competition law and in economics. The neoclassical definition of 
market power has always focused on the ability of a firm to raise prices 
profitably and reduce output, which essentially fits to the competition as an 
efficient outcome approach it advocates. The legal definition of 
market/monopoly power has, on the contrary, insisted on the ability of the firm 
to exclude competitors and to affect the competitive process, a definition that 
fits well with the conception of competition as a process of rivalry250. The 
concept of dominant position in EC competition law has been inspired by the 
second approach as it emphasizes behaviour rather than market outcomes. 
The classic definition of the concept of dominant position within the meaning 
of Article 82 is found in the ECJ’s judgment in the United Brands case, where 
it was described as referring to  
“a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables 
it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market 
by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of 
its competitors, customers and ultimately of consumers”.251 
The broad definition of dominant position as essentially an ability of 
independent behaviour made possible the consideration by the Court of a 
multitude of sources of market power, including the existence of a situation of 
economic dependence or that of an obligatory partner. The Court made 
certainly reference to a number of structural factors, such as market shares 
and barriers to entry, as indicators of the existence of a dominant position but 
the flexibility of the concept of relevant market offered the opportunity to the 
ECJ to keep the concept of dominant position tuned to its original 
interpretation. The situation has nevertheless evolved. Article 2 of the former 
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EC Merger Regulation 4064/89 employed the concept of dominant position 
but linked it more directly than the previous case law on Article 82 to the 
concept of effective competition252. In order to define the existence of effective 
competition, one should look to indications of performance as well as of 
market structure. In other words, effects on the market count. Relying on this 
effects-based approach, subsequent case law broadened the concept of 
dominant position in order to cover situations of coordinated effects. The 
concept could not, however, be extended to cover unilateral effects. This led 
to the implementation of a new substantive test in EC merger control, the 
significant impediment of effective competition test. According to Regulation 
139/2004, the criterion of dominant position serves now as a simple indication 
of a significant impediment of competition and therefore of the existence of a 
potential harm to consumers253. In its most recent documents, the 
Commission embraced this more economics-oriented definition of the concept 
in other areas than EC merger control. The staff discussion paper on Article 
82 illustrates this subtle evolution:  
“the definition of dominance consists of three elements, two of which 
are closely linked: (a) there must be a position of economic strength on 
a market which (b) enables the undertaking(s) in question to prevent 
effective competition being maintained on that market by (c) affording it 
the power to behave independently to an appreciable extent”254. 
Of particular importance here are the last two elements, which, 
according to the staff discussion paper, are intrinsically linked. The discussion 
paper reveals the nature of the relationship between these two elements of 
the dominant position, that is, the idea of independent behaviour and the 
concept of effective competition and brings closer than ever this concept to 
the economic conception of monopoly: 
“The notion of independence, which is the special feature of 
dominance, is related to the level of competitive constraint facing the 
undertaking(s) in question. For dominance to exist the undertaking(s) 
concerned must not be subject to effective competitive constraints. In 
other words, it thus must have substantial market power”255. 
Market power, or substantial market power, is the missing thread that 
operates as the unifying concept for the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC 
and the introduction of a more economics-oriented approach in justifying 
antitrust intervention on the marketplace. A capacity of independent behaviour 
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with regard to the competitors and consumers is not a sufficient criterion for 
the finding of a dominant position. The discussion paper adopts, instead, an 
approach which is closer to the definition of market power by neoclassical 
price theory (the ability to raise prices profitably and reduce output). The 
recent Commission Guidance on its Enforcement Priorities in Article 82 
(Commission Guidance) adopts an equivalent formulation but further 
emphasizes the link with neoclassical price theory: “(t)he Commission 
considers that an undertaking which is capable of profitably increasing prices 
above the competitive level for a significant period of time does not face 
sufficiently effective competitive constraints and can thus generally be 
regarded as dominant”256. The following table indicates the increasing reliance 
to the economic concept of “market power” in all areas of EC Competition law 
enforcement, measured by references to market power in all cases at the 
European judiciary, decisions of the European Commission and soft law texts, 
such as guidelines (Table 2) 
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 The convergence of the economic and the legal definition of monopoly 
power or dominant position is not, however, complete. While the definition of 
the concept of market power adopted by the Commission Guidance on Article 
82, as well as the recent non-horizontal merger guidelines, presents 
similarities to the economic concept of market power, its scope is broader. In 
a similar formulation for Article 81, 82 and EC merger control purposes, the 
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Commission defined market power as “the ability of one or more firms to 
profitably increase prices, reduce output, choice or quality of goods and 
services, diminish innovation, or otherwise negatively influence parameters of 
competition”257. This broad definition accommodates the emphasis of EC 
competition law on the protection of the competitive process and consumer 
sovereignty. Although the increase of prices stays the primary concern of 
competition law, in conformity with the neoclassical price theory approach, the 
content of the concept of market power epitomizes the broad definition of 
what constitutes a restriction of competition under EC competition law and the 
recognition of quality and variety investment competition. In contrast, US 
courts do not include, in their majority, as an equal consideration other 
parameters than price in the definition of market power and therefore in 
assessing the scope of intervention of antitrust law258. This example illustrates 
that, economic transplants are influenced by the legal environment to which 
they are integrated and by the specific objectives pursued by the legal 
system. The same economic concept, market power, may have a different 
content when it is transplanted in EC competition law than in US antitrust law. 
As Robert Bork has once perceptively remarked, “antitrust is necessarily a 
hybrid policy science, a cross between law and economics that produces a 
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mode of reasoning somewhat different from that of either discipline alone”259. 
The deference of the judge to the expert will in this case be less pronounced, 
as the economic concept is a legal concept, defined in the guidelines and 
other texts of soft law, from which the judge can be inspired and guided in his 
interpretation of the concept. In other words, because of the integration of 
economics into the legal system, the epistemic asymmetry between the judge 
and the expert is, in these circumstances, more limited and the role of the 
judge becomes more active260.  
 
3.2.3. Economic authority 
 
A different situation occurs when economic concepts are not explicitly 
referred to in the text of the law but constitute an importance source of 
inspiration and authority for the judge in interpreting the law (economic 
authority). Following the evolution of competition law towards an economic 
approach, normative economic arguments and theories play an important role 
in the interpretation of what constitutes a restriction of competition or an 
abuse of a dominant position. The terms restriction of competition, abuse of 
dominant position or significant impediment of effective competition have no 
content of their own; their content is related to public policy considerations, 
such as market integration, protection of the competitive process, economic 
efficiency, distributive justice and consumer sovereignty, which define the 
scope and the limitations of competition law intervention. By introducing a 
legal exception regime, Regulation 1/2003 made possible the conduct of a 
balancing test in the context of Article 81, paragraph 3. The role of the judge 
is not any more only limited to the definition of the existence of an 
unreasonable, or disproportional, restriction of rivalry but also extends to the 
consideration of economic arguments and theories that may indicate, on 
balance, a restrictive effect of the conduct on “competition” and consumers. 
The judge needs therefore to have access to economic expertise, which will 
give to this body of law its muscle. Richard Posner is therefore misleading 
when he describes current practice as following: 
“…the expert will not be permitted to testify that antitrust law should not 
forbid price fixing, but will be permitted to testify that the defendant’s 
pricing behaviour is inconsistent with their having agreed to fix prices or 
that it had no effect on the average price paid by the plaintiff”261. 
                                            
259
 Robert Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself (Simon & Schuster, 1993), 
at 8. 
260
 Genzyme Ltd v. OFT [2004] CAT 4, para. 150, “…resolving the issues on the present case 
on such matters as relevant product market, dominance and abuse, may require a more or 
less complex assessment of numerous interlocking factors, including economic evidence. 
Such an exercise intrinsically involves an element of appreciation and the exercise of 
judgment”. 
261
 Richard A. Posner, ‘The Law and Economics of the Economic Expert Witness’, above, at 
92. 
  62 
It is clear that the judge will be influenced by economic authority as well 
as from legal precedent in enforcing the competition law provisions. This is 
particularly the case in situations where there is no consensus in the legal 
community over the adequate competition law standard for a business 
practice. The competition policy community is a hybrid one, composed by 
lawyers and economists and is generally familiar with economic theories. For 
example, Chicago theories about economic efficiency gains, the post-Chicago 
theories of anticompetitive harm for vertical mergers and foreclosure, such as 
raising rivals costs theory, theories about incentives to innovate are 
increasingly framing the debate over the adequate competition law standards 
for certain commercial practices. The Courts look implicitly or explicitly “to 
economic authority in order to establish antitrust authority as a matter of 
law”262. However, in contrast with US courts, the EC Courts do not rely 
explicitly on economic authority in their decisions263. 
The implicit reliance of the EC Courts on economic authority may have 
some shortcomings. Most often, these theories rest on first assumptions for 
which there is no consensus in economic theory itself. By not providing 
explicitly the economic source of its inspiration the EC Courts create a 
situation of legal uncertainty and do not offer any predictive tools to firms and 
consumers. For example, when the European Court of Justice defined the 
concept of dominant position, it also indicated a number of operational criteria 
that would help the decision makers to define the existence of a dominant 
position: among these criteria, the concept of barriers to entry is extremely 
important. The Court does not however give any definition to the concept of 
barriers to entry, for the simple reason that the Court decided not to rely on 
any economic authority, which leads to conceptual uncertainty, as there are 
many possible definitions of the concept of barriers to entry in economics. 
Legal commentators are therefore obliged to look at the specific facts and 
context of each case in order to understand and predict the EC Courts 
practice in this area264. One could even question the effort of finding the 
economic theory/authority on which the Court implicitly relies on in defining 
the existence of barriers to entry as a futile exercise. If the Court relied 
implicitly and ambiguously on a specific economic authority, nothing 
guarantees that the EC Courts will not be inspired by another economic 
authority in a slightly different factual context, when they do not risk any 
obvious incoherence with their previous case law. 
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Furthermore, the empirical analysis on which these theoretical models 
are based is often poor and at best inconclusive. The judge is therefore 
confronted to the challenging task of selecting the economic arguments that 
would fit to the facts of the case based on poor empirical (and therefore less 
persuasive in terms of legitimacy) grounds. 
The recent US Supreme Court case in Leegin on the continuous 
validity of the per se interdiction rule for resale price maintenance may 
illustrate the difficulty of the task265. During the oral hearing, an interesting 
dialogue occurred between Theodore Olson appearing for Leegin and Justice 
Breyer266. Olson claimed that it will only be in an economic context where 
retailers dispose of a strong market power that resale price maintenance will 
most likely lead to anticompetitive effects. He based his argument on the 
Chicago school’s assumption that the interest of supplier and consumers are 
always aligned and on the necessity to preserve dealer’s promotion efforts 
from free riding. This assumption has been questioned by a number of other 
economists who claim that vertical restraints and, in particular, resale price 
maintenance, may lead to anticompetitive effects and that the same 
objectives could be achieved by less restrictive means. Justice Breyer, a fine 
connoisseur of antitrust and regulatory economics was quick to observe: 
“Breyer: “Which economists? I know the Chicago school tends to want 
rule of reason and so forth. Professor Sherer is an economist, isn’t he? 
Worked at the FTC for a long time? A good expert in the field…And his 
conclusion is, as in the uniform enforcement of resale price 
maintenance, the restraints can impose massive anti-consumer 
benefits. Massive…” 
Olson: “In the vast majority of the economist who have looked at this 
have come out to the opposite conclusion, Justice Breyer” 
Breyer: “We ‘re supposed to count economists?... Is that how we 
decide it? (Laughter)”267. 
One could understand the challenges of decision making on the basis 
of conflicting economic expertise that follows different assumptions and 
empirical evidence. Because of the information asymmetry problem, the judge 
is not able to assess, by his own, the veracity and plausibility of each of the 
economic theories and arguments presented. Absence of empirical evidence 
and consensus between economists may lead the judge to ignore economic 
expertise or base his choice of economic theory on extra-scientific grounds, 
such as the degree of compatibility of assumptions and first principles with the 
objectives and the context of the specific competition law system. 
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3.2.4. Economic “laws” 
 
One could object that economic theories often rely on assumptions that 
are universally accepted by an overwhelming majority of economists 
(economic laws), which form the fourth category of economic concepts268. The 
layman or non expert judge, in this circumstance, should take these economic 
laws as a given and an uncontested truth. For example the idea that market 
power may produce allocative inefficiency is based on the perfect competition 
model, which could be conceived as a specific expression of the law of supply 
and demand. This is not a natural law, like the Universal Law of Gravitation, 
which can be tested, but relies instead on hypothesis and assumptions such 
as the rationality postulate269. Economic laws may also be subject to 
questioning by contrary empirical evidence. For example, recent economic 
literature highlights that real consumers are sometimes guided by their 
perceptions of fairness rather than by marginal utility, when they make a 
decision to act on a transaction or, more specifically, to consume270. 
Despite these challenges, economic laws form part of general 
experience and can be accepted without the need to be established and 
explained by experts. Information asymmetry between the judge and the 
expert is in this case minimal, almost inexistent. These economic laws 
constitute the common frame of reference for judges and economists. One 
could certainly question the universal validity of these general “truths”. In most 
cases, however, these economic laws are built in the legal system itself and 
form part of the legal and economic nexus. For example Marxist labour 
theories of value will have little chance to be accepted as valid economic 
authority. The judge will automatically exclude this type of economic 
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expertise, based on his experience of the tensions that would exist between 
this specific economic authority and the basic assumptions that lay the 
economic foundations of his legal system. 
Distinguishing between these four forms of economic expertise 
illustrates the different degrees of epistemic asymmetry that may exist 
between the judge and the expert. The issue of the points of access of 
economic expertise in courts becomes therefore crucial. 
4. Points of entry of economic expertise in the courtroom: a comparative 
institutional analysis  
 
There are different institutional frameworks that could mitigate the 
information/epistemic asymmetry problem raised by economic expertise in 
courts. Common law jurisdictions (e.g. United Kingdom, United States) have 
traditionally used different mechanisms from civil law jurisdictions (e.g. 
France, Germany) in order to address the information asymmetry that exists 
between economic experts and judges and to ensure the objectivity of judicial 
decision-making271. They chose to emphasize the role of the adversarial 
process (expert witnesses) instead of the quest for a neutral arbiter (court 
appointed experts), mechanism traditionally chosen by civil law jurisdictions. 
The nature of the judicial system, inquisitorial or adversarial, could influence 
the institutional framework of expert evidence in courts. Adversarial systems 
generally accord an important role to expert witnesses, whereas inquisitorial 
systems emphasize the role of judge-appointed experts and in-house 
expertise in courts that could address the problem of impartiality and will fit 
perfectly with the investigation function of the judge in these systems. 
Recent reforms in civil litigation have, nevertheless, taken different 
directions. They led to an integration of the function of the expert and that of 
adjudication by creating specialised tribunals, by the appointment of 
economists as judges as well as the appointment of assessors and by the 
systematic training of judges in the analytical methods of competition law 
economics. Others have emphasized the monitoring task of the judges in 
managing the experts by offering procedures such as the “hot tub” or the 
possibility to appoint joint experts. This section will highlight these approaches 
and will critically assess their implications in competition litigation. 
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 As it has been previously explained, these different institutional 
arrangements face two challenges. First, it is important to ensure the 
legitimacy (in terms of persuasiveness and epistemic competence) of the 
decision reached, which may require the intervention in the decision making 
process of an impartial and epistemically competent player. Second, keeping 
some degree of adversarial process will be compatible with a more pluralistic 
view of scientific discourse, as it will make possible to hear a variety of points 
of view, thus ensuring greater competition in the upstream marketplace of 
ideas. The selection of the adequate institutional framework largely depends 
on the priorities of the decision makers. 
 
4.1. Expert witnesses 
 
Expert witnesses have been the dominant method of providing expertise in 
Common law jurisdictions since the 16th century. It is also used, in some 
cases informally, in Continental jurisdictions (shadow experts) in conjunction 
with the appointment of neutral experts. There are two problems with this 
point of entry of economic expertise in courts: first, the absence of regulation 
and institutional support for this type of expertise at the European level and 
second, risks that arise from the partisan character of expert witnesses. The 
second problem has led to the development of specific instruments in order to 
mitigate that risk. 
If we turn to the experience at the European Union (EU) level, as Barbier 
de la Serre and Sibony observe, the status of expert witnesses under EU law 
is “unclear” and “informal”272. This informality exists both at the level of EU 
courts and that of national courts. Although it is possible for parties to submit 
evidence based on expert reports, the Courts’ Rules of procedure do not allow 
party experts to put forward explanations during the hearing273. Experts are 
not considered as “advisors” in the sense of Article 19 of the Statute of the 
European Court of Justice, although “in practice, the EC courts often allow 
non-lawyers to address the Court at the hearing ‘in the presence and under 
the supervision of the lawyer”; however, it is rare that they will be cross-
examined by the opposing party274. The input of expert witnesses has been 
considered in a number of competition law cases, with disparate results275. In 
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some cases, the EU Courts proceeded in undertaking their own appraisal of 
the reliability of the expert’s report. Barbier de la Serre & Sibony note that 
there are many examples of cases “in which the conclusions of the expert’s 
reports were not irrelevant but were questioned and/or judged unfounded (e.g. 
when the other party submitted an expert report that contradicted the findings 
of the other report, the report did not put forwards the ‘slightest evidence’ 
supporting its conclusions, the expert’s conclusions were based on complex 
premises which in view of their number and complexity did not permit 
sufficiently definite conclusions, the expert’s qualifications did not correspond 
to the factual issues at stake, and the report was based on incomplete 
knowledge of the facts” or simply “unreliable”276. 
An important problem of this unclear status of partisan expert evidence in 
EC law is that there are no Community rules that regulate expert witnesses in 
national courts, when the latter enforce EU law. It is important, for example, in 
order to ensure the effectiveness of private enforcement of EC competition 
law, in particular after the recent policy decision to increase the incentives for 
private enforcement in Europe, that plaintiffs in Continental jurisdictions are 
not put in a different position than plaintiffs in Common law jurisdiction with 
regard to the production of economic evidence. The principle of procedural 
autonomy may explain the lack of European procedural rules in the past. 
However, it is clear that, in some areas, procedural harmonization of national 
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law has already started, following the need for greater effectiveness in EC law 
enforcement, an important example being EC competition law277. Many 
proposals have been made as to the development of a European framework 
regarding disclosure and production of evidence, in general, and economic 
evidence in particular in competition law litigation. The Green paper adopted 
by the European Commission on action for damages raised the problem of 
expert witnesses but seemed to understate their importance and suggested 
instead the possibility for the parties to “agree on an expert to be appointed by 
the court rather than by themselves” (Option 35): The explanation given for 
such a reduced role for expert witnesses was the following: 
“Given the complexity of damages actions for infringement of antitrust law, 
use of expertise in court is particularly important to ensure efficient 
proceedings. If experts were appointed by the court, cost savings might 
result since fewer experts would be required. This would also reduce the 
multitude of experts giving conflicting evidence, depending on their client’s 
standpoint”278. 
The recent European Commission’s White paper on damages actions 
ignored, however, issue of expert witnesses versus court-appointed 
experts279. 
In essence, three problems may be identified: first, the issue of increasing 
the costs of litigation because of the appointment of experts (private costs), 
thus putting no deep-pockets plaintiffs in disadvantage in relation to corporate 
defendants; second, the issue of increasing the length of the litigation and 
thus the social costs of the litigation and third, the issue of the limited quality 
(in the sense of independence and reliability) of partisan expertise in relation 
to court-appointed experts. The first is a non-problem: parties will anyway be 
inclined to employ experts just in order to be able to prepare the case and 
eventually to scrutinize the court-appointed expert: the costs would be 
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incurred in all circumstances280. The second problem will also occur if the 
Court decides to appoint neutral experts. The third problem, the issue of 
impartiality, constitutes therefore the main reason that explains the distrust to 
expert witnesses. 
Expert witnesses are paid by the respective parties and therefore are 
bound to be partisans “rather than being disinterested and hence 
presumptively truthful, or at least honest, witnesses”.281 This does not 
necessarily mean that expert witnesses are hired guns but that the experts 
are dependent on the parties in order to collect data, such as costs, output, 
sales prices, market shares that are not on the public domain. One could also 
add that parties have the incentive to present expert evidence that favours 
their case and that they will inevitably have a selection bias in favour of 
experts that represent a position which is close to them. 
The collection and analysis of the data involves some degree of discretion, 
with regard to the relevant data and the methodology applied. “The selected 
and omitted data will determine the final results, and may be used in such way 
that the desired outcome, the one aligned with the parties discourse, is 
achieved”282.  Mathematical modelling also requires the choice by the analyst 
of the relevant facts and of a limited number of variables283. Simplification 
always leads to the exclusion of a number of facts and there is a risk that the 
expert may eliminate these facts in order to obtain a predefined result that 
would be favourable to the party she represents. Richard Posner was right to 
observe that experts may hide behind “an impenetrable wall of esoteric 
knowledge” and therefore can easily mislead judges and juries284. 
Finally, opposing experts can cancel each other out, with the result that 
the judge will ignore their expertise and decide the case using a principles 
approach or on the basis of non-expert intuition. This is particularly true for 
economics, where because of the relative importance of the assumptions of 
the economist, her prior beliefs or the lack of considerable empirical research 
in the area of competition economics, it is possible that disagreement 
between experts may occur more frequently than in “harder” scientific 
disciplines. 
There are certainly areas of economics where there is an overwhelming 
consensus over the anticompetitive character of certain business practices in 
a specific setting. However, as it is highlighted by Posner, 
                                            
280
 Andrew Gavil, ‘The Challenges of Economic Proof in a Decentralized and Privatized 
European Competition Policy System: Lessons from the American Experience’, above, at 
203. 
281
 Richard A. Posner, ‘The Law and Economics of the Economic Expert Witness’, above, at 
93. 
282
 Juan D. R. Gutiérrez, ‘Expert Economic Testimony, Economic Evidence and Asymmetry of 
Information in Antitrust Cases’, above, at 2.2.3. 
283
 Ibid. 
284
 Richard A. Posner, “The Law and Economics of the Economic Expert Witness”, above, at 
93. 
  70 
“(w)here the use of economic experts is more problematic is in the areas 
of economics on which  there is no professional consensus. This used to 
be and to some extent still is the situation with regards to antitrust 
economics. A perfectly respectable economist may be an antitrust “hawk”, 
another equally respectable economist an antitrust dove. Each might have 
a long list of reputable academic publications fully consistent with 
systematically pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant testimony, and so a judge or a 
jury would have little basis for choosing between them”285. 
The partiality/partisan character of expert witnesses is one of the main 
problems identified with this model of expertise, if one adopts the traditional 
view of experts as educators or translators. The possible 
strategic/opportunistic behaviour of the parties (in selecting their experts) and 
of the economic experts (acting as “hired guns” for the parties and not 
representing a “neutral” scientific view point) is a related claim. The risk is 
perceived as particularly significant in the United States, where the important 
role of the jury in the process of judicial decision-making reduces the ability of 
judges to monitor the process of expertise. This criticism assumes that juries 
are less capable than non-expert judges to comprehend complex economic 
expertise. This assumption seems to be influential in the US, as the courts 
have established a complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment right to 
jury trial under the U.S. Constitution if that would impair the Fifth 
Amendment’s due process right to have a rational and fair adjudication in 
certain circumstances (technically complex issues)286. 
 Concerns about the impartiality of expertise have been the main 
justification for the reform of expert evidence in civil procedure in recent years. 
Lord Woolf noted in his Interim Access to Justice Report that 
“(m)ost of the problems with expert evidence arise because the expert 
is initially recruited as part of the team which investigates and 
advances a party's contentions and then has to change roles and seek 
to provide the independent expert evidence which the court is entitled 
to expect. As Lord Wilberforce, in The Ikarian Reefer (1993, 2 Lloyds 
Reports 68) stated, "It is necessary that expert evidence presented to 
the court should be and should be seen to be the independent product 
of the expert uninfluenced as to form or content by the exigencies of 
litigation." In many cases the expert, instead of playing the role 
identified by Lord Wilberforce, has become … ‘a very effective weapon 
in the parties' arsenal of tactics”.287 
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In addition, Lord Woolf observed the fact that employing expert witnesses 
may lead to considerable delay and costs in litigation with the “shortage of 
experts” that are “sympathetic to particular causes” and the “tendency of 
solicitors to rely on the experts who are familiar to them”.288 The problem of 
impartiality and consequently of moral hazard that might exist between judges 
and expert witnesses, has been an important concern in the organization of 
judicial procedure and has led to proposals to reinforce the monitoring role of 
the judge in the process (the “case management” system) in the UK, an 
experience from which the EU may get inspiration.  
 The objective of the “case management” system is to increase the 
impartiality of the process of expertise by creating instruments that attempt to 
loosen the links that exist between the expert witness and the parties. This is 
done either by not putting the accent on the adversarial dimension of the 
process or by emphasizing the “scientific” dimension of the debate between 
the different experts (limitation of the “material” aspect of the dispute). I will 
analyze briefly two procedures: the hot tub (or the organization of pre-trial 
conferences between experts) and the possibility for the parties to appoint a 
single joint expert. 
 The “hot tub” procedure, developed by the Australian Competition 
Tribunal in the 1970s289, aims to maintain the basic principles of the 
adversarial system while at the same time to orchestrate interaction among 
experts. Economists submit written statements prior to the oral proceedings 
but after they have received written non-expert evidence. Then at the 
conclusion of the oral evidence but prior to counsel’s submissions, they may 
be called upon to participate in a short seminar or debate before the Tribunal. 
The procedure ensures that the experts called have an opportunity to deal 
with the case on the basis of the evidence adduced and the issues raised by 
both parties in a disconnected way. During these “concurrent evidence 
sessions”, expert witnesses may make extended statements and comments 
on the evidence presented by the other experts. In this part of the procedure, 
the judge, and not the lawyers of the parties, has the control: there is no 
cross-examination by the lawyers. The second part of the procedure is the 
classic adversarial trial: lawyers take control and they may cross-examine the 
expert witnesses. The process attempts to emulate the environment of a 
scholarly scientific debate in a colloquium rather than that of the conventional 
adversarial proceedings. The “hot tub” procedure attempts to limit 
partisanship, enhance communication and analysis between the experts and 
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reduce the time of the trial by narrowing the debate to the real issues, as 
these are perceived by the experts.  
 One of the important innovations brought in the UK Civil Procedure 
Rules following the Lord Woof report has been the concept of the single joint 
expert. If the issue is not contentious, the parties are encouraged to use a 
single joint expert. Part 35.7 of the Civil Procedure Rules endorses the Woolf 
approach: “where two or more parties wish to submit expert evidence on a 
particular issue, the court may direct that the evidence on that issue is to 
given by one expert only”290. Where the instructing parties cannot agree who 
should be the expert, the court may either select the expert from a list 
prepared or identified by the instructing parties or devise a different procedure 
to select the expert291. The procedure makes possible the interaction between 
experts: “(t)he court may, at any stage, direct a discussion between experts 
for the purpose of requiring the experts to identify and discuss the expert 
issues in the proceedings and to where possible, reach an agreed opinion on 
those issues”292. The Court keeps a dominant role in the process: first, it 
specifies the issues the experts should discuss, second, it directs the 
discussion between experts who should complete a statement showing to the 
Court the issues they agree and the issues and reasons they disagree. 
However, the revision of the CPR did not go as far as ending the adversarial 
character of the proceedings. First, the content of the discussion between the 
experts cannot be referred to at the trial unless the parties agree. Second, 
“(w)here experts reach agreement on an issue during their discussions, the 
agreement shall not bind the parties unless the parties expressly agree to be 
bound by the agreement”293. 
 
4.2. Court-appointed experts 
 
 In the presence of conflicting expertise, the judge may decide to 
appoint a “neutral” expert. A neutral expert will mitigate the risk of impartiality 
that mines the option of expert witnesses. According to article 25 of the 
Statute of the Court of Justice, the Court may at any time entrust any 
individual, body, authority, committee, or other organisation it chooses with 
the task of giving an expert opinion. The ECJ may order, as a measure of 
inquiry and after hearing the Advocate general, the commissioning of an 
expert’s report.294 Similarly, according to article 65(d) of the Rules of 
procedure of the Court of First Instance, “the CFI may request the 
commissioning of an expert’s report”. Furthermore, according to Article 70 of 
the Rules of procedure of the CFI: 
                                            
290
 Part 35.7 of the CPR (Civil Procedure Rules). 
291
 Ibid. 
292
 Part 35.12 of the CPR. 
293
 Ibid. 
294
 Article 45 of the ECJ Rules of procedure. 
  73 
“the CFI may order that an expert’s report be obtained. The order 
appointing the expert shall define his task and set a time-limit within 
which he is to make his report. After the expert has made his report, 
the CFI may order that he be examined, the parties having been given 
notice to attend. Questions may be put to the expert by the 
representatives of the parties”.  
Either of the parties may request the appointment of a neutral expert. The 
appointed experts are not instructed by the parties (single joint experts) but by 
the judge295. The EC Courts may also commission an expert’s report ex 
officio296. The expert operates under the supervision of the Judge 
Rapporteur297. The process is, to some degree, adversarial in the sense that 
the parties should be able to follow the neutral expert’s work (e.g. be shown 
the documents he has taken into account) or should have the opportunity to 
make their views known during the preparation of the expert’s report and put 
questions to the expert298, in particular if the report is likely to have a 
“preponderant influence on the assessment of the facts by the court”.299. 
 The appointment of experts by courts mitigates the risks associated 
with the epistemic asymmetry between judges and experts, in particular the 
problem of biased expertise. Court-appointed experts have the incentive to 
present a balanced position that would rely on principles and views for which 
there is a broad consensus in the community of academic economists. The 
view of the neutral expert will acquire authority only if it is vested with 
“objectivity”, in other words it has the support of the impartial, because not 
linked with the material interests of the case, community of academic 
economists. A legal system that favours court-appointed experts, instead of 
expert witnesses, thus favours the appointment of economists that represent 
the middle ground, not antitrust “hawks” or “doves”. 
 On the contrary, a system based on party experts “favors the selection 
of experts with extreme views, rather than views that are representative of the 
scientific community”, which may give the impression that “there is less 
consensus in a field than actually exists”300. This may explain why the idea 
that there are conflicting schools of antitrust analysis that influence 
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periodically antitrust discourse has not been influential in framing the 
competition law debate in Europe, in comparison to the US, as almost all 
competition economists share the middle ground. This hypothesis needs to be 
empirically verified. However, if this hypothesis is proved to be correct, it may 
have important implications on the market for economic expertise. Academic 
economists will have the incentive to adopt middle ground views, in order to 
increase their chances to be appointed as court-appointed experts. The 
system of court-appointed experts will alter the incentives of antitrust 
economists and lead to a different kind of specialisation: some economists will 
specialise in providing expertise to courts or antitrust agencies, others in 
providing support to the litigants as shadow experts or part experts in 
common law jurisdictions. This strengthens the boundaries between the 
community of academic economists and that of professional forensic 
economists. Academic discourse will evolve independently, thus providing a 
useful check to the views advanced by forensic and antitrust economists. In 
other words, the institutional choice of a court-appointed experts system may 
have positive effects on the evolution of research in economics, as it 
dissociates the market for forensic/partisan economists from that of academic 
economists. 
 The system presents also, however important shortcomings.  
First, it may reduce the adversarial character of the procedure. This 
could be problematic for two interrelated reasons: first, there is a higher risk of 
error if the judge is advised by one expert instead of being confronted to an 
array of expert opinions and in some cases the judge cannot be confident that 
the picked expert is “a genuine neutral”301. Second, the system assumes that 
there is an objective scientific knowledge/”truth” that the neutral expert will be 
able to discover and present. This does not take into account the pluralistic 
character of economic discourse. The expert may have particular 
assumptions and may defend the ideas of his “school” or “network”. The 
system of court-appointed experts will tend to maintain the status quo, 
represented by mainstream and well accepted economic theories, and will 
reduce the opportunity for minority views to gain access to the courtroom.  
The appointment of a panel- college of experts rather than one expert 
may avoid this problem, although it will most probably lead to higher litigation 
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costs. This possibility exists and has already been used in the context of the 
WTO. Article 13 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) provides that 
“each panel shall have the right to seek information and technical advice from 
any individual or body which it deems appropriate” (Art. 13.1) and that “with 
respect to a factual issue concerning a scientific or other technical matter 
raised by a party to a dispute, a panel may request an advisory report in 
writing from an expert review group” (Art. 13.2). The procedure for the 
appointment of expert review groups is set out in detail in Appendix 4: the 
expert review groups are under the WTO panel's authority and submit a final 
report to the panel after they have submitted a draft report to the parties to the 
dispute with a view to obtaining their comments, and taking them into account, 
as appropriate. The panels have employed the possibility offered by Article 
13.2 in a number of cases, although it is interesting to note that the panel did 
not ask for a consensus report from the experts and preferred to obtain their 
opinions individually.302 A possible explanation lies on the composition of the 
WTO panels that are usually formed by well-qualified governmental and/or 
non-governmental individuals with “a sufficiently diverse background and a 
wide spectrum of experience”, chosen according to their specific expertise in 
“the sectors or subject matter of the covered agreements” (Art. 8.2. and 8.4. of 
the DSU). 
 In other words, the WTO panel can be compared to a specialised 
court: the members of the jurisdiction feel confident in their expertise to 
assess conflicting scientific evidence. The fact that this procedure has proven 
successful in the context of specialised courts does not necessarily mean that 
it will be adequate in the context of generalist courts. The EC Courts have 
appointed several experts but the experts were asked to produce a single 
report, “a means of narrowing down the scope of the dispute over facts”303. 
The aim is not to provide the judge with an array of competing explanations 
from which he has to make a choice, based on some normative principle or 
other instrumental objective, but to simplify the decision making process by 
offering to the judge an “objective” representation of the scientific knowledge 
of the field from which he can easily draw authoritative conclusions. In 
practice, the judge delegates her adjudicatory authority to the experts by 
adopting as such their findings.304 
Second, there is also the difficulty of devising a procedure of 
appointment of really neutral experts. The judge may appoint an expert 
                                            
302
 David Palmeter & Petros Mavroidis, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization 
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004), at 121-123. 
303
 See, Eric Barbier de la Serre & Anne-Lise Sibony, above, at 945, note 21. It should also be 
noted that Article 70 of the CFI Rules of procedure seems to exclude the possibility of 
appointing more than one experts: See, Anne-Lise Sibony, Le juge et le raisonnement 
économique en droit de la concurrence (LGDJ, 2008), at 562, footnote 259. 
304
 Ibid., pp. 962-964 (noting that “once the EC Courts have decided to rely on an expert’s 
report, they rarely question its conclusions. The experts are therefore used as actual 
assessors”). 
  76 
chosen from a list submitted by the parties305. However, in EU law, the neutral 
expert is not instructed by the parties but appointed by the judge. There is no 
indication in the Statute of the Court and the ECJ and CFI internal rules of 
procedure on the method of appointment of experts other than that the parties 
may object to the appointment on the ground that the expert is not competent 
or the proper person to act as an expert.306 The procedure for the 
appointment of neutral expert(s) should ensure impartiality (independence 
from the material interests of the case) but also achieve the representation of 
different perspectives/positions that could be relevant for the adjudication of 
the specific case. 
Some authors advance the view that the procedure used to select 
arbitrators could provide some important insights307: a common method of 
selecting arbitrators is for each party to choose an arbitrator and for the two 
arbitrators to then choose a neutral, who generally casts the deciding vote”308. 
Other possibilities include the appointment of experts from a list of experts 
registered in the EU and national courts309 or from a list of experts of the 
specific field nominated/suggested by professional associations, such as the 
European Economic Association. However, it is unclear from the Statute of 
the Court or the regulation on procedure how the judge should proceed if the 
parties do not agree with the choice of the expert310. Furthermore, there is 
nothing that guarantees that the neutral expert will not be biased, in particular 
in situations where they frequently participate as partisan experts in antitrust 
litigation and have therefore the interest to ensure consistency between the 
views expressed when they act as a court-appointed expert and those when 
they acts as partisan experts. Intellectual interest bias may also be an 
important concern, if the expert favors a position for the simple reason that it 
reinforces his “school” or “network”. 
Third, the EC Courts have rarely appointed experts.311 The European 
Courts have ordered an expertise in the Dyestuffs and the Wood Pulp cases. 
In Dyestuffs, the Court ordered an expert’s report after it had appointed two 
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experts following the common agreement between the parties on the names 
of the two experts312. The commissioning of a neutral expert’s report was 
justified by the divergent opinions defended by the expert witnesses of the 
parties with regard to the plausibility of a concerted practice in the oligopolistic 
dyestuffs market313. In Wood Pulp314, the Court had initially ordered an 
expert’s report on the existence of a price parallelism in the market and then a 
second expert report on the presence, or not, of a causal link between the 
price parallelism and the alleged horizontal concertation315. The Court 
adopted the conclusions of the experts’ reports316, despite the substantial 
objections raised by the Commission (which were also based on an expert’s 
report) and the extensively argued reticent opinion of AG Darmon to accept all 
the court-appointed experts’ conclusions.317  
Barbier de la Serre and Sibony explain the few instances the European 
courts appointed neutral experts by the conjunction of a number of factors: 
strict substantive requirements (“the EC Courts do not commission an expert 
report unless the evidence before it is deficient in some material respect or 
the requesting party provides prima facie evidence in favour of his argument”), 
the specificity of the EC courts function, the costs and length of the procedure, 
the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the European Commission in certain 
fields, or the EC courts reliance on their own expertise318. A consistent trend 
is also that the Courts generally adopt as such the conclusions of neutral 
experts319.  
Fourth, an additional difficulty with court-appointed experts in the 
European context exists in situations where the EU Courts intervene in the 
process of judicial review of a Commission’s decision. Under Article 230 EC, 
when the appreciation of the facts involves complex economic assessments, 
the European Commission benefits from a considerable margin of 
appreciation. The Court observed in Microsoft that 
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“…it follows from consistent case-law that, although as a general rule 
the Community Courts undertake a comprehensive review of the 
question as to whether or not the conditions for the application of the 
competition rules are met, their review of complex economic appraisals 
made by the Commission is necessarily limited to checking whether the 
relevant rules on procedure and on stating reasons have been 
complied with, whether the facts have been accurately stated and 
whether there has been any manifest error of assessment or a misuse 
of powers. 
Likewise, in so far as the Commission’s decision is the result of 
complex technical appraisals, those appraisals are in principle subject 
to only limited review by the Court, which means that the Community 
Courts cannot substitute their own assessment of matters of fact for the 
Commission’s 
However, while the Community Courts recognise that the Commission 
has a margin of appreciation in economic or technical matters, that 
does not mean that they must decline to review the Commission’s 
interpretation of economic or technical data. The Community Courts 
must not only establish whether the evidence put forward is factually 
accurate, reliable and consistent but must also determine whether that 
evidence contains all the relevant data that must be taken into 
consideration in appraising a complex situation and whether it is 
capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it”320. 
The Courts usually rely on the Commission’s economic appreciation, in 
particular if the latter based its decision on specially commissioned expert 
reports and they do not take the risk of appointing a neutral expert who will 
second-guess the Commission’s expert analysis. In some recent merger 
control cases321, however, the Court addressed directly the economic 
arguments advanced by the parties and, according to some authors, the 
judges have endorsed the role of economic expert for themselves322. This is 
certainly an improvement from previous case law where the judges of the 
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Court had relied on their own analysis of the issue, which was not based on 
sound economics323. 
 
4.3. Hybrid options 
 
The greater recourse to economic analysis in competition has led to the 
development of additional options to the two main models of integration of 
economic expertise in courts. Particular emphasis is now given to the 
development of sources of internal economic expertise, in particular because 
of the important costs of contracting out (judge appointed expert) and the risks 
of relying on expert witnesses (moral hazard) in conjunction with the more 
intensive use of economic expertise after the modernization of European 
competition law. Déirdre Dwyer cites a number of variables that are taken into 
account in deciding the allocation of tasks in judicial decision-making. These 
can be whether the court should be unicameral deciding questions of law and 
fact, or bicameral, consisting of separate tribunals of law and fact, as it seems 
to be the case in the US with the allocation of tasks between judges and 
juries; whether those composing the court should be lawyers or non-lawyers; 
whether they are specialist in the factual subject matter in the case or not324. 
Depending on the emphasis put on each of these variables, it is possible to 
identify different hybrid options that address the issue of epistemic asymmetry 
and expert bias. 
 
4.3.1. Assessors and special juries 
 
The practice of assessors or special juries attempts to “incorporate the 
community of practice directly into the tribunal of fact”, thus adopting a 
bicameral approach in judicial decision-making325. In the UK, the Court may 
decide to appoint assessors, a judge's or magistrate's assistant. Following the 
recommendations of Lord Woolf326, Rule 35.15 CPR gives the courts authority 
to appoint an assessor, with the aim to assist the court in dealing with the 
matter of her expertise and to “educate the judge”. Assessors (or technical 
advisors, as they are called in the US) are only appointed to assist the court to 
fulfil its obligations. Contrary to court-appointed experts, they are not strictly 
subject to the adversarial process, which may present some risks, in terms of 
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methodological and substantive theory pluralism327, as well as from the point 
of view of a possible infringement of article 6(1) of the European Convention 
on Human Rights328. One could also envision “special juries” involving 
specialists in the tribunal of facts329. 
 
4.3.2. Amicus curiae or advice from the competition authorities 
 
According to Art. 15 of Regulation 1/2003, 
 “in proceedings for the application of Article 81 or Article 82 of the 
Treaty, courts of the Member states may ask the Commission to 
transmit to them information in its possession or its opinion on 
questions concerning the application of Community competition rules” 
In addition, according to Article 15(3) of Regulation 1/2004, 
 “Competition authorities of the Member States, acting on their own 
initiative, may submit written observations to the national courts of their 
Member State on issues relating to the application of Articles 81 and 
82. With the permission of the court in question, they may also submit 
oral observations to the national courts of the member State”. 
When the coherent application of Article 81 or 82 so requires, the 
Commission, acting on its own initiative, may submit written observations to 
courts of the Member States and with the permission of these courts may 
make oral observations. 
However, there is no possibility, at least with the current procedural 
rules for economists, antitrust or economic associations (e.g, the Association 
of Competition Economists) to act as amicus curiae. 
 
4.3.3. Internal economic expertise (clerks, research and documentation 
units in courts formed by economists) 
 
A further option could be to recruit economists as judicial clerks. This may be 
an option to explore at the EU Courts level but they are very few judicial clerks 
working at the Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice with 
some form of economic background. It is also possible to recruit economists 
at the Research and Documentation Unit of the EU Courts. The Judge-
Rapporteur could ask the Research and Documentation unit to prepare a 
research note on economic authority issues that could be used by the Court. 
The systematic training of judges in competition law and economics may 
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provide an additional option, although the outcomes of these training 
programmes do not seem to make an important difference, if one measures 
their effect with regard to the number of cases that were appealed 
successfully330. Finally, it is possible for economists to be members of the EU 
and national jurisdictions enforcing competition law. Historical examples are 
not lacking: French economist Jacques Rueff was a judge at the European 
Court of Justice from 1958 to 1962, unfortunately some years before the main 
competition law cases brought to the Court. In 2004, economist Frédéric 
Jenny was appointed a judge at the French Supreme Court (Cour de 
Cassation). 
4.3.4. Specialised or trans-disciplinary courts 
 
One could also imagine a system in which competition disputes will be 
brought only to specific courts with judges trained in competition law and 
economics331. It would be possible to constitute a specific competition law 
section at the generalist court or proceed by “opinion specialization”, that is 
select the judges that will sit in competition law cases only from those judges 
experienced in competition law cases, which is what apparently happens in 
practice332. A specialised court, such as the Competition Appeal Tribunal in 
the UK could be another option. There have been some proposals for the 
constitution of a specialised European court in competition law333. The Court 
will be composed by distinguished academics, practitioners with experience in 
the field of competition law and economics. I would be in favour of such a 
proposal. I consider that the risks that are usually linked with this type of 
specialist courts (e.g. the DC Federal Circuit as an IP court in the US; IP 
courts favour IP owners and interpret IP statutes extensively) are less likely to 
materialise in the case of competition law. It is also highly desirable to reduce 
the epistemic asymmetry between experts and judges, without at the same 
time reduce the adversarial dimension of the procedure. Finally this option fits 
and works better with the discursive substantive approach to economic 
evidence that this study will suggest in Section 5.2. 
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5. Substantive assessment of economic expertise  
 
It is possible to distinguish two steps in the substantive assessment of 
economic evidence. First, there is the issue of the admissibility of economic 
expertise (which is linked to reliability of the expert’s methodology). Second, 
an additional issue is the weight to be attached to the economic expertise that 
was found reliable. The two stages are clearly separated in US law, which 
recognizes a gatekeeper function to the judge: the later has to exclude 
problematic expertise, such as “junk science”, “hired guns” etc from being 
heard by the jury. This is mainly the result of the specificities of the US legal 
system, in particular the right to be judged by a jury, and the risk that this 
entails if a jury of non-specialists hears problematic expertise, without being 
capable of distinguishing “scientific” from “un-scientific” statements. 
Adopting specific rules on the admissibility of expertise was justified in 
the US by the numerous tort liability claims that relied on questionable 
expertise. The issue is not therefore specifically related to antitrust. The 
structural problem is, however, the same in both situations: the existence of a 
number of incentives that favour excessive (rent-seeking) private litigation. 
This problem is not as acute in EU competition law, where private 
enforcement of competition law is still nascent. Therefore, there is no specific 
policy-based reason to adopt two different steps of assessing economic 
evidence in Europe. 
Establishing rules regulating the admissibility of economic evidence 
could also be subject to the same criticism than the “objectivist” view of social 
sciences that I criticized in the first part of this study. Clearly distinguishing 
between the two different steps may lead to the exclusion of important 
evidence that may rely on minority views in science but which could, at the 
same time, provide a more adequate explanation of the facts of the case and 
therefore a more plausible narrative. I would therefore oppose the 
exclusionary ethos, of clearly distinguishing between the two steps, with the 
discursive (but not necessarily inclusive) ethos of assessing evidence by 
defining the standard of proof (which could also be expressed as the standard 
of persuasion) to be reached in each circumstance. The exclusionary 
approach followed in the US mainly asks from the judge to compare the 
methodologies used with what is acceptable in the discipline. The discursive 
approach forces the judge to engage with the expert’s discipline itself and in 
particular with the substance of economic authority before reaching her 
decision. 
 
5.1. Admissibility of economic expertise: the exclusionary ethos 
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5.1.1. The emergence of the gate-keeping role of the judge 
 
Following common law precedent, the US courts have long recognized 
that expert testimony must be subject to a strong and careful judicial 
gatekeeper function. The idea is that although recourse to expertise and 
economic authority involves some form of delegation of the translation task to 
be performed to the expert, the judge should keep some form of control of the 
process of translation334.  
The DC Circuit laid down a test to determine the admissibility of pure 
opinion expert testimony (opinion not based on own experience, observation 
or research) in Frye v. United States335. Under the Frye standard expert 
testimony was admissible only if the methodology was generally accepted 
(consensus has been reached) in the relevant scientific community336. The 
traditional common law test accorded a considerable importance to the 
marketplace in order to delimit the boundaries of admissible scientific 
knowledge: the admissibility of expertise was dependent on the expert’s 
success in a profession/community that embraced that knowledge 
(commercial marketplace test)337. The validity of the expert’s opinion was 
tested by cross-examination of the expert witnesses, in essence by the 
adversarial process. The Frye test integrated means of recognition, which are 
external to the trial, by developing the concept of “general acceptance” in the 
particular field/scientific community: the commercial’s marketplace 
acceptance or the adversarial system is not essential, one should also look to 
the marketplace of ideas (intellectual marketplace test)338. The key issue is 
the diffusion of this specific method or knowledge in the relevant scientific 
discipline or opinion. Contrary to the previous common law standard that 
focused on demand, the acceptance of expertise by the market, and the 
adversarial process, the Frye test was offer-oriented and, at the same time, a 
form of out-sourcing of the assessment of the expertise: it is the scientific 
community that produces knowledge that is the final arbiter of the admissibility 
of the specific expertise. The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE), enacted in 
1975, included Rule 702, which created a statutory standard of “factual 
assistance” that seemed to be in conflict with Frye. Rule 702 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence (FRE 702), which governs all proceedings in the U.S. 
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federal court system and imposes restrictions on the admissibility of expert 
testimony: 
 “if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualifies as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training 
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise”. 
Rule 702 requires therefore a showing that (1) the proposed witness 
possesses an acceptable degree of expertise on a scientific technical or 
specialized matter and (2), that the evidence will facilitate the resolution of a 
purely factual dispute, thus ignoring the general acceptance criterion of Frye.  
Concerning the first element of the test, Rule 702 provides that the 
expert witness is deemed to have the requisite degree of expertise if (1) the 
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the 
product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the 
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. However, Rule 702 
does not suggest any standard to appreciate these factors, either individually 
or collectively. The tension between the Frye test and the Federal Rules of 
Evidence was manifest in a number of low courts decisions that followed the 
enactment of the FRE. This led to a divergent interpretation of the Rules by 
different circuits, eventually pushing the Supreme Court to intervene in order 
to establish the definitive standard for assessing the admissibility of expert 
evidence. 
In Daubert, the Supreme Court held that the “rigid” Frye standard did 
not survive the enactment of the “liberal” Federal Rules of Evidence that 
relaxed “traditional barriers to opinion testimony”339, but also interpreted Rule 
702 FRE as requiring that scientific expert testimony be grounded in the 
methodology and reasoning of science340. The Court embraced reliability as 
the primary criterion for admitting expert evidence as it collapsed the scientific 
standard of reliability (does the principle support what it aims to show?) and 
validity (does application of the principle produce consistent results?) into a 
legal standard of reliability: evidentiary reliability341. However, in order to 
qualify as scientific knowledge, “an inference or assertion must be derived by 
the scientific method”342. The evidence must be more than “subjective belief 
or unsupported speculation”343. 
The judge should also examine the “fit” of the expert testimony. Expert 
testimony should relate to the issues in the case. It should be “sufficiently tied 
to the facts of the case that will aid the jury in resolving the legal dispute”344. 
                                            
339
 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm, Inc, 509 U.S. 579, 588-589 (1993) 
340
 Ibid., at 590. 
341
 Ibid, at 590 & n. 9, “(i)n a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be 
based upo scientific validity”. 
342
 Ibid. 
343
 Ibid., at 590. 
344
 Ibid., at 591. 
  85 
This condition is primarily linked to relevance: “(e)xpert testimony which does 
not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful”345. 
The expert\testimony is admissible only if it is based upon sufficient facts or 
data (which excludes excessive speculation) and sound knowledge of the 
industry. The relevance requirement is interpreted restrictively so as to 
constitute a bias (presumption) for exclusion of scientific evidence. As the 
Ninth circuit explained on remand in Daubert, 
 “scientific expert testimony carries special dangers to the fact-finding 
process because it can be both powerful and quite misleading because 
of the difficulty in evaluating it. Federal judges must therefore exclude 
proffered scientific evidence under Rules 702 and 403 unless they are 
convinced that it speaks clearly and directly to an issue in dispute in 
the case and that it will not mislead the jury”346. 
The standard for analyzing the fit of an expert’s testimony is “higher than bare 
relevance” but “lower than the standard of correctness”347. The fit requirement 
is important when economists rely on theoretical models. The justification 
should be fact-based. Daubert requires a thorough analysis of the expert’s 
economic model, which should not be admitted if it does not apply to the 
specific facts of the case.  
Finally, the Courts examine the qualifications of the experts348. In 
Berlyn, Inc v. Gazette, the district court excluded the testimony of the 
plaintiff’s expert, who was an experienced newspaper executive, on the 
relevant market in question, for the simple reason that he was not an 
economist or an attorney and had never published anything related to 
economics or antitrust: “general business experience unrelated to antitrust 
economics does not render a witness qualified to offer an opinion on 
complicated antitrust issues such as defining relevant markets”349. In some 
cases the analysis of the expert’s qualifications leads the courts to the 
perilous exercise of characterizing the expert’s profile… In Casper v. SMG, 
the district court excluded the testimony of an expert detaining a J.D. (law 
degree) and a Ph.D in Economics. The Court looked to the expert’s resume 
and extensive list of publications and found that “he is most accurately 
characterized as a lawyer who also holds a doctorate in economics rather 
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than an economist who also holds a law degree”!350 The court found that the 
part of the expert’s report was an impermissible legal opinion, as the expert’s 
testimony relied on case law and statutes and the testimony given was 
speculative, the expert’s inferences being based on subjective belief rather 
than a specific methodology351.  
 In Kumho Tire Company, Ltd & al. v. Patrick Carmichael, the Supreme 
Court extended the “general gatekeeping obligation” of the judges not only to 
testimony based on scientific knowledge, but also to testimony based on 
technical and other specialised knowledge (therefore economic expertise)352. 
An expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal 
experience, should employ in the courtroom “the same level of intellectual 
rigor that characterizes the practices of an expert in the relevant field”353.  As 
a result of Kumho, Daubert’s criteria apply to all forms of technical expert 
testimony, including economic expertise in antitrust cases354. In conclusion, 
the Supreme Court loosened the application of the Daubert test by indicating 
that not all the factors used to ascertain scientific validity might apply, or that 
they might apply differently to other areas of expertise. 
The application of Daubert requires from the judge to assess “whether 
the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid” 
and “whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the 
facts at issue”355. It is not clear which party has generally the burden to 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence standard that the expert 
testimony meets or does not meet the requirements of FRE 702356. The 
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Courts take into account a certain number of factors, such as the 
qualifications of the expert, although this requirement may seem redundant as 
the parties have the incentive to signal that the expert hired is very competent 
and that his testimony will have a high quality. An expert’s testimony must 
also “be grounded in an accepted body of learning or experience in the 
expert’s field, and the expert must explain how the conclusion is so 
grounded”357. The Court mentioned in Daubert four non-exclusive factors that 
could be taken into account for the purpose of this inquiry:  
First, it is important to determine whether a theory or technique is 
“scientific knowledge”. According to the Court (which cited Hempel), “scientific 
methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and testing them to 
see if they can be falsified; indeed, this methodology is what distinguishes 
science from other fields of human inquiry”358 According to the Court (citing 
this time Popper), “(t)he criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its 
falsifiability, or refutability, or testability”359. In other words, the statements 
constituting a scientific explanation must be capable of empirical testing 
(which is compatible with the verificationism of Hempel and the falsificationism 
of Popper). However, the Court explicitly embraced the Popperian concept of 
falsifiability, or refutability, in order to define “scientific knowledge”. The 
importance the majority opinion in Daubert gave to the criterion of 
“falsifiability” was questioned by the dissenting opinion of the then Chief 
Justice Renquist and Justice Stevens, who found this concept “mysterious” 
enough for federal judges to define.360 An additional complication with this 
condition of Daubert is the amalgam that the Court seemed to make between 
Popper’s theory, which equates falsifiability to testability (ability to be tested), 
and the Court’s focus on falsification and the requirement that the theory “has 
been tested”, not just that it can be tested361. It is finally ironic that the Court 
made the choice to cite philosophical authorities for propositions which have 
not been tested and some would even argue that they cannot be tested.  
Second, an additional consideration is whether the theory or technique 
has been subjected to peer review and publication. The Court noted that 
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“submission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a component of good 
science in part because it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in 
methodology will be detected362. 
Third, “in the case of a particular scientific technique, the court 
ordinarily should consider the known or potential rate of error”363. 
Fourth, “general” or “widespread” acceptance in the relevant scientific 
community (which introduces the previous Frye test as an additional factor of 
the analysis) has still a bearing on the inquiry. According to the Court, “a 
known technique which has been able to attract only minimal support within 
the community may properly be viewed with scepticism”364. 
The inquiry is flexible enough and it focuses on principles and 
methodology, not on the conclusions of the expert365. Some authors have 
analyzed this dichotomy as a matter of distinguishing between “general 
causation”, which “refers to the proposition that one factor (or more) can 
produce certain results, and thus the finding transcends any one case” and 
“specific causation”, which “considers whether those factors had those results 
in the specific case at bar”366. In other words, methodology is trans-case and 
should be subject to an admissibility control while the conclusions reached by 
the expert in applying the particular methodology to the case in hand is a 
matter that should be examined by the jury in the stage of evaluating/weighing 
the evidence. The Court’s approach seems more liberal, in comparison to the 
Frye general acceptance standard, as it includes a richer set of criteria to 
scrutinize methodology but still recognizes a gatekeeper role to the judge, 
which could eventually allow for the exclusion of invalid evidence. Although 
falsifiability is only one relevant factor of the inquiry, it underpins at least the 
second one: obviously, a non testable hypothesis cannot have an error rate. 
Testability may be treated as a prerequisite rather than just another factor. As 
the Supreme Court itself recognized, this approach may sanction “a stifling 
and repressive scientific orthodoxy” and be “inimical to the search for truth”367.  
Daubert did not address the appellate review standard for evidentiary rulings 
but only indicated the important latitude of the trial judge to declare admissible 
or non-admissible expert evidence. In subsequent decisions the Court noted 
that the admissibility of expert testimony is not reviewable de novo, but it is 
reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard368.  
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5.1.2. The application of the Daubert rules in competition law litigation 
 
Although the Supreme Court has not applied Daubert yet to an antitrust 
case, lower courts have considered Daubert motions in a number of cases. 
Lower courts have a broad discretion in deciding to admit or to exclude expert 
testimony as they are subject to an abuse of discretion control by higher 
courts369.  
In general, speculative/conjectural evidence as well as evidence based 
on assumptions “so unrealistic and contradictory as to suggest bad faith” 
should be excluded370. In SMS, the first Circuit court of appeals found that the 
economic expert testimony on the existence of monopoly power was highly 
suspect and failed Daubert’s standard because the expert did not include any 
explanation on the customer data he was relying on to demonstrate monopoly 
power371. In Concord Boat Corp, the court of appeals reversed the trial’s court 
finding for plaintiffs in a Section 1 and 2 Sherman Act case, which should 
have been excluded from consideration372. The Court found that the expert’s 
testimony, which was based on a Cournot model in order to support that the 
defendant’s high market shares resulted from anticompetitive contracts and 
rebates with certain customers, did not take into account the conditions of the 
real market, in particular the fact that both firms were making differentiated 
products, in which cases a Bertrand model would be more appropriate. In 
addition, the expert argued that any deviation from the Cournot model should 
be considered anticompetitive, which was a normative rather than a 
descriptive issue, for which the economic expert was not competent to 
testify373.  
In a number of cases, the courts excluded economic evidence for lack 
of empirical grounding: In American Booksellers Association v. Barnes & 
Noble, Inc., the court found that the expert testimony was inadmissible as it 
was entirely speculative and contained too many assumptions and 
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simplifications that were not supported by real-world evidence374. In 
Craftsmen Limousine, Inc. v. Ford Motor, the eighth circuit court of appeals, 
acting or remand, affirmed the district court’s decision which had excluded the 
admissibility of the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert for not having considered 
the effect of alleged conspiracy at issue on the relevant market as a whole 
and did not provide any empirical support for the definition of the relevant 
market375. The courts also attach importance to the consideration of 
alternative hypothesis and explanatory factors when the parties present 
regression analyses with the objective to demonstrate a causal link between 
the alleged anticompetitive conduct and consumer harm376. There is a risk 
that this type of analysis might blur the distinction established between 
admissibility and sufficiency of evidence377. 
Economic expertise has also been excluded from consideration in 
circumstances where the expert’s testimony runs counter to applicable law 
and usurps the role of the judge in instructing the jury as to the appropriate 
legal framework or bypasses the role of the jury in establishing the facts of the 
case378. In PSKS, Inc v. Leegin the court of appeals of the fifth circuit affirmed 
the exclusion by the district court of the admissibility of Leegin’s economic 
expert who criticized in his testimony the application of the per se rule for 
resale price maintenance (RPM) and argued that Leegin’s pricing practices 
were procompetitive under the rule of reason; according to the court, “with the 
per se rule, expert testimony regarding economic conditions and the pricing 
policy’s pro-competitive effects is not relevant”379. 
In addition, the issue of “hired guns” constitutes an important reason for 
declaring economic expertise inadmissible. In Lantec, the court of appeals 
affirmed the ruling of the district court that had declared inadmissible the 
evidence provided by the plaintiff’s expert, for lack of understanding of the 
relevant market, for employing unreliable data and for his failure to use 
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consumer studies and to perform cross-elasticity of demand analyses to 
determine the existence of substitutes for the product at issue380. In re 
Aluminium Phosphide Antitrust Litigation, the district court went even further 
and, despite the general acceptance of the methodology used, declared the 
testimony inadmissible as the expert was a professional “for hire”, who “has 
devoted his career to partisan adjudicatory purposes” and whose analyses 
presented a number of shortcomings, such as the fact that he failed to 
perform a regression analysis to explain the cause of price differences before 
and after the alleged  conduct of price-fixing381.  
The hired gun issue is not, however, the main reason for rejecting the 
admissibility of expertise. In the most important part of the cases of exclusion 
of evidence under the Daubert rule identified by the author, the exclusion was 
linked to the fact that the expert’s testimony contained internal contradictions, 
the expert ignored inconvenient facts or he did not explain sufficiently his 
inferences from the data or he has developed a model that was irrelevant for 
the purposes of the case382. 
 The courts have increasingly looked into the details of the expert 
testimony, sometimes ignoring the distinction between methodology and 
conclusions383. As the Supreme Court noted in Joiner, 
“(c)onclusions and methodology are not entirely different from one 
another. Trained  experts commonly extrapolate from existing data. But 
nothing in either Daubert or the federal Rules of Evidence requires a 
district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing 
data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that 
there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the 
opinion offered”384. 
The Supreme Court accentuated that trend in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 
where it observed that “(t)he objective of (Daubert) is to […] make certain that 
an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal 
experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that 
characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field”,385 thus subjecting 
expertise to a “quasi malpractice standard”, according to which the Court 
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verifies if the expert has departed from the level of professional care normally 
observed in the scientific domain (outside the litigation context)386.  
In City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chemicals, Inc387. the District court 
excluded economic evidence presented by an economist and a statistician 
regarding a price-fixing conspiracy. The experts had relied on neoclassical 
price theory to infer the existence of tacit collusion from a number of factors, 
such as that there was a small number of firms in the market, that the product 
was homogenous with identical or similar costs, that there was transparency 
in the market as the defendants published their list prices and additional 
evidence of identical bidding, thus making collusion a plausible explanation. 
The district court rejected the economic evidence under the Daubert standard, 
noting that there is a difference between “conscious parallelism” in an 
oligopoly and antitrust agreement. As it was noted by different commentators 
and the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed the decision, the district court mainly 
based its decision to exclude the economic testimony on grounds that related 
to the conclusions reached and not to the methodology employed by the 
experts, which was the well-accepted multiple regression analysis, “a 
methodology that is well-established as reliable”388. The Eleventh Circuit 
noted that the exclusion conflated admissibility issues with issues regarding 
the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence. However, the Eleventh Circuit also 
accepted some of the district court’s finding with regard the some of the 
expert’s conclusions on legal standards which were outside the area of his 
competence389.  
It is particularly difficult to draw limits between the admissibility and 
sufficiency issues, in particular if judges subject economic experts’ 
methodologies to a thorough examination390. Some courts exercise, however, 
a form of self-restraint in the examination of economic testimony and seem 
influenced by a more limited perception of the aim of the Daubert rule: afford 
the courts “limited control over extreme and unreliable expert testimony”391. 
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5.1.3. A critical assessment of the Daubert test 
 
Although in some cases the Daubert test may seem more liberal and 
permissive than the general acceptance test of Frye, it can also be more 
restrictive in other circumstances, in particular for knowledge that has not yet 
been empirically verified to be sound, although it gained acceptance in the 
field. This could be a problem in economics as frequently economic 
assumptions and theories have not been empirically tested. 
Quantitative/statistical techniques, such as regression analysis, have been 
declared in principle admissible by the courts392, unless there are problems 
with the selection of observations, the design of the statistical model, the 
variables included in the statistical model, the inferences that follow from the 
statistical analysis, or if the study is irrelevant for the purposes of the 
investigation 393. Kaye notes that “Daubert motions to exclude statistical 
studies or conclusions have migrated from the realm of epidemiology in which 
Daubert was grounded to many substantive fields and types of statistical 
proof”394. This is one of the consequences of the blurring between 
methodology and conclusions, a trend initiated by the Supreme Court in 
Kumho.  
For example, the admissibility of evidence based on game theory may 
be problematic in some circumstances. Adopting a strict interpretation of the 
Daubert doctrine, in particular of falsificationism395, Malcolm Coates and 
Jeffrey Fischer argue that, although the classic micro-economic theories of 
competition and monopoly are “sufficiently robust to meet the Daubert 
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standard for admissibility, structuralist theory fails the test of admissibility and 
“modern game-theoretic unilateral analysis”  fails it even more crudely: 
“applied to mergers, unilateral effects game theory is mathematics, not 
validated economic science”396. This is certainly linked to the Popperian view 
that mathematics is not a science397. 
Coates and Fischer advance a number of arguments to support this 
claim. Inspired by Milton Friedman’s instrumentalism, they claim that, 
ultimately, the demarcation criterion should be the ability of a “scientific” 
theory or “best-validated hypothesis”, to predict well. The assumptions should 
meet minimal standards of rationality (they should be logically complete and 
consistent), but these assumptions do not need to correspond to reality or to 
be empirically validated as such. Friedman is ready to assume that reality 
corresponds to the assumptions and structures of the theory, if the predictive 
results of the theory are accurate (his “as if” argument)398.  
Coates and Fischer dismiss “out of hand” post-modern philosophy, “as 
it ponders questions exogenous to legal (and many suggest) scientific 
pursuits”399. They consider that legal analysis “needs decision making tools 
(instrumentalism) more than explanations (realism) and facts (falsification) 
more than deductive logic (scientific positivism)”400. The Daubert rule 
recognizes that by advancing falsifiability as the main demarcation criterion, 
which is interpreted by the authors, citing Friedman, as analogous to an 
empirical verification of the theories advanced401. The authors seem to 
confuse falsifiability and falsification, as they seem to argue that Daubert 
requires that the theory has been tested, more than it is a testable 
hypothesis402. This is in conformity with their interpretation of the Daubert test 
as including two steps, a “simple methodology screen” followed by “a quick 
look at the merits”, thus implying that they do not perceive the distinction 
between methodology and conclusions as being sharp403.   
Based on this reading of the Daubert condition, Coates and Fischer 
question the empirical foundations of the structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm, as well as of some aspects of modern oligopoly theory. They argue 
that empirical evidence demonstrated that market concentration is not linked 
with the existence of additional profits, thus undermining the earlier 
conclusions and implying that “structuralism was not a generally applicable 
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scientific principle”404. They note that structuralist theory could have passed 
under the Frye test, as it was generally acceptable for a long time after its 
foundations have been contested, “because the economic consensus 
changes slowly”, thus implying that, under a Daubert standard, admissibility of 
the structuralist theory would not have been possible immediately after the 
empirical foundations of the theory were tested405. They continue by attacking 
the revival of the Structure Conduct Performance paradigm by new industrial 
economics based on game theory, which is the foundation of what is called 
the “post-Chicago” school406. First, any oligopoly theory based on Cournot 
equilibrium model “is falsified as a general economic proposition (Science is a 
harsh matter)”407. Second, differentiated goods Nash-Bertrand equilibria 
models, are based on a “heroic assumption” that “while changes in market 
structure affect price, firms cannot adjust their market strategies outside the 
narrow focus on price allowed by the optimization calculations”, and, in 
addition, have been advanced “with very little empirical evidence” falsified by 
empirical studies in different industries408. The authors conclude that “overall, 
the consumer goods evidence appears to falsify the Nash-Bertrand merger 
model, because, as a general rule, these models do not predict well” and 
suggest that Daubert rules preclude the general application of the 
“methodology” of the general unilateral effects model409.   
Coates and Fischer do not argue that the theory of unilateral effects is 
completely irrelevant, but they just confine it to a secondary role, as a 
“possibility theory”, applying “a set of assumptions relevant to as few as one 
situation and draw a conclusion for that specific set of facts”410. In other 
words, unilateral effects theory may not pass the admissibility test, unless one 
brings lots of empirical support in the form of “generalizing evidence”, in which 
case, it becomes a possibility theorem that may be examined at the stage of 
the evaluation of the evidence. Others have also criticized the propensity of 
game theory for continuous adjustments to the initial assumptions and 
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hypotheses and argued against drawing generalized conclusions to 
implement in competition law analysis411. 
An additional attack to game theory could be the unrealistic nature of 
its assumptions. Game theory assumes that individual action is instrumentally 
rational, that there is common knowledge of this rationality, that there are 
common priors, that is that “rational agents draw the same inferences on how 
a game is to be played”, that individual players know the rules of the game 
and that “a person’s motive for choosing a particular action is strictly 
independent of the rules of the game which structure the opportunities for 
action”, what is called the principle of “consistent alignment of beliefs”412. One 
could remark that these assumptions are not less realistic than those of the 
perfect competition model in neoclassical theory, starting with Cournot. Game 
theory shares also with neoclassical theory, methodological individualism, 
thus ignoring the existence of institutions and other social factors, which could 
be separate from the actions of individuals, or, in other words that they are not 
created spontaneously through conventions between instrumentally rational 
individuals interacting413. However, if one questions these assumptions it is 
difficult to support the concept of Nash-equilibrium, the basis of modern 
oligopoly theory: first, rational players must hold consistently aligned beliefs, 
which is difficult to accept as a general proposition in dynamic games, and, 
second, it is unclear “how one Nash equilibrium is selected when there are 
many”414.  
Coates and Fischer conveniently ignore this possible criticism to game 
theory, as it would also jeopardise the foundations of the perfect 
competition/monopoly models that they support. Their insistence on 
Popperian philosophy of science may thus be understood as an ideal cover-
up for this omission: as I have previously explained Popper insisted on the 
importance of “situational analysis” or “situational logic” in the methodology of 
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social sciences, thus providing scientific status to assumptions based on the 
rationality principle415. They also rely on the predictive power of the perfect 
competition/monopoly model, following Milton Friedman’s methodology, which 
they oppose to the empirical predictive weakness of game theory. However, 
the predictive power of their model is less than clear. First, one could argue, 
with regard to the monopoly model, that there is conflicting empirical support 
of the proposition that monopoly is linked with less performance, if one takes 
into account dynamic efficiency gains and incentives to innovation (the classic 
Schumpeterian argument)416. Empirical and experimental evidence about 
oligopoly theory is also more nuanced than the picture presented by the 
authors, with a number of studies showing that market outcomes get more 
competitive the larger the number of firms417. Nothing thus explains the 
asymmetric treatment by Coates and Fischer of the predictive power of these 
different models. Second, they take for granted the view that a proposition is 
scientific, if it is possible to base on it successful predictions418. This 
hypothesis can be questioned. As Tony Lawson rightly observes, one may 
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argue that “the primary aim of science is not the illumination or prediction of 
events at all but the identification and comprehension of the structures, 
powers, mechanisms and tendencies which produce or facilitate them”419. 
Successful prediction may also be theoretically undesirable as an objective for 
science: “for the possibility of successful prediction, turning as it does on the 
existence of constant conjunctions of events, would mean either that the 
future is already determined, or, if exogenous variables could be fixed by us, 
open to social control”, which would be “inconsistent with the possibility of 
generalised human choice and freedom”420. 
More importantly, the Daubert rule may lead to establishing the 
dominance of a particular theory, without giving the opportunity to newer 
theories that it has not been possible to subject to systematic testing and 
empirical research, to be heard in court. One could argue that the application 
of the Daubert rule will exceedingly favour the Chicago school antitrust 
economics, which are based on the simpler models of monopoly and perfect 
competition and it will disfavour post-Chicago economic theory, which relies 
on game theory and oligopoly models with differentiated products. The 
assumption of rationality and the “situational logic” of Popperianism immunize 
the Chicago school’s assumptions from every realist-assumptions type 
criticism and conveniently exclude rival post-Chicago theories from access to 
the courtroom421.  
This may have profound implications on the outcomes of antitrust 
cases. And indeed, empirical research is telling: According to a recent 
empirical study on the application of the Daubert rules to economic expertise 
in antitrust cases, the successful challenges of an expert economist amount to 
40% of all Daubert challenges in antitrust cases, which indicates that 
economists in antitrust cases are more likely to be challenged than any other 
experts or any other economic experts422. In addition, the study compared the 
percentage of exclusion of economic expertise when the Daubert challenge is 
presented by the defendant against the plaintiff’s expert with situations where 
it is presented by the plaintiff against the defendant’s expert and found that 
the exclusion rate for plaintiff’s economic expert’s is much higher than that of 
the defendant’s economic experts. This finding confirms the hypothesis that 
the Daubert rule favors defendants more than plaintiffs. The study concludes 
that “antitrust plaintiffs appear to have a substantial likelihood of being 
challenged and having their cases thrown out based on Daubert grounds, 
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since virtually all antitrust cases need experts to articulate the theory, provide 
evidence and data on liability, and estimate damages”423. Indeed, “economists 
testifying on liability and/or damages for the plaintiff have close to a 1 in 2 
chance of some or all of their opinion being excluded once challenged, while 
economists testifying for the defense have closer to a 1 in 4 probability of 
being fully or partially excluded after challenge424. These results underscore 
the asymmetry of Daubert’s effects on plaintiffs and defendants and seem 
incompatible with the idea that Daubert entrusts to the judges a “neutral 
gatekeeping function that preserves the fact-finding role of the jury”425. More 
than a simple methodological issue, the Daubert rule seems to affect the legal 
conclusions/interpretation reached by the courts and the outcome of antitrust 
cases. 
 A possible explanation for these results may be the fact that “higher 
quality experts self select as defense witnesses”426. More empirical 
investigation needs to be done, but a brief examination shows that the 
testimony of well-known and internationally respected economists has also in 
some cases been excluded as inadmissible. One may also expect that the 
plaintiff’s experts have more time to prepare their testimony than defendant’s 
experts, as they might have been consulted before the litigation was engaged, 
but this is not always the case. 
 An additional criticism of the exclusionary ethos of the Daubert rule is 
that the Court emphasizes superficial criteria of admissibility (such as general 
acceptance, qualifications, publication, peer review, error rate of the theory’s 
predictions) that do not offer the possibility to the court to seriously engage 
with the essence of the expertise. One of the reasons advanced for this is the 
methodology/conclusions distinction. But the real reason for this distinction 
may be more profound. It represents the choice of the US legal system to 
favor a system of “peripheral or heuristic” processing of information, whereas 
the decision-maker is expected not to focus on the quality and validity of 
arguments but to adopt shortcuts to determine the value of a message (e.g. 
the communicator’s credentials), rather than a system of “central processing”, 
which would require the decision-maker to examine the “content of a 
communication to assess its validity” and therefore to examine the quality (in 
terms of persuasiveness) of the arguments advanced427.  
The development of admissibility standards (and of the Daubert rule) 
could be perceived as a division of tasks between judges and juries: at the 
first step of the assessment of expert evidence, the judges will conduct both a 
peripheral processing of the information, as well as a central processing 
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regarding the scientific methodology used, while, at the second step, the 
jurors will proceed to the central processing of the information which was not 
excluded at the first step. In other words, the Daubert rule implies a lack of 
confidence in the jurors’ capacity to perform the peripheral processing of the 
Daubert criteria of the qualification of the experts, publication and peer review, 
or the central processing of scientific methodology used, while they are 
considered as able to conduct the central processing of the economic 
evidence presented. This seems paradoxical, as one would have expected 
that if the jurors were able to perform the more difficult task of central 
processing in the evaluation of evidence step, they should be able to conduct 
at least parts of the peripheral or central assessment required by Daubert in 
the admissibility step. One could argue that in this case the distinction 
between central and peripheral processing is artificial, as in reality the judges 
maintain also the control of the central processing step, simply by defining the 
standard of proof (standard of persuasion) required for the evidence to be 
deemed convincing. The jurors are thus absent from the first step and only the 
nominal masters of the process in the second step. 
The Daubert rule, as well as the Frye rule, are based on the principle of 
“epistemic paternalism”428: the aim is to protect the jurors from their propensity 
to focus on peripheral criteria and not on the essence of the issues. Brian 
Leiter notes that the Daubert rule develops two types of epistemic rules: 
primary epistemic rules requiring the exclusion of unscientific evidence, a rule 
justified by “the epistemic shortcomings of jurors” (“their susceptibility to 
confusion and prejudice or their generally modest level of intellectual ability”), 
and secondary epistemic rules requiring judges to exclude unscientific 
evidence, which, however, do not fit with the epistemic shortcomings of 
judges, in particular, “their general lack of expertise in scientific matters”429. 
Indeed, if there is some empirical and laboratory support of the epistemic 
shortcomings of jurors in complex cases430, the situation of generalist judges 
is not better, in particular for the central processing bits of Daubert. Of 
particular interest is the finding that “only four percent of the judges offered an 
explanation that involved a clear understanding of falsifiability and thirty-five 
percent gave answers that were clearly wrong”431. Most of the analysis from 
generalist judges of admissibility questions focused on peripheral processing, 
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such as the issues of relevance and qualifications432. It follows that, even if 
the epistemic paternalism argument is true, there is a considerable misfit 
between the justification of paternalism and the tools that have been used in 
order to overcome the respective epistemic shortcomings of judges and 
experts.  
In conclusion, juries and generalist judges present many similarities, as 
in both cases there is a “novice” (jury or generalist judge), who is not in a 
position to assess the “expert’s” testimony by using her own opinion433. 
Emphasizing the specific role of judges as gatekeepers would therefore lead 
to increase the amount of peripheral processing in presence of conflicting 
expert testimony. Alvin Goldman cites different sources of evidence that a 
novice may have in order to trust one expert rather than another: 
argumentative justification (strong support for the premises of a specific 
argument434), dialectical superiority of one expert to the other (this may be 
linked to the ability of the expert to communicate clearly its expertise but also 
a greater capacity to collect or manipulate relevant information), agreement 
from other experts of the field (although he defends that numbers do not 
always matter), “evidence of distortion interests and biases that might be 
behind a putative expert’s claims”435, or using past track-records436. It is 
submitted that these criteria might be helpful complements to the analysis and 
may affect the probative value of the evidence. However, it would be wrong to 
elevate this type of peripheral processing to an absolute barrier for the 
admissibility of the proffered evidence. 
The model is very different in the context of an “expert/expert” situation, 
which characterizes the context of expertise in a specialized tribunal or in the 
presence of a court-appointed expert: in this case, the judges proceed to 
either “direct calibration”, that is “use their own opinion about the subject 
matter in question”, or “indirect calibration”, that is, use the opinion of other 
scientists, whose opinions they have previously evaluated by direct 
calibration, “based on their own opinion about the subject-matter in 
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question”437. There is a propensity of the “expert” judge to critically assess the 
economic reasoning presented by the “expert” (a specialized authority 
integrating expertise in the case of judicial review or a stand alone expert 
witness) and to proceed to a different economic assessment. An example is 
the clear rejection by the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT), a specialised 
UK competition court, of the so-called ‘Efficient Component-Pricing Rule’ 
(ECPR) as an applicable pricing rule to determine margins and any alleged 
squeeze. Briefly, ECPR is a form of marginal-cost pricing according to which it 
is optimal to set the access price to a bottleneck equal to the direct cost of 
providing access plus the opportunity cost of providing access to the 
interested provider, which is equivalent to the reduction of the incumbent profit 
caused by the provision of access –i.e., the price minus the direct cost and 
the marginal cost. ECPR is then a pricing rule proposed as a second-best 
access rule in cases where the user-level price has already been fixed 
(ensuring absence of monopoly rents) and the regulator is concentrated solely 
on productive efficiency. In the Albion case the CAT felt more confident than 
“experts” regulators to decide whether the application of such debatable rule 
was meritorious or not, or even worse, whether the rule was reasonable 
enough to be applicable .438 The perception of expertise may not only be 
linked to the status of specialised tribunal but could also be justified on 
increased familiarity with economic thinking, for example because of previous 
exposure to a certain type of cases. Even an “expert” judge needs, however, 
to respect the institutional constraints of her role, in particular if the “expert” 
authority maintains a discretionary power to make policy choices. This should 
nonetheless be the only reason limiting the scope of the “expert” judge’s 
intervention in reviewing economic reasoning. 
Daubert’s emphasis on methodology (with a small m) does not also 
take into account the fact that the objectives and values of legal decision-
making are different from those of scientific research and that this approach 
may affect the admissibility of relatively new, non-tested, theories, even if they 
are generally accepted by the specific scientific community. The exclusionary 
ethos of Daubert might block useful information that could be taken into 
account, along with other data and theories, during the assessment/evaluation 
of evidence phase. The judge may give less weight to an idiosyncratic opinion 
at the stage of the assessment of evidence. If examined in conjunction with 
other facts and data, these idiosyncratic economic theories may nevertheless 
make more sense (in other words fit better with the facts of the case). The 
analysis of the reliability of evidence precedes the examination of the issue of 
relevance.  In other words, if the theory or methodology advanced does not 
fulfil some of the peripheral processing type of conditions of reliability under 
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Daubert, it could not be examined at the stage of relevance. Consequently, 
the result of Daubert is that the excluded expertise will be ignored both by the 
judge and the jury when they assess the facts of the case, thus excluding the 
benefit of important insights to the decision maker. 
Less restrictive alternatives are possible in order to mitigate the risks of 
“hired guns” and “expert witness shopping”. Richard Posner has suggested 
mandatory disclosure rules as an alternative439. Parties will be asked to 
disclose the list of economists contacted by their lawyers, even those experts 
that did not accept to work for them. Posner also suggests the establishment 
of a roster managed by an economists association or non-profit firm that will 
contain “all testimonial appearances by members of the association… an 
abstract of the member’s testimony… and would also record any criticisms of 
the testimony by the judge or by the lawyers or experts on the other side of 
the suit.440” This record would allow the academic community to “monitor its 
members’ adherence to high standards of probity and care in their testimonial 
activities”. This suggestion underlines the need to develop rules of evidence 
that regulate the pre-trial, the trial process and the post-trial process, thus 
expanding the scope of evidence law beyond the trial-focused traditional 
conception441. 
Another possibility, which has been explored in UK criminal law 
procedure consists in establishing extra-judicial bodies (sort of 
interdisciplinary commissions), which will regulate the quality standards of the 
forensic science market and will conduct some form of post-conviction 
scrutiny focusing on the issue of the reliability of forensic evidence. The 
House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology published 
in 2005 a report “Forensic Science on Trial” where it suggested the creation of 
a Forensic Science Advisory Council (FSAC), which will “oversee the 
regulation of the forensic science market and provide independent and 
impartial advice on forensic science”, the creation of a forum for Science and 
the Law and the establishment of a Scientific Review Committee within the 
Criminal Cases Review Commission442. The Report considered that, “the 
absence of an agreed protocol for the validation of scientific techniques prior 
to their being admitted in court is entirely unsatisfactory” and that “judges are 
not well-placed to determine scientific validity without input from scientists”. 
The Report recommended that one of the most important tasks of the 
Forensic Science Advisory Council will be to develop a “gate-keeping” test for 
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expert evidence, which should be done in cooperation with judges, scientists 
and other key players and should build on the US Daubert test”443. The Report 
was adopted following some high profile criminal law cases where forensic 
evidence in the form of statistics led to concerns of miscarriage of justice444. 
The FSAC was established in 2007 with the mission to regulate the 
market of forensic science but nothing is mentioned in the FSAC’s terms of 
reference on possible intervention in the area of ex-post conviction 
assessment of the admissibility of forensic evidence. However, other 
examples exist in the UK criminal procedure system. The Criminal Cases 
Review Commission (CCRC) in England or the Scottish Criminal Cases 
Review Commission (SCCRC) have been established to conduct a post-
conviction scrutiny of forensic evidence with the possibility to refer a case 
back to the court of appeal if the forensic evidence relied on was found 
inadmissible and they believe that “a miscarriage of justice may have 
occurred”445. Some have argued that these “cross-border institutions”, should 
have the mission to scrutinize the reliability of scientific evidence that has 
been submitted in specific cases and decide whether the scientific theory or 
the application of this theory in the specific case, was unreliable446. These 
recommendations for post-trial scrutiny may be considered as a form of 
compensation for the relatively liberal UK standards for the admissibility of 
evidence and expertise in courts. They indicate an alternative way to address 
concerns of admissibility of scientific evidence. Their applicability in the 
competition law context could, however, be subject to doubt. First, the costs of 
false convictions in the criminal law field are much more important than the 
costs of type II errors in the enforcement of competition law, in particular in 
the EU, where there is no provision for criminal sanctions for competition law 
infringements. Second, their existence has been mainly justified by the 
“asymmetrical distribution of knowledge and means of proof” between the 
defendants and public prosecution in the context of a criminal trial to the 
benefit of pubic prosecution447. In contrast, in EC competition law, as it is 
recognized by the European Commission’s staff working paper on damages, 
“(c)ompetition cases are characterised by a very asymmetric distribution of 
the available information and the necessary evidence: it is often very difficult 
for claimants to produce the required evidence, since many of the relevant 
facts are in the possession of the defendant or of third persons and are often 
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not known to claimants in sufficient detail”.448 Such a process of post-
conviction evaluation under Daubert-like standards of scientific evidence will 
nevertheless offer the opportunity to transform the Daubert test from a “past-
oriented” analysis of the of a theory to a “future-oriented assessment of the 
falsifiability of the theory, without incurring the risk of opening widely the door 
to non-admissible scientific arguments. 
One could also argue that the gate-keeper role of the judge advanced 
by Frye and Daubert does not take sufficiently into account the need to 
guarantee both greater reliance on the scientific Method in addressing 
complex issues of facts and a more effective judicial decision-making process. 
The important point is not to examine if a theory is “formally” scientific but to 
determine “when it is rational to accept a scientific theory for the purpose of 
decision making”449. This highlights the need for a decision-theoretic approach 
in order to address the complexity of scientific evidence, in presence of 
epistemic asymmetry. However, it also leads to an inevitable blurring of the 
distinction between admissibility and evaluation of scientific evidence, as in 
such a setting, the “quantitative” assessment of how the verified 
consequences of a theory have increased our rational belief in its truth, which 
is inspired by the Hempel part of Daubert replaces the “qualitative” Popperian 
requirement of the testability of the theory450.  
The confusion becomes even clearer if one adopts a Bayesian 
probability approach, instead of a statistical frequency type of perspective. 
One important difference between the two approaches is that the frequentist 
view accepts only two outcomes: either acceptance or rejection of a theory, 
while the Bayesian approach essentially attaches a probability to a specific 
hypothesis, thus making possible a more nuanced assessment of the 
evidence. The Daubert rule essentially adopts a frequentist view for 
admissibility, as it either includes or excludes a specific theory for 
consideration. This may be appropriate in clear-cut cases of “junk science” 
and personal bias where there is no doubt that the theory presented is totally 
unfounded or the expert is unqualified. However, it is not an adequate 
standard in the greater majority of cases, where there is a suspicion of 
structural intellectual or other bias. It is also clear that a frequentist approach 
does not deal directly with the “science for litigation” problem, as in most 
cases litigation driven research fulfils the Daubert criteria and is then 
assessed in equal terms with independent academically created research. It is 
therefore important not to artificially distinguish between the admissibility and 
the assessment step but to address both issues together. After all, as Twining 
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has once observed, the focus should be on “information in litigation”, that is, 
“the collection, construction, processing, uses of and argumentation about 
information in respect of important decisions in the context of litigation seen 
as a total process”451. 
 
5.2. Assessment and sufficiency of economic expertise: the discursive 
ethos 
 
 The assessment of scientific evidence requires, as it is the case for all 
types of evidence, the evaluation of the strength of all arguments presented 
and the decision to attach a specific weight to arguments/theories implying the 
existence of different outcomes. Assuming the consequentialist nature of the 
competition law decision-maker’s task (as the use of economic evidence 
indicates that there is less place for a deontological-principled judgment), one 
could argue that if all evidence presented or induced from rules of general 
experience does not imply a specific outcome, it is important to determine a 
point where evidence will be deemed sufficient, in other words, the decision 
will be legitimate. This implies that the judicial decision-maker is not a passive 
receiver of economic expertise.  
One could distinguish two steps in this process. Initially, the decision-
maker assigns weight to any particular piece of economic evidence. This is a 
concrete analysis that takes into account the specific characteristics of each 
case. The issue of the standard of proof comes next: the quantity/quality of 
evidence needed in order to persuade a decision-maker that an allegation is 
true. This is an abstract determination, in the sense that it is determined ex 
ante for all cases or for categories of cases. 
 
5.2.1. Attaching weight to economic evidence as a filter for a more 
extensive competition law assessment 
 
5.2.1.1. The development of procedures requiring the weighing of 
economic evidence: summary judgments and the expansion of the 
plausible economics inquiry 
 
 In US antitrust law, the Supreme Court developed “an aggressive 
doctrine” of summary judgment which offers the possibility to pass judgment 
on the quality and weight of admissible economic testimony452. A defendant 
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may move for summary judgment and argue that no reasonable jury could 
accept as sufficient proof of an antitrust infringement (or some elements of it, 
such as the existence of an antitrust agreement) the economic evidence 
advanced by the plaintiff. The Court looks to the entire record and examines 
whether “there is no genuine issue, as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law”453. If the Court finds 
that the defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, then it enters a 
summary judgment in favour of the defendant.  
For a long time, summary judgments were “used sparingly” in antitrust 
litigation454. However, in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio, the 
Supreme Court employed the summary judgment doctrine in order to erect an 
additional evidentiary barrier to the plaintiffs455. In a decision drafted by 
Justice Powel, the Court declared that if “the factual context renders 
respondents’ claim implausible – if the claim is one that simply makes no 
economic sense – respondents must come forward with more persuasive 
evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary”456. In the 
presence of ambiguous evidence over the alleged conspiracy between 
Japanese manufacturers to a predatory pricing scheme with the aim to 
exclude their US competitors, the Court dismissed the Third Circuit’s 
exclusion of the summary judgment motion as it did not consider the 
plausibility of the inferences drawn from the existing circumstantial evidence 
and, in particular, the conclusions of the economic expert. According to the 
Court,  
 “if the factual context renders respondent’s claim implausible – if the 
claim is one that simply makes no economic sense – respondents must 
come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim 
than would otherwise be necessary”457. 
This additional hurdle to the plaintiff may be explained by the underlying aim 
of the Supreme Court to construct a restrictive interpretation of the concept of 
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antitrust conspiracy in order to limit false positives458. That has already 
appeared as a clear trend in the case law in a decision rendered two years 
earlier in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., also drafted by Justice 
Powel459. In both cases the Court found that the risk of false positives and the 
possible risk of deterring or penalizing “perfectly legitimate conduct460” should 
be seriously considered. This would be “especially costly”, because such 
behaviour “chill(s) the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to 
protect461” The Court thus required a higher standard of evidentiary sufficiency 
for the plaintiffs: 
“(t)o survive a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict,  
plaintiff seeking damages for a violation of § 1 must present evidence 
that tends to exclude the possibility that the alleges conspirators acted 
independently”462. 
The Court found that the risk of false negatives was particularly low in these 
cases463, in particular, as it assumed that a rational maximizer of profits would 
not conspire in the circumstances of the case464. The assumption of the Court 
may be subject to criticism. Justice White observed in his dissenting opinion 
that “in discussing the unlikelihood of a predatory conspiracy” the Court 
“consistently assumes that petitioners valued profit-maximization over 
growth”, but this seemed inconsistent with the factual record of the case, as 
the firms in question commercialised their goods while incurring substantial 
losses over a long period of time465. Other authors have criticized the court’s 
narrow focus on error costs, instead of error costs and information costs466. 
The assumption of rational profit-maximizer has since made heavy 
inroads in antitrust analysis, and same for the concern of false positives467. 
The broad implications of the Supreme Court’s position in Matsushita is that it 
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added a new “early exit route” in antitrust cases brought by plaintiffs with the 
aim to introduce a series of filters that would mitigate the important risk of 
excessive private litigation in the US, because of the incentives offered, for 
example, by treble damages, contingency fees and class actions468. This is 
particularly true for practices for which the calculus of the cost of type 1 
versus type 2 errors leans towards false positives, such as vertical restrictions 
or price-cutting behaviour. The requirement that the plaintiff’s theory should 
make economic sense requires from the judge a prima facie assessment of 
the economic arguments of the theory of consumer harm advanced by the 
plaintiff. 
The Supreme Court has nevertheless adopted a more restrictive 
approach in granting motions for summary judgment in situations where it is 
more likely that the alleged anticompetitive behaviour would cause consumer 
harm. In Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical services, Inc., the Supreme 
Court denied Kodak’s motion for summary judgment as the later failed to 
demonstrate that the inference of Kodak’s market power on the aftermarkets 
was unreasonable469. There was direct evidence of the capacity of Kodak to 
raise prices, in particular in view of the characteristics of the market: the 
existence of locked-in customers and high information costs470. The Court 
interpreted restrictively the requirement of plausibility of Matsushita: the 
plaintiff’s theory should be “economically senseless”, that is, non reasonable 
jury could find in its favour471. The moving party has therefore “a substantial 
burden in showing that it is entitled to summary judgment”472. The position of 
the Court may be explained by the low risk of false positives in this case. 
Contrary to Monsanto and Matsushita, the conduct in question led to higher 
service prices and market foreclosure and was “facially anticompetitive”, thus 
not creating any presumption in favour of summary judgment473. 
 The Supreme Court moved in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly even 
further towards a standard of increased scrutiny of the economic plausibility of 
the theory of anticompetitive effects by the close of pleading and before 
discovery (at the notice pleading stage)474. The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (FRCP) embody two conflicting sets of principles: Rule 1 
emphasizes that the Rules should be “construed and administered to secure 
the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action”, while Rule 
8(a) FRSP imposes to the plaintiff only a “short and plain statement of the 
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claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”475. The objective of this rule 
is to give fair notice to the defendant so that it can prepare for trial476. If, it is 
clear from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff cannot win, the defendant 
is entitled to file a motion to dismiss, according to Article 12 of the FRCP. For 
a long time, the Supreme Court had adopted a liberal interpretation of Rule 
8(a) and did not require the plaintiffs to set out in detail the facts upon which 
they based their claims. In Conley v. Gibson, the Court indicated that “a 
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears 
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim 
which would entitle him to relief”477.  The Supreme Court had subsequently 
declared that the same notice pleading requirement applied to antitrust cases, 
therefore not imposing a heightened pleading requirement for antitrust 
complaints478. 
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court considered that 
the “enormous” cost of discovery, in particular in an antitrust class action 
setting, and the possibility of discovery abuse which cannot be solved by a 
careful scrutiny of the facts of the case at the summary judgment stage should 
lead to a re-interpretation of Rule 8(a) in favour of the defendants479. The 
plaintiffs alleged that the four major local exchange carriers colluded to block 
competitive entry into their respective local telephone and/or high speed 
internet services markets. The plaintiffs rested their claims of antitrust 
conspiracy on the description of parallel conduct alone without bringing 
forward direct evidence of actual agreement or other plus factors480, in 
particular as parallel conduct could have had in this case alternative 
explanations481.  As it is rightly observed by Richard Epstein, “it seems clear 
that these allegations meet the requirements of Rule 8 insofar as they put the 
defendant on notice of the nature of the claim and place of the challenged 
conduct”482. However, for the Court, accepting such broad allegations would 
have the effect to increase claims brought with the aim to harass companies 
and force them to a settlement for fear of a long-term and costly discovery 
procedure. The Court reinterpreted Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules as 
excluding the possibility for the plaintiff to prove only one set of facts, thus 
reversing the favourable position of the plaintiffs in the previous case law. 
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Following Twombly, to overcome a motion to dismiss, there must be at least 
one set of facts in support of the plaintiff’s claims, but also, the plaintiff must 
plead the facts “beyond a speculative level” to plausibly claim that an antitrust 
violation has occurred483. Parallel conduct alone could not constitute a 
sufficient indication of the plausibility of an antitrust violation, in particular as 
there was no reason to infer in this case “that the companies had agreed 
among themselves to do what was only natural anyway; so natural, in fact, 
that if alleging parallel decisions to resist competition were enough to imply an 
antitrust conspiracy, pleading a §1 violation against almost any group of 
competing businesses would be a sure thing”484.  
In conclusion, the result of Twombly is that it extends Matsushita’s rule 
for summary judgment motions in an earlier stage of the case and transforms 
motions to dismiss to “disguised summary judgments”485. The Court/s 
decision did not consider the likelihood of error costs that might follow from 
such a rule (false negatives) and emphasized only information costs 
(discovery costs). The Court’s position is consistent with its case law on class 
certification where economic analysis has also made heavy inroads486. As a 
result of this case law economic analysis matters now at the early stages of 
the proceedings as the plaintiff should be able to bring forward a plausible 
economic story in order to proceed first to a class complaint then to discovery 
and finally to trial. The objective is to limit the risk of class actions and 
litigation costs for business as well as to filter the cases that arrive to the jury. 
These examples show that the current system has enough filters to avoid 
speculative and not sufficiently substantiated economic theories to be 
advanced in litigation. The admissibility step seems therefore redundant, 
including for the reasons advanced earlier on the difficulty to distinguish 
questions of admissibility from issues of sufficiency of evidence. 
 
5.2.1.2. How to determine the evidential weight of economic evidence? 
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A closer look to the case law also shows that, in practice, the evidential 
weight of economic theory varies and depends on the acceptability of the 
premises of the theory or the perception of its empirical validation by the 
judge. The judge’s perception is itself influenced by the relative 
weight/credence of the theory in the specific scientific community.  
The use of oligopoly theory in merger litigation may provide a useful 
illustration of this link. Both in the United States and in Europe, there are three 
broad theories of anticompetitive effects for horizontal mergers: the merger 
might lead to monopoly or dominance, it might lead to coordinated effects or it 
might lead to non-coordinated effects487. In the United States, the first and the 
third possibility are classified under the same category: that of unilateral 
effects, the main difference between them being that the analysis of mergers 
to monopoly draws essentially from the model of monopoly, while the analysis 
of mergers producing non-coordinated effects draws from oligopoly models. In 
all these cases the merging firms may find it profitable to alter their behavior 
unilaterally, following the acquisition, by elevating the price and suppressing 
output, by acting independently of the remaining firms488. It is only recently in 
Europe that unilateral effects that do not reach the level of dominance were 
included in the scope of EU merger control, following the adoption of a new 
substantive test, that of significant impediment of effective competition (SIEC) 
which expanded the EU merger control’s scope beyond the situations where 
the merging firms acquired a dominant position489.  
As it was previously explained, both unilateral and coordinated effects’ 
theories are based on Nash-Cournot, Nash-Bertrand equilibria models or 
auction models490, which make use of game theory in order to assess the 
likely anticompetitive effects of a merger. The main difference between 
unilateral effects and coordinated effects is that unilateral effects reflect a 
move from a static premerger Cournot or Bertrand equilibrium to a static post-
merger equilibrium induced by the merger, in other words, “this partial 
equilibrium approach assumes that rivals maintain their premerger prices or 
outputs and the assumption is that the post-merger game will continue to be 
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Cournot or Bertrand” (the assumption is that this is a single play game)491. 
Coordinated effects are based on a more dynamic model of “an equilibrium 
outcome of repeated interactions, where each interaction is just a play of the 
static Cournot or Bertrand game”492. The fact that firms interact repeatedly 
may enable them to realize more profitable and less competitive outcomes 
relative to what would have been the case in a single play game and also 
“affects firms’ incentives and ability to implement and sustain a collusive 
outcome”493. 
 A closer look to the US and European case law on these three types 
of anticompetitive effects illustrates that the respective weight accorded to 
qualitative evidence or quantitative evidence of anticompetitive effects, the 
latter including economic theory based inferences (including structural 
models) and pure empirical findings (in the sense of observations from natural 
experiments494), varies and is not similar in all three theories of 
anticompetitive harm495. 
In the United States, as well as in Europe, there is a presumption of 
anticompetitive effects for mergers to monopoly or dominance496. Once 
evidence is brought that the resulting merger will create a dominant position 
on the relevant market, it is more likely that consumer harm will follow, unless 
if there is the constraint of potential entry or if there are efficiency gains497. In 
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other words, qualitative evidence (increased concentration in the market) may 
be sufficient to prove anticompetitive effects absent any likelihood of potential 
entry or efficiency gains. 
 When coordinated effects are advanced as the main theory of 
consumer harm in oligopoly markets, both US and EC competition law impose 
a certain number of pre-defined requirements/conditions for the courts to 
conclude that evidence of anticompetitive effects is sufficient. Increased 
market concentration (structural presumption) is not enough. Further evidence 
on the ability of the merging firm to monitor the common policy, the incentive 
not to depart from the common policy and the results (impact) expected of the 
common policy is required498. These criteria were set out by the Court of First 
Instance (CFI) for the finding of a collective dominant position (the Airtours 
criteria)499. Since the CFI’s decision in Impala v. Commission, they can be 
proved either directly or indirectly by reference “to indicia and items of 
evidence relating to the signs, manifestations and phenomena inherent in the 
presence of a collective dominant position”500. 
These conditions essentially reproduce those generally advanced by 
economists who, most recently, have focused their attention on the 
“mechanism of coordination” between the merging firm and other firms on the 
market and pay less attention to structural factors such as market 
concentration, likelihood of entry, firm and product homogeneity, the extent of 
excess capacity, stability of demand or past evidence of attempted or 
successful collusion501. Recent economic theory is attached on the precise 
description of the means by which coordination would be implemented and 
sustained as well the identification of the conditions that would enable the 
coordination mechanism to be effective, which explains the difficulty of 
employing coordinated effects and the high standard of proof that the recent 
decisions of the Court of First Instance have imposed to the European 
Commission502.  
                                            
498
 On the “ability-incentive-impact” framework, see the excellent analysis of Alexandr 
Svetlicinii, “Exploring the role of legal presumptions under the ‘convincing evidence’ standard 
in EC merger control”, (2008) 1 Global Antitrust Review 117, 120, available at 
http://www.icc.qmul.ac.uk/GAR/Svetlicini.pdf . See also, in a non-horizontal context, EU non-
horizontal merger guidelines, [2008] OJ C 265/6  (ability, incentive and likely impact). 
499
 See, Case T-342/99, Airtours plc v. Commission [2002] ECR II-2585, para 62 : 
- sufficient market transparency to enable each member of the dominant 
oligopoly to know how the other members are behaving and to monitor 
whether or not they are adopting a common policy 
- the ability to sustain a situation of tacit coordination over time, i.e., the 
existence of deterrents to ensure that there is a long-term incentive not to 
depart from the common policy; and 
- the results expected by the common policy must not be jeopardised by the 
foreseeable reaction of current and future competitors, as well as of 
consumers. 
500
 Case T-464/04, Impala v. Commission [2006] ECR II-2289, para 251. 
501
 Janusz A. Ordover, “Coordinated Effects”, above, at 1363-1372. 
502
 Case T-342/99, para. 58-61; Case T-464/04, Independent Music Publishers & Labels 
Association (IMPALA) v. Commission, [2006] ECR II-2289, para. 247-248 & 525-528. 
  115 
In other words, the theory of coordinated effects is accepted as a 
possible source of anticompetitive effects and what is required by the 
plaintiff/competition authorities is to bring factual evidence that these three 
conditions are fulfilled in concreto, following what the theory of coordinated 
effects will operate automatically and will bring the decision-maker to the 
conclusion that the merger is likely to produce anticompetitive effects. Of 
course, this is not dismissive of the case as it would be possible to consider 
constraints imposed by possible entry or efficiency gains that would pass on 
to consumers. In other words, the theory of co-ordinated effects has an 
independent evidential value to the empirical evidence advanced in support of 
the likelihood of collusion between the merging firm and its rivals on the 
relevant market.  
 The situation seems to be slightly different with regard to unilateral 
effects. Although the competition agencies in the US and Europe have 
published guidelines spelling out the conditions for the unilateral (non-
coordinated) effects theory to build an inference of anticompetitive effects in 
differentiated product markets503, the courts have not yet explicitly accepted 
an independent evidential value for the theory. In the United States, theories 
of unilateral effects were advanced in cases such as Swedish Match504, 
Heinz505, Staples/Office depot506, Kraft General Foods507, United States v. 
Oracle508, Whole Foods509. In all these cases the Federal Trade Commission 
based its unilateral effects claim on a wealth of empirical evidence as well as 
on economic models. In practice, two methods are mainly used in order to 
assess whether a particular merger is likely to cause substantial unilateral 
effects or whether these are negligible. First, on could employ econometric 
methods, such as regression analysis, in order to identify the competitive 
interrelations between firms from past data and estimate the intensity of 
competition through diversion ratios in local markets. The diversion ratio 
measures how much the firm can profitably increase price and decrease 
output for one product when it owns another product which is consumers’ 
second choice. The calculation considers if the products are close or distant 
substitutes by looking to data such as marketing surveys, bid information, loss 
business reports, own-price or cross-price elasticities, if these are  known. 
The diversion ratio will then be used to estimate a post merger price increase. 
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The result should be complemented by a closer look to “post merger product 
repositioning, entry or efficiencies”510.  
Second, merger simulation models may also provide reliable 
projections of the effects of the merger on price or quantity for a short term (2-
3 years after the merger). Merger simulation is a method that estimates post 
merger prices based on pre merger market conditions and assumptions about 
the behaviour of the firms (such as short-run profit maximization) production 
technology (the nature of costs) and consumers (the demand functions for the 
product) post merger. Structural models, such as simulation, are designed “to 
capture the key economic elements of the real world, abstracting from those 
elements that are not crucial”, the choice of the key elements being 
dependent on the model specification511. The advantage of merger simulation 
is that it incorporates efficiencies as the model takes usually into account the 
extent to which the claimed efficiencies are likely to reduce incremental costs 
post merger. Indeed, simulation uses economic models grounded in the 
theory of industrial organization and in particular oligopoly theory. The model 
is partly based on data and partly on assumptions. For example, one of the 
first steps is to estimate market shares and own or cross-price elasticities of 
demand pre-merger from retail supermarket scanner data or manufacturer 
level data512. These estimated elasticities are then combined with observed 
data on price, quantities or market shares to calibrate the demand system. 
The calibration process involves some degree of subjective judgment as it 
essentially determines the parameter values of the model indirectly from 
“casual empiricism or unrelated econometric studies or are chosen to 
guarantee that the model precisely mimics some particular feature of the 
historical data”513. The second step of the simulation model estimates the 
price changes post-merger that would be consistent with the merged firm’s 
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maximizing profits for all the brands it owns, while it incorporates merger-
related costs changes and the likely reaction of competitors to the changed 
competitive environment.  
 A frequent criticism to simulation models is that they abstract too much 
from the actual details of the industry under consideration. The Antitrust Logit 
Model, which is employed in merger control, is based on strong assumptions 
concerning the form of the demand or the fact that firms are price setters, and 
its utility in complex data settings, when market shares premerger are 
asymmetric and there are post merger synergies, has been questioned514. 
There is also little empirical evidence of the accuracy of merger simulation in 
predicting the effects of actual mergers. The defenders of the theory argue, in 
a pure Friedman’s instrumentalist tradition, that “a model is properly tested by 
examining the accuracy of its predictions of economic outcomes rather than 
the realism of its assumptions”515. But even if one adheres to Friedman’s 
theory516, and it is clear that this is not the position defended in this study, 
there is the risk that behind the veil of “esoteric knowledge” of the economist, 
a crucial factor may be omitted, thus leading to biased predictions517 or that 
the process would be based on unquantifiable and incommensurate 
variables518. Unravelling the omitted factor will certainly be time consuming 
and costly, if this is to be done by an expert. Courts have also generally been 
more reticent to accept predictive evidence as opposed to evidence of past 
events or current events, and this affects the success of predictive 
quantitative methods, such as merger simulation519. 
It could be argued that in an adversarial system, the opposing expert 
may fulfil precisely this role. However, facing two conflicting experts would put 
the non-specialist judge in front of a difficult choice. In the “battle of expert 
witnesses” the Court must ultimately choose the most convincing evidence520. 
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Werden, Froeb and Scheffman propose, in order to address this problem, the 
definition of strict technical standards for the quality of merger simulation 
models, such as a strict application of the Daubert reliability screen for merger 
simulation that would require justification for every modelling choice, evidence 
that the theory has been applicable in the past to the industry under 
consideration and systematic sensitivity analysis of its impact521. This strategy 
is insufficient, according to Budzinski and Ruhmer, as “it cannot completely 
prevent that competing models with incompatible predictions, all of which fulfil 
these standards, are injected into an antitrust procedure by the parties”522. 
They add that the “political interests” of the experts may bias their models, 
without the later being necessarily of insufficient quality and that even if no 
distortions by biased experts existed, “it might be impossible to 
unambiguously identify the most appropriate model among the available ones 
due to them being all imperfect and possessing the same ‘distance’ to the 
underlying real case”523. In most cases the judge will solve this selection 
problem based on other empirical evidence, if available, such as the 
company’s documents. 
Oliver Budzinski and Isabel Ruhmer indicate additional problems for 
merger simulation. First, it is difficult and often impossible to collect the 
comprehensive and precise data that are required to calibrate the merger 
simulation; Second, one should take into account the possibility of non-
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anticipatable “structural interruptions” that will change post-merger the form of 
competition, for example, from Bertrand to Cournot and contrary to the 
assumptions of merger simulation model; Third, it is possible that the merger 
simulation will neglect non-quantifiable short-run and long-run competitive 
effects, (consumer sovereignty, innovative efficiency for the long-run or 
barriers to entry and exit or buyer power and brands for the short-run), which 
cannot be modelled or quantified; Fourth, they note the high costs of the 
procedure, in collecting data, employing experts, duration of the proceedings, 
the important notification and submission requirements that a simulation 
model will require in the notification phase of a merger524. 
Natural experiments also depend on some degree of subjective 
judgment from the expert, for example, in the choice of an appropriate 
economic model (e.g. Bertrand, Cournot, others) to set up the test for 
measuring the impact of the event on the relevant outcomes or for the 
“correct” identification of endogenous (as opposed to exogenous) variables, 
which ultimately depends on the choice of the economic model that is 
considered. Similar criticisms have been addressed to the accuracy of other 
quantitative methods in antitrust, such as critical loss analysis525 or event 
studies526. 
 One could also argue that the courts have not completely embraced 
the merger simulation tool when they assess evidence of anticompetitive 
effects527. The European Courts have been relatively silent on the probative 
value of merger simulation528, and they have not yet employed the theory of 
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unilateral effects to oppose a merger529. If the US antitrust authorities have 
embraced unilateral effects theory530, US courts have subject claims of 
unilateral effects to a higher standard of proof than coordinated effects. One 
could explain this cautious approach by the fact that the courts have been 
receptive to some uncertainty and questioning in the economic profession 
over the empirical grounding of the theory531. This is a paradox, as the theory 
of coordinated effects is more controversial, in economic theory, than 
unilateral effects532. An alternative explanation is that the formulation of 
unilateral effects theory is fairly recent, compared to coordinated effects, and 
this may justify the slow and low impact of the theory in the courtroom533.  
The Oracle/PeopleSoft case in the US provides an example of this 
cautious attitude of the judiciary towards the theory of unilateral effects with 
differentiated products534. The case involved a horizontal merger between the 
US software company oracle and its US rival PeopleSoft. The Department of 
Justice files suit essentially arguing that the merging entity will be able to 
increase the prices as well as lead to less innovation and consumer choice in 
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the market for business software, namely that for enterprise application 
software, based on the theory of unilateral effects. Part of the DOJ’s case 
relied on a narrow definition of the relevant market, which was based on 
evidence from customer witnesses, industry witnesses and economic expert 
testimony. Judge Walker, of the District court of Northern California, subjected 
the proof of a unilateral effects claim to four strict evidential conditions:  
“First, the products controlled by the merging firms must be 
differentiated. Products are differentiated if no perfect substitutes exist 
for the products controlled by the merging firms… product 
differentiation that goes to fairly fundamental differences in product 
design, manufacturing costs, technology, or use of inputs… 
Second, the products controlled by the merging firms must be close 
substitutes. Products are close substitutes if a substantial number of 
the customers of one firm would turn to the other in response to a price 
increase… 
Third, other products must be sufficiently different from the products 
controlled by the merging firms that a merger would make a small but 
significant and non-transitory price increase profitable for the merging 
firms. 
Finally, repositioning by the non-merging firms must be unlikely. In 
other words, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the non-merging firms 
are unlikely to introduce products sufficiently similar to the products 
controlled by the merging firms to eliminate any significant market 
power created by the merger”535. 
The Court required also from the plaintiff to demonstrate that “the 
merging parties would enjoy a post-merger monopoly or dominant position, at 
least in a ‘localized competition’ space”, which implies, if one takes into 
account the further analysis by the court of the risks of defining sub-markets 
and the court’s emphasis on marginal buyers’ only, that it would be very 
difficult for the plaintiffs to argue a theory of unilateral effects536. Because of 
the high risk of a narrow market definition the court observed that “a strong 
presumption of anticompetitive effects based on market concentration is 
especially problematic in a differentiated products unilateral effects context” 
and therefore “unwarranted”537. The high standard of proof to which the court 
subjected the theory of unilateral effects is also clear in the assessment of the 
different types of evidence advanced by the plaintiffs. The court seemed more 
inclined to be convinced by econometric analysis such as diversion ratios 
rather than by merger simulation or qualitative evidence (customer 
testimony)538, although it also made the general statement that “merger 
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simulation models may allow more precise estimations of likely 
anticompetitive effects and eliminate the need to, or lessen the impact of, the 
arbitrariness inherent in defining the relevant market”539. Indeed, econometric 
evidence proved essential in all other cases, where the court accepted claims 
of unilateral effects540. 
The position of the DC Circuit in Whole Foods indicates a trend 
towards the opposite direction541. The court of appeal reversed the decision of 
the district court, which had rejected the demand for a restraining order and 
preliminary injunction brought by the FTC in order to block a merger between 
two premium, natural and organic (PNO) supermarkets. The government’s 
case was based on the theory of unilateral effects, advancing that the merger 
will create a monopoly in eighteen cities where the two merging companies 
were the only PNO supermarkets. This contention was based on internal 
business documents that demonstrated the closeness of competition between 
the two merging companies and direct evidence (based on diversion ratios) 
showing that entry by other PNO supermarkets had greater impact on PNOs 
prices than entry by conventional supermarkets. The district court rejected 
these arguments, that were focusing on the effect of the merger to consumers 
that were buying only organic food and proceeded to a market definition that 
considered important the role of marginal consumers, thus including the 
conventional supermarkets in the same relevant market as the PNOs: 
“because so many people are cross-shopping for natural and organic foods 
and are marginal rather than core customers, the actual loss from a SSNIP 
would exceed the critical loss”, that is it will be unprofitable542.  
By insisting on the step of market definition, the district court ignored 
the possibility of proving unilateral effects directly, which was the point of the 
FTC. The court of appeal agreed with the district court on the need to define a 
relevant market543 but it also emphasized that core consumers, demanding 
exclusively a particular product or package of products, are in some situations 
“worthy of antitrust protection544”, therefore leading to the definition of a 
distinct submarket that could be affected by the merger. Indeed, these 
consumers “may be captive to the sole supplier, which can then, by means of 
price discrimination, extract monopoly profits from then while competing for 
the business of marginal consumers”545. This position influenced the 
evidential weight of the different methodologies applied by the parties’ 
experts: the court rejected the defendant’s expert conclusions, which were 
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based on critical loss analysis (focusing on marginal loss of sales) as these 
did not fit with the focus of the court on “core consumers”; in contrast, the 
critical diversion ratios focusing on the average behaviour of customers, 
employed by the FTC’s expert, were more appropriate in this case546. The 
court of appeal also found relevant evidence of industry or public recognition 
of the distinctiveness of the market in question, focusing merely on the 
company’s internal documents. The overall approach of the court facilitates 
the proof of unilateral effects, to the price, however, of employing the much 
contested concept of “submarkets”. 
 
5.2.2. The determination of the standard of proof 
 
The previous examples showed that examining the sufficiency of 
economic evidence is a complex task that includes different considerations. 
The courts seem to be influenced by the general acceptability of a theory, its 
established track record in the case law, econometric evidence such as 
diversion ratios, circumstantial evidence such as internal company 
documents, customer testimony or even the qualifications of the experts547, 
thus including elements that form part of the admissibility step in assessing 
economic evidence. The modularity of the standard of proof (standard of 
persuasion) in evaluating and weighing economic evidence seems also a 
superior alternative to the frequentist/categorical view. There are two different 
approaches in determining the standard of persuasion for economic evidence. 
The standard of proof may be conceptualized as essentially a probabilistic 
enquiry. This seems to be the position adopted in some of the most recent 
competition law cases of the European Courts, which employ the concept of 
“reasonable probability” or just “probability” when assessing the impact of 
cartels for the setting of fines on the basis of the gravity of the infringement548 
or when the dominant firm demonstrates “with a sufficient degree of 
probability” that the four conditions for the acceptance of efficiency gains, 
under Article 82, are fulfilled549. An alternative view will conceptualize the 
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standard of proof as a relative plausibility enquiry, which seems also to be an 
approach followed by the case law. 
 
5.2.2.1. A probabilistic account of standards of proof (persuasion) for 
economic evidence 
 
Taking a probabilistic perspective, Oliver Budzinski and Arndt 
Christiansen describe different forms of standard of proof for predictive 
economic evidence (from most to less difficult for plaintiffs to carry their 
burden of proof550).  
“(a) beyong reasonable doubt (certainty) 
(b) balance of probabilities (i.e. more likely than not, preponderance of 
evidence; (probability π › 0,5) [harm to consumers must be more likely 
than no harm] 
(c) considerable or appreciable effects (i.e. a more than negligible 
probability; e.g. π › 0.25 
(d) plausibility (i.e. not against logic and experience), 
(e) possibility (i.e. a positive probability; π › 0.551” 
The authors support standard (c) as the most adequate for economic 
evidence552 but they also advance an argument to “adjust the standard of 
proof according to the nature of economic evidence”, which will involve a “two-
sided standard of proof, encompassing some kind of mixed burden of proof or 
a qualified burden of proof”.553 They point out that “in this scenario, it would 
not be enough for the opposing side to raise doubts, instead, the opposing 
party would be obliged to present a reasonable and at least equally plausible 
alternative”554. They conclude that “this would allow for a level-playing field of 
competition between the affected parties on the merits of their models with the 
prospect of increasing the economic quality of the outcome”555.  
 This analysis constitutes a promising starting point. First, it integrates in 
the assessment of economic evidence the flexibility of differentiated rules, 
which could be set optimally, according to a number of criteria, so as to 
provide the adequate legitimacy to judicial determinations, in other words the 
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required level of confidence for a certain finding556. This could make possible 
the continuous adjustment of the level of sufficiency of economic evidence, 
according to past experience.  
Second, it offers the opportunity to develop different types of standards 
in each stage of the litigation process with the objective to economize the 
important costs of decision-making (costs of information gathering, processing 
and administrative costs: called direct costs). In an adversarial setting, these 
costs are mostly assumed by the litigants but also by the judicial system. The 
objective of the system is “to minimize the sum of error costs and direct 
costs”557. Decision makers employ a sequential information gathering process 
in order to reduce information costs.558 The decision to process more 
information is function of a trade-off between two types of costs: “error costs 
on the one hand”, costs of “wrong” decisions (false positives or false 
negatives), and “information costs on the other”.559 This decision-theoretic 
analysis is relevant and has been employed in order to explain the allocation 
of the burden of proof between the parties. However, setting the standard of 
proof (standard of persuasion) is a decision that cannot depend only on 
economic considerations, as, by definition, we do not know the real value of 
errors costs, assuming we know the probability of their occurrence. The 
concept of the standard of proof is profoundly interlinked with the issue of the 
legitimacy of the court’s decision: the adequate standard of proof should 
enable the court to reach a reasoned opinion which could be perceived, by 
the disputants or the broader community, as “a fair and consistent result”560. 
In the “two-sided standard of proof” model, whatever the standard of 
proof is for the plaintiff in order to prove an allegation, it should be equally 
easy or difficult for the defendant to disprove the allegation. For example, if 
the plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence, such as market shares in order 
to prove market power, the defendant should be able to rely on the reduction 
of these market shares in order to disprove market power. If the plaintiff brings 
direct evidence of market power (e.g. a critical diversion ratios analysis) the 
defendant should also be able to rely on direct evidence to disprove the 
allegation. If the standard of persuasion is plausibility, the standard of disproof 
should also be plausibility.  
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The recent decision of the Court of First Instance (CFI) in Impala v. 
Commission, annulling the decision of the Commission that cleared a merger 
between two of the five music majors, may be considered as the first step 
towards the institutionalisation of a “two-sided standard of proof”561. In 
applying the Airtours criteria, the CFI concluded that the Commission did not 
bring sufficient evidence that the market was not conducive to collective 
dominance and, in particular, its finding that the market was not transparent 
was not supported by specific data. The CFI pointed out that the alignment of 
prices together with other factors, such as power of the undertakings in an 
oligopoly situation, stability of market shares, could suggest, or constitute an 
indication, in the absence of an alternative explanation, that “the alignment of 
prices is not the result of the normal play of effective competition and that the 
market is sufficiently transparent in that it allowed tacit price coordination”562. 
In other words, the CFI required from the Commission to adopt a “two-sided 
standard of proof”. Even if the merger fulfils the Airtours conditions, the 
Commission should not adopt a clearing decision before it examines 
alternative explanations for the market conditions and possible signs of 
collusion. 
The determination of the adequate standard of proof for economic 
evidence could also be differentiated, according to the stage of the procedure. 
At the initial stage of private antitrust enforcement there is a “very asymmetric 
distribution of the available information and the necessary evidence” between 
the parties563. This may indicate that the standard of persuasion should be 
lower than the standard of proof in the assessment of liability at trial. In 
deciding to provide to the plaintiff the opportunity to collect evidence, and thus 
to use the discovery procedure, one could argue that the courts should just 
ask for evidence of a probable claim, certainly not the high standard adopted 
by the Supreme Court in Twombly564. It is also clear that, in order to pass 
through the summary judgment stage in the US, the plaintiff is facing a high 
standard of proof which resembles more to a considerable or appreciable 
effects standard rather than to a plausibility standard, despite the wording 
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used in Matsushita565. The preponderance of the evidence standard 
constitutes the default standard of persuasion in the trial stage of a case, 
which seems fair as it puts the parties to an equal starting point566. The 
criminal standard is beyond reasonable doubt567. 
In the European context, the standard of proof is still an unsettled 
issue568. Contrary to the US, where merger enforcement takes place in a court 
litigation setting, the European merger control system is based on an 
administrative process that takes place at the European Commission’s level. 
The Commission’s decision is subject to the judicial review of the Court of 
First Instance. In a number of cases, the Community courts have suggested 
that the Commission be subject to a standard of “convincing evidence”569. 
This is certainly not very helpful as an indication and somehow tautological, 
as it introduces a certain degree of subjectivity in the judgment of what 
constitutes convincing: what may be convincing for one judge, would not 
necessarily be convincing for another: everything depends on previous 
experience. In the European context where decisions are taken by a number 
of judges in chambers, without the possibility of dissenting opinions, it would 
be particularly difficult to predict ex ante what could be convincing. For 
example, if the judge did not have any economic training or familiarity with 
industrial economics literature or quantitative methods before, it is clear that 
he or she would be more inclined to see lions in Regent’s park than Alsatian’s, 
if one employs Lord Hoffman’s metaphor570.  
Parr and Burrows rightly point out that “the concept of standard of proof 
and the cogency of the evidence required for the standard of proof to be met 
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are two separate matters”571. The European Court of Justice has nevertheless 
the tendency to collapse the two concepts in one. For example, in Tetra Laval 
the European Court of Justice adopted some Matshushita language, noting 
that  
“..the quality of the evidence produced by the Commission in order to 
establish that it is necessary to adopt a decision declaring the 
concentration incompatible with the common market is particularly 
important, since that evidence must support the Commission’s 
conclusion that, if such a decision were not adopted, the economic 
development envisaged by it would be plausible”572. 
If plausibility is the standard of proof for mergers, this is lower than the 
standard of proof in US merger law at the trial stage of the procedure, or than 
the standard of proof in UK merger control573. However, in the immediately 
previous paragraph, the Court employs language that implies a higher 
standard than plausibility: 
“the prospective analysis consists of an examination of how a 
concentration might alter the factors determining the state of 
competition on a given market in order to establish whether it would 
give rise to a serious impediment to effective competition. Such an 
analysis makes it necessary to envisage various chains of cause and 
effect with a view to ascertaining which of them are the most likely”574. 
 The distinction between standard of proof and cogency of evidence 
may have inspired the position of the Court of First Instance towards non-
horizontal mergers. In Tetra Laval, the Court ruled that, “(s)ince the effects of 
a conglomerate-type merger are generally considered to be neutral, or even 
beneficial, for competition on the markets concerned […] the proof of anti-
competitive conglomerate effects of such a merger calls for a precise 
examination, supported by convincing evidence, of the circumstances which 
allegedly produce those effects”575. This positive presumption towards 
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conglomerate or vertical mergers576 “increases the burden of proof on the 
Commission up to the ‘convincing evidence’ standard”577. More precisely, 
notwithstanding the “perfectly symmetrical nature” of the standard of proof578, 
the cogency of evidence required for non-horizontal mergers is of a higher 
degree than for horizontal mergers: after all, it is more likely to see an Alsatian 
walking in the Green Park than a lion579. 
With regard to the standard of proof in Article 81 and 82 proceedings, 
one should distinguish between administrative proceedings and private 
enforcement. The concept of standard of proof is not known as such in civil 
law systems, which emphasize instead the principle of “unfettered evaluation 
of evidence” without any specific indication on the level of certainty that 
evidence must achieve in order to carry conviction580. The Community Courts 
have imposed the rather broad requirement of “sufficiently precise and 
coherent proof” for the public enforcement of competition law581. Parr and 
Burrows observe that, in practice, this approach “imports a considerable 
degree of flexibility, dependent upon the particular circumstances of the case, 
the allegation made and the nature of the evidence involved”582.  
There are different reasons explaining the flexibility of the standard of 
proof. First, the standard of proof is indirectly related to the standard of review 
performed by the courts. The Commission has traditionally been offered a 
little more margin of appreciation in matters of economic analysis, under the 
cover of the doctrine of “complex economic assessments”583. Advocate 
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general Tizzano may have been inspired by this view of judicial review when 
he suggested, in the context of merger control, that 
“(w)ith regard to the findings of fact, the review is clearly more intense, 
in that the issue is to verify objectively and materially the accuracy of 
certain facts and the correctness of the conclusions drawn in order to 
establish whether certain known facts make it possible to prove the 
existence of other facts to be ascertained. By contrast, with regard to 
the complex economic assessments made by the Commission, review 
by the Community judicature is necessarily more limited, since the 
latter has to respect the broad discretion inherent in that kind of 
assessment and may not substitute its own point of view for that of the 
body which is institutionally responsible for making those 
assessments”584. 
One could establish a distinction between economic facts and economic 
authority with regard to the intensity of the judicial review585, thus affecting the 
standard of proof required for each of these types of economic evidence. A 
possible distinction could also be established between economic evidence 
entirely based on past events (e.g. event studies) and essentially predictive 
evidence of a prospective nature based on particular future events or courses 
of events (e.g. simulation or theories of potential anticompetitive harm, as is, 
for example, most of the time the case when the anticompetitive conduct is 
exclusionary)586. 
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 Second, the standard of proof for economic evidence seems to vary 
according to the type of evidence (direct, circumstantial) or because of the 
existence of presumptions on the inherent dangerousness of the conduct for 
competition. For example, in his Opinion in Rhône-Poulenc, Advocate 
General Vesterdorf remarked that “considerable importance must be attached 
to the fact that competition cases of this kind (cartels) are in reality of a penal 
nature, which naturally suggests that a high standard of proof is required” and 
that “there must be a sufficient basis for the decision and any reasonable 
doubt must be for the benefit of the applicants according to the principle in 
dubio pro reo”587. The principle in dubio pro reo, enshrined in Article 6(2) of 
the European Convention of Human Rights, requires that “any doubt in the 
mind of the Court must operate to the advantage of the undertaking to which 
the decision finding an infringement was addressed”, in particular for 
decisions imposing fines or periodic penalty payments588. This is particularly 
the case in presence of indirect evidence of a concerted practice, such as 
parallel conduct, the Courts being relatively reluctant to infer the existence of 
a concerted practice, and thus requiring a relatively high standard of proof589. 
In contrast, when undertakings participate to meetings with their competitors, 
there is a presumption that they take account of the information exchanged 
with their competitors, if they remain active on the market, thus leading to the 
finding of collusion590. This different approach can be explained by the 
relatively important weight recognized to direct evidence of concertation in 
comparison to circumstantial evidence. The standard for the finding of 
collusion in the presence of parallel conduct is not, however, the beyond 
reasonable doubt standard591, although it seems to require a higher degree of 
evidential cogency, in particular because of the high risk of false positives to 
which the inclusion in the scope of Article 81 of situations of oligopolistic 
interdependence would have led. 
 Third, although less pronounced, in comparison to US antitrust law, the 
standard of proof varies according to the stage of the administrative 
proceedings. The standard of proof for the opening of the proceedings or 
                                            
587
 Opinion of AG Vesterdorf, Case T-1/89, above. 
588
 Case T-44/02 Dresdner bank AG and others v. Commission [2006] II-3567, para 60-61. 
589
 See, Joined Cases 40-48/73, 50/73, 54-56/73, 111/73, 113-114/73 Suiker Unie and Others 
v Commission [1975] ECR 1663, para 354 (a different explanation of the parallelism of the 
conduct may raise doubts on the existence of a concerted practice). 
590
 See, Case C-49/92 P Commission v Anic [1999] ECR I-4125, para. 121, 126; Joined 
Cases C-204-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P & C-219/00 P Aalborg Portland 
and Others v Commission [2004] ECR I-123, para. 81; Joined Cases C-403/04 P and C-
405/04 P, Re Seamless Steel Tubes Cartel: Sumitomo Metal Industries Ltd and Others v 
Commission [2007] 4 C.M.L.R. 16, para 47-48 & 51. 
591
 See, Case T-53/03, BPB Plc v Commission, [2008] not yet published, para 64, “(i)t is 
apparent from that case law that the Court must reject the applicant's assertion that the 
Commission must adduce proof “beyond reasonable doubt” of the existence of the 
infringement in cases where it imposes heavy fines”. 
  132 
sending a statement of objections is not clear in EC competition law592, but 
national competition authorities, such as the OFT in the UK, are required to 
have “reasonable grounds” for suspecting the existence of a competition law 
infringement593. In Claymore, the CAT distinguished three steps in the 
investigative proceedings of the OFT: the first stage is the investigation as 
such, the second stage is prosecution (Rule 14 notice) and the third stage is 
decision-making: the CAT imposed a sufficient evidence standard for the 
second and the third stage of the proceedings594. The CFI has nonetheless 
determined the standard of proof required in order for the Commission to 
grant interim measures prior to the finding of an infringement595 or the 
possibility for Community Courts to suspend the effect of a Commission’s 
decision on appeal (interim relief)596, which are, in both cases, lower than the 
standard of proof required for the finding of a competition law infringement.  
 With regard to private enforcement, there is no definition at the 
European level of the standard of proof required for the finding of a 
competition law infringement, the matter being left to the Member States597. 
There was a discussion in the Green paper on damages to lower the standard 
of proof for the issue of damages and causation, in comparison to the 
standard of proof for the finding of an infringement, as a possible means to 
address the informational asymmetry between the plaintiffs and the 
defendants598. This option was explicitly rejected by the European 
Commission599. The absence of a European framework leads to important 
differences between jurisdictions where the concept of standard of proof is 
known and jurisdictions which simply mention that evidence should be 
convincing; in practice, however, there is little difference between the two 
standards600. The UK courts seem to require a balance of probabilities 
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standard or a higher standard of proof in some cases for finding a competition 
law infringement601. A lower standard of proof applies when the courts give 
summary judgments602 or grant interim applications603. 
 In conclusion, the concept of the standard of proof offers a great 
flexibility in integrating economic evidence in competition law proceedings. 
Contrary to the all-or-nothing determination of the admissibility of evidence, 
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the standard of proof accommodates the inclusion, in the judicial 
consideration of facts and law, of all economic evidence that corresponds to 
the requisite standards of conviction in each stage of the proceedings. This 
does not mean that all economic evidence included will have an equal impact 
in the decision-making process. In practice, evidence is not evaluated in 
isolated pieces but, as Hock Lai observes “rather in large cognitive structures 
most familiarly in the form of narratives, stories or global accounts”604.The 
approach is holistic rather than atomistic and “judgments of plausibility are 
rendered not on propositions of facts viewed individually and in isolation”; “the 
truth of any particular proposition of fact will have to be assessed in the 
context of a larger hypothesis or story or narrative account”605. Kahneman and 
Tversky have shown the importance of “heuristics” and the tendency to fit 
information into existing “schemas” in order to fill in gaps and interpret 
evidence, rather than making probability statements on the basis of specific 
units of information606. The next section will advance a different perspective in 
the assessment of economic evidence, not based on probability 
 
5.2.2.2. Relative plausibility theory and standards of proof (persuasion) 
 
 The probabilistic view of the standard of proof derives from and 
accommodates an objectivist view of economic science. The relative 
plausibility theory departs from different premises, and seems a superior 
alternative if one adopts, as this study does, a more sceptical view of the 
“objective” nature of economic knowledge/science. Plausibility does not 
reduce to probability. This is even if the term probability is not meant in the 
statistical or frequency theory sense but is perceived as having instead an 
essentially epistemic nature. Hock Lai argues that “in the epistemological 
sense probability does not reside in the content of the believed proposition, as 
objective probability does, it is rather a measure of the extent of belief in a 
proposition”607. This conception fits relatively well with our approach of 
denying any claim of objective truth in economic science statements and 
perceiving them as a form of rhetoric that attempts to persuade a specific 
audience. The belief formed will not be categorical but partial: contrary to 
categorical belief which is “knowledge-oriented” (knowledge constituting the 
aim of all scientific endeavour), partial belief is “action-oriented”: it is the state 
where the quest for additional knowledge is excluded, the fact-finder 
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considering that the knowledge acquired so far is sufficient to justify this 
partial belief as a matter of practical reasoning. Nevertheless, the fact-finder 
adopts an approach of humility: she recognizes that her belief falls short of a 
categorical nature and she is ready to reconsider this belief in light of 
additional knowledge/information. The assessment of the evidence or more 
generally fact-finding should not therefore focus on probabilities but on the 
relative plausibility of competing hypothesis presented by the parties608. 
According to this theory, legal proof is a form of inference to the best 
explanation that examines the comparative plausibility of the parties’ stories609 
“ending in the question whether one is justified in believing (or treating) any of 
them as the true (or most plausible) account”610. 
 Such an approach has important implications on the integration of 
economic evidence in litigation. First, it renders redundant the separate step 
of admissibility of economic evidence. In order to decide on the probative 
value of evidence, judges “ought to consider the quality of competing 
explanations in the context of the case”; “the probative value of evidence will 
be determined by what best explains it”611. The process will involve two 
steps612: first, it is important to generate potential explanations of the 
evidence; second, it is important to select the best explanation from the list of 
potential ones (which will be the “actual explanation”)613. Choosing among 
competing explanations depends on the relative plausibility of each 
narrative/story, as measured by reference to a number of criteria: the degree 
of coverage (that is “the greater the portion of the evidence a story is able to 
account for the higher its plausibility”), the completeness/consilience of the 
story (it explains more facts and has less gaps)614, the coherence of the 
narrative (that is “the added quality of the individual elements integrating well 
together to yield a smooth and convincing narrative of events” and finally its 
probative force (that is “the positive support it receives from the evidence)615. 
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It becomes therefore clear that plausibility cannot be confined to a simple 
statement of probability, quantitatively determined as a percentage of already 
known “objective data” or universal objective frequencies, which would 
assume that all available explanatory hypotheses would be known by the 
court616. Rather it refers to the relative “strength of the explanation”, as 
determined by the “inferential interests of the decision-maker”617, the context 
of other evidence or other contrary explanations618. An inclusive rather than 
an exclusionary approach to economic evidence will certainly fit better to the 
importance of contextual determination that plausibility, as opposed to 
probability, entails. 
 Second, it facilitates the introduction of a two-sided plausibility 
standard. Relative plausibility requires an active participation of both parties in 
proving and disproving evidence. One cannot decide on the relative 
plausibility of a hypothesis before hearing the competing story/narrative. The 
parties should be able to advance their competing stories at each stage of the 
judicial decision-making process. The burden of proof will have a significant 
role to play in situations where both stories are equally plausible or 
implausible and it is difficult to differentiate among potential competing 
explanations. Pardo and Allen explain that “(i)f the proffered explanations truly 
are equally bad (or good), including additionally constructed ones, judgment 
will (and should) go against the party with the burden of persuasion” and that 
“(t)hrough burdens of proof the structure of civil trials thus assuages concerns 
associated with too few potential explanations”619. The two-sided plausibility 
standard is particularly well suited for economic evidence, where it is always 
possible to advance different explanations or causal linkages between 
conduct and actual or potential market outcomes. The issue of proving a 
concerted practice in presence of parallel conduct may illustrate the point. The 
case law of the European courts has focused on the presence of alternative 
explanations of price parallelism than collusion. Their approach is holistic and 
compares competing narratives. If an alternative explanation/narrative (e.g. 
simple oligopolistic interdependence) is more plausible than collusion, the 
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courts conclude that there is no concerted practice and therefore finds no 
infringement of Article 81 EC620. 
 Third, the concept of the standard of proof could be considered as a 
decisional threshold: if the fact-finder’s belief in the plausibility of a 
proposition, compared to another one, crosses a certain level, she must 
accept it621. The level refers to the degree of differentiation in plausibility 
among potential competing explanations, which would be deemed persuasive 
for the decision-maker. For example if the standard of proof (persuasion) is 
the balance of probabilities, a slight differentiation in the plausibility of an 
hypothesis A compared to a hypothesis B, A is a little bit more plausible than 
B, will be deemed sufficient to persuade the decision-maker that A is the 
“actual explanation”. If, however, the standard of proof is “clear and 
convincing evidence”, a slight differentiation in the plausibility of hypothesis A, 
relative to hypothesis B, may not be sufficient to carry persuasion that A is the 
actual explanation: “the explanation must be plausible enough that it is clearly 
and convincingly more plausible than those favoring the other side”622. In this 
case, even if hypothesis A is slightly more plausible than hypothesis B. 
Hypothesis B will prevail if the burden of proof falls on the party advancing 
hypothesis A.  
The level of the decisional threshold (e.g. balance of probabilities, clear 
and convincing evidence, beyond reasonable doubt) is determined according 
to some social policy objective: optimal deterrence or compensation for 
consumer harm, with always in mind the efficient use of administrative/judicial 
resources. According to economic analysis of law, “(t)he optimal standard of 
proof…should balance the social cost of false convictions … against the 
social cost of false acquittals and further, against the costs of errors must be 
weighed the costs of installing procedures to reduce the rate of errors”623. The 
magnitude of costs (real or perceived) will exercise an influence over the 
determination of the standard of proof. This theory may explain the reference 
to the “enormous” cost of discovery in antitrust litigation in order to justify the 
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adoption of a higher standard of proof for motions to dismiss in Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly624. It may also explain the evolution of the standards of 
persuasion and sufficiency (cogency) of evidence for a number of commercial 
practices, such as vertical restraints, following the Chicago school revolution. 
As it is well explained by William Page,  
“the problem of error costs is largely a product of the discretion of 
inexpert decision-makers in applying broadly stated rules. So long as 
practices like resale price maintenance and tying arrangements were 
perceived as simply monopolistic, there was little concern that juries 
might wrongly apply rules to alleged instances of a practice. The 
benefits of deterring the practices appeared to outweigh any costs of 
error associated with the vagueness of antitrust rules. The models’ 
identification of efficiencies associated with practices facially similar to 
those prohibited by antitrust rules has made the courts more aware of 
the potential for false positives in the application of the rules. It has 
limited the types of permissible inferences from ambiguous evidence in 
cases where ‘mistaken inferences…are especially costly, because they 
chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect”625. 
It is clear that substantive and procedural/processual issues are closely 
interlinked in competition law. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
There are important differences across legal systems on the way 
economic analysis informs competition law. The study explored the 
hypothesis that this divergence may be explained by three factors: (1) 
institutional dissimilarities regarding the administration of economic expertise 
in courts, (2) different perceptions concerning the role of the actors of the 
system (experts, judges) and (3) the role of scientific networks (e.g. schools of 
economic thought) and power relations in shaping the behaviour of the actors 
of the system. It is argued that the institutional and social framework of 
economic expertise has a particularly important role in shaping competition 
law doctrine. Procedural or substantives rules developed in order to organize 
the process of expertise and to mitigate the risks flowing from the epistemic 
asymmetry that exists between judges and experts. This inevitably influences 
the interpretation and enforcement of competition law. It is important also to 
recognize the “cultural” differences between lawyers and economists in 
envisioning their respective role in the process: practical reason and the 
principle of the administration of justice may set limits to the open-ended 
environment of scientific discourse.  
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At the same time, the analysis of the social context of expertise brought 
into light the “trials of strengths” between competing networks and schools of 
thought in economics. It also indicated the non-neutral, in the sense of non-
directional, role of the legal context of expertise in the evolution of economic 
research. Admissibility and assessment rules in the consideration of economic 
evidence may influence the perception of a specific economic discourse, not 
only in the sphere of the legal, but also in the economics community. The 
study relies on the assumption that the social context of expertise and the 
interaction between academic and forensic economists establish the 
existence of a link between the broad legal environment (the legal framework 
of expertise, its application in competition law) and the research agenda of 
economics. Disclosure rules for the methodologies used, or assumptions and, 
as much as possible, clear presentation of the arguments and the 
methodology followed may identify the different positions defended by the 
experts and may mitigate the risks of epistemic asymmetry. However, the 
adversarial process may provide incentives to discredit the expert, based on 
methodological grounds rather than on substantive conclusions. There is 
probably the need for a model that promotes discussion and consensus 
building (e.g. hot tub). We should abandon the view that expert witnesses (in 
antitrust proceedings) should be “neutral” and “objective” (a theory based on 
the educator and translator view of expertise, which does not correspond to 
current practice) and adopt instead the theory that experts are advocates, like 
lawyers: economic consultancies operate along with law firms for the defence 
of their clients. Interdisciplinary panels of experts and specialised courts 
would reduce the risks posed by the epistemic asymmetry between judges 
and experts. At the same time, it is contended that court-appointed experts or 
specialised tribunals will inevitably influence the incentives, role and 
behaviour of economic experts and could possibly lead to the emergence of 
more “middle of the road” economic expertise that would not be systematically 
and institutionally pro-defendant or pro-plaintiff. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
